PAPERS ON THE COGNITIVE QUEST FOR GOD

William H. Bernhardt

I. Religion and the Problem of Knowledge *

The primary task of the minister is not necessarily that of providing technically correct philosophies of religion for a given congregation. The congregation is a congeries of groups of people gathered together, for various reasons, into a loosely organized body. It is, therefore, a manifold rather than a simple organizational entity. Furthermore, the primary religious needs are needs of persons, not necessarily of groups. It is individuals who have guilt-feelings; it is individuals who feel the need for security and significance, even though these desires may be extended, symbolically, to the group. Salvation, no matter how it may be defined, apparently happens to individual persons, even though some participation in group activity may be a prerequisite.

If religion is not an anti-intellectual or non-intellectual experience, these religious needs must be clearly discerned and adequately interpreted. It is in this phase of his activity that the minister as religious leader, faces the problem of knowledge. If religious needs are real needs, which emerge in the process of human living, they may presumably be met more adequately if the interpretations of persons and their needs are adequately discerned and formulated. Furthermore, since man does not live in a vacuum, either social or cosmic, some relationship to the social and cosmic environment is essential. Here again, the problem of knowledge becomes important. Many, if not most of the religious failures are rooted in ignorance either of man and his needs or of the system of conditions within which his destiny must be achieved. The weird theologies developed in the fringe areas of conventional religion constitute a body of evidence which no critical thinker can afford to overlook when he ponders the relevance of right thinking to effective religious living. An intelligent control of religious thinking appears to be indispensable if religion is to make its contribution to adequate human living.

I

There is probably no universal problem of knowledge. All human thinking is relevant to specific problem-areas. This is true even of such abstract fields as mathematics and logistic. Mathematics is a deducative system, or congeries of systems based upon certain "elements, properties, functions and relations." As such, it is perhaps the most general of cognitive enterprises. At the same time, as applied to the investigation of natural phenomena, its relevance is always determined by locus and interest. The mathematical problem then becomes specific. Logistics, as Lewis and Langford define it, is restricted in its subject matter to the "principles which govern the validity of inference."[1] When logistics becomes functional in the solution of human problems, it must also become specific.

Even if one grants that in mathematics and logistics the problems are practically universal, it is a universality which is confined to the conceptual level.

* The Iliff Review, Vol VIII, No. 1, Winter, 1951

THINKING OF THINGS TOGETHER: A MEETING GROUP

William H. Poteat

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[illegible] This [illegible] social realm where religious problems emerge and where [illegible] must [illegible] whatever satisfaction is possible. Consequently, the problem of knowledge at the religious level must begin with the location of the problems in the field of religion as such.

Religion is the general name for a complex form of individual and group behavior designed to achieve and conserve specific values by means of a reinterpretation of human beings and determinate situations and the use of certain overt behaviors or techniques. There are at least three specific areas involved in the religious complex. There is, first, a function or functions. Religious institutions, in common with all other human institutions, developed to meet certain needs and continues to maintain itself because these needs still persist and because a sufficient number of persons believe religion serves them. There is, secondly, an interpretative or reinterpretative phase, or theology proper. The history of mankind's search for that in his total environment to which persons might relate themselves helpfully is a long and highly complex one. It is empirical evidence for the suggestion that Aristotle was not wholly wrong when he defined man as a "rational animal." The amount of human ingenuity and hard intellectual labor which has been devoted to the task of defining specifically the nature of man as a religious person, the nature and character of God, and the relations between them is probably second to none other intellectual task to the present at least. There is, thirdly, the area of religious techniques. The term "technique" is used to designate the complex of overt behaviors of individuals and groups whereby they seek to realize values religiously. This includes all that is commonly known as worship, both public and private in the broadest meaning of the term. The religious complex, therefore, can be analyzed into (i) function, aim or goal; (ii) interpretation or theology; and (iii) techniques or overt responsibilities.[2]

This three--fold analysis of religion suggests the possibility that the problem of religious knowledge is itself at least a three--fold problem. If we find three distinct phases in a given experience, we may expect to discover differences, either great or small, in the character of the problems which emerge at the intellectual level. As an institutional form of individual and group behavior designed to conserve and achieve values by intellectual and overt means, religion poses for the thoughtful persons problems at three levels.

II

Religion as institutionalized is one of the complex of institutions which constitutes a given culture. It may be defined, functionally, as the attempt to achieve and conserve certain values, individual and social, by specific means. Individual and social attempts to realize values give rise to institutions--defines as established orders, principles, laws and customs. Accordingly, religion is one of the complex of similar institutions developed in cultural history which is coordinate with education, law, the state, medicine, marriage, and any number of other identifiable established forms of human behavior.

The study of religion, at one level, is therefore an investigation at the institutional level of culture. As such, the methods proper to such investigation belong to what is called "social science." One will either use the

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methods previously developed, or invention ones which he believes are more efficient. The problem at this level belongs in the general area of philosophy of religion which should precede all other investigation in the field. This is based on the conviction that one must first determine the general area to which the term religion refers. The first course in the philosophy of religion will normally be devoted to the task of defining the extension of the term religion, or the functions which religion at the institutional level performs. Religious thinking, then, begins at the institutional level. At this level it will use methodology appropriate to social studies, namely, some of the complex methods known as "social science."[4]

III

The next level of religious thinking belongs to what we have called the Reinterpretational Level. This is the area normally spoken of al theological or metaphysical. It is called "theological" primarily be those who accept revelation as authoritative. It becomes metaphysics particularly among those who approach religious thinking from the philosophical point of view.[5] The term "metaphysics" is defined variously by these several thinkers, but in general it designates the study of the more inclusive factors involved in the Existential Medium, namely, the totality of entities, events, behaviors, and whatever else may effect man directly or indirectly More technically, it may be defined as the investigation of the categories, i.e. the most pervasive characteristics of the Existential Medium.

The primary problem at this level is the problem of God. Familiarity with discussions of this problem may lead to the conclusion that the problem involved here is simple. Discussions of the conception of God are normally confined to one or more of the following subjects: the nature of God; the existence of God as defined; the relation of God as defined to the world and man. Attempts have been made occasionally to dismiss some or all of these questions as irrelevant. George Santayana insisted that "religions as such will be better or worse, never true or false." Religion for him was an imaginative search for value, and its God--concepts were based upon imaginative rather than factual data. Others seek to obviate the problem of God's existence by defining God in such terms that existence is a necessary corollary. Wieman defined God, in an early work, as that "Something upon which human life is most dependent for its security, welfare and increasing abundance."[7] It is obvious that human life enjoys some security, welfare and increasing abundance. Consequently, it is unnecessary to prove that the basis for these exists. In his next volume, however, he defined God more specifically, and then he did so, faced the necessity of "testing" the concept.[8] This "testing" consisted in the attempt to prove that God as defined actually existed. It may be stated categorically that when God is defined in specific terms, the question of the existence of God-as-defined must be faced. To the present, at least, it appears to be impossible to evade the three-fold question of nature-existence-relation when one considers the problem of God.

There is a preliminary question, however, which must be answered before these three related matters may be considered intelligently. This preliminary question may be stated thus: To what class of realities does God belong? An analogy from physics may clarify the meaning of this question. When thephysicist is asked about the nature of his basic material, he may answer that "physics" is mainly the science of the transformations of Energy (Energetics)."[9] The physicist, in other words, has selected some phase of the universe about him and subjects it to critical examination. He confines his attention to energy and its transformations, and attempts to answer the questions which emerge from its consideration.

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He does not question the existence of energy, but begins with common sense experiences of movement, actual and potential, and subjects them to increasingly refined and complex analysis. The other sciences follow a similar procedure: they select given areas of the world in which they live, and investigate these areas as thoroughly as possible.

The religious thinker has no such clearly-defined field. He may not assume that the object of his study exists: no other inference may be drawn from the fact that he must prove its existence. Furthermore, religious thinkers disagree as to the data which may be admitted as valid for such prof. Some contemporary religious thinkers believe that Deity is a member of a class of essentially and absoluetly non-sensible or imperceptible realities;[10] others that Deity belongs to the category of perceptible objects. The latter group may be divided into those who consider Deity the creative source of value,[11] and those who consider Him the dominant phase of reality or controlling factor in all reality.[12] Each group selects a different phase of reality as its referent for Deity. As a result it accepts a different body of data as admissible in the investigation of this reality's nature.

The various schools of theological thought with their several divergent conceptions of God are thus the logical consequences of the selection of different categories for Deity. If one accepts as data only that which points to or is expressive of a realm of subsistent objects, he has by that choice determined in advance the general character of the conception of God which he will develop. Likewise, if he selects for observation and examination that which denotes or represents the dominant or controlling phase or phases of reality, he has by the selection of data likewise predetermined the basic character of the God-concept which will result from his investigations.

The answer which is made to the preliminary question of general class or category to which all God-concepts belong is thus of major importance in any investigation of the problem of God. The specific signifficance of such choice may become more evident by an analysis of some possible categories.

Two basic categories for Deity may be discerned in the literature of all religions. The first we shall name the Agathonic. The term "agathonic" is derived from the Greek word (to agathon), which means good in its kind or admirable, as that which is the source of value, worth or goodness. By agathonic we shall mean either that which is of use to or enjoyment by human beings or the source of that which is of use and enjoyment. There are many specific types of God-concepts derived and derivable from the adoption of this general class or category for Deity. Plato stated that God himself was perfect and changeless in character.[13] One of Plato's numerous successors in this tradition is C. E. M. Joad. According to Joad's early metaphysics, reality consisted in three levels. The first and lowest was matter, defined as an entity devoid of life or mind and exhoustively explicable in physico-chemical terms. The second level was Life, described as an indefinable principle which appeared in matter in some mysterious manner at an indeterminable time. Its basic character consists in a Protean thrust or impulsion.[14] The third level consists in value, defined in Platonic terms as that which is permanent, perfect and changeless. It contains all that may be designated, at its lowest levels, by the terms God may be used to symbolize this realm of value when conceived as one and individuated.[15]

From this point of view, knowledge of God cannot be obtained by an examination of either matter or life. Knowledge, according to Joad, is a matter of awareness, and awareness is defined as the directional activity of living beings accompanied by the convistion of immediate certainty.

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Thus all forms of knowing are forms of awareness; awareness of matter is called sensation; awareness of subsistent objects, such as thoughts, is called thinking.[16] Awareness at its highest level is called mysticism or the vision of God. It is a much rarer form of awareness than the two preceding types and those who possess it may be called 'sports' whose vision may guide lesser folk in their groping quest for light.[17]

Some persons, in other words, may catch glimpses of God directly in the mystic vision. Others may glimpse him indirectly and momentarily in the esthetic experience. The major source of information concerning God comes, however, from the experience of the mystics, or in more prosaic language, from awareness of the third level of reality, the realm of value. No information concerning God is directly attainable through sensation or cognition. To all logical intents and purposes, the whole spatio-temporal world is irrelevant in the cognitive quest for God.

Perhaps the most significant American theological exponent of the agathonic category is Henry Nelson Wieman. Like Plato, he insists that God did not create and cannot be held responsible for the creation of the physical universe. In one of his numerous public debates, he specifically denied that God created mechanisms. He defined a mechanism as whatever "has its parts externally related to one another," or as that in which " the natures of the several parts are not determined by their relations to one another." According to Wieman at that time, God may use mechanisms for the creation or the furtherance of values, but he is not responsible for mechanisms as such. This means that for him information concerning the nature of God is not derivable from the study of the astronomical universe as pure fact, or in its existential dimension. He believes that one must seek in the realm of value and value-making processes in reality for date concerning the nature of God.

The Agathonic approach to the problem of God thus presupposes that the term Deity refers to that in one's total environment which is the source of that which is of use, enjoyment and appreciation to humanity. The agathonic thinkers have accepted an answer to the preliminary question which determines, in a large measure, the specific answers they will make to the problems of the nature of God, his existence, and his relations to man and the world.

The second category for Deity which has found expression in the mythology and literature of religion may be called the Dynamic. This term is likewise a Greek deriviative and meant, originally, "to be able." As a category for Deity, it may be defined in terms of the power or powers responsible for human life and for its varied experiences. This category dominated the thought of primitive peoples. The Melanesians have a term, "mana", which they use to denote the power or influence which conditions human existence and which must be considered seriously if life is to be lived safely and significantly. "Mana," like the burning bush in the Moses saga, had to be approached cautiously. At a much higher level of human thought, Aristotle adopted the same category. In his search for an adequate metaphysics, he began with the observable facts of motion. He concluded that motion implied change or movement, and that movement implied both that which moved or underwent change and that which was responsible for movement or change. The distinction which Aristotle drew between motion and its source involved him in a process of infinite regression. In his attempt to break this interminable cause-effect sequence, he posited an ultimate Unmoved Mover as the final source of all movement.[19] He then identified God with this ultimate power whose existence was implied, according to Aristotle's logic, in the facts of immediate experience.

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Northrop believes that the facts educed by modern physics and the theories to which these facts are generalized compel us to accept the existence of a Macroscopic Atom, perfectly spherical in form, which encloses the vast field of micoscopic atoms itself and impresses upon them the order, intelligibility and other characteristics which they exhibit.[20] This Macroscopic Atom is then identified with God. God is thus the dominant or determining phase, atomic in character, of one's total environment, social and cosmic. He is finally responsible for the behavior of the microscopic atoms individually and for their various, if temporary, forms of structuralized relationships. James Bisett Pratt has populatized the term "Determiner of Destiny" for his version of this general category.

The effect of the adoption of the Dynamic category upon the character of the religious thinking is readily discernible. If God is the power which conditions existence, then the nature of that basic power is a matter of primary concern. The Melanesian natives were especially sensitive to all forms of power, especially that which was mysterious and little understood. Aristotle based his metaphysical structure upon the conclusions reached in his "Physics." Northrop presents his definition of God as the culmination of his study of science and first principles. The adoption of the dynamic category has as a logical consequence acceptance of a different body of data from that accepted in the Agathonic approach in the attempt to determine the specific nature of God.

This preliminary examination of basic categories has several important implications. In the first place, the category which one adopts governs the choice of date considered admissible in determining thenature of God. From the agathonic approach, the world-as-valued or the world-experienced-as-value constitutes the primary source of data. This realm of value may constitute a large or small portion of the world-as-known. No matter what its size, it constitutes the source of admissible data. All else is more or less irrelevant. From the dynamic approach, it is the world-as-experienced or the world-as-known which constitutes the source of data. The thinker who accepts this approach may not impose any value criterion as test of data-admissibility. His task is that of determining the nature of the dominant or determinate phase of his total cosmic medium. Consequently, the category which he has adopted does not permit him to exclude from consideration as admissible data any fact which presents itself. The only limit to his potential source of data are the boundaries which circumscribe the total realm of existential entities.

Both positions are subject to criticism at this point. Those who adopt the agathonic category are accused of being too highly selective in their choice of data. The criticism levelled at Kant and Kantians by Walter Lippmann is relevant here.[21] Kant failed to find an adequate basis for his belief in God in his analysis of experience by means of pure reason. Rather than change his belief in God, he accepted man's moral experience as absolute to provide him with the date required to support his belief. The more recent agathonic thinkers modify Kant's principle of selectivity somewhat, but the practical epistemological consequences are the same. Kant confined himself to man's moral needs; the contemporary agathonic philosophers extend this to include man's value experiences and the source of such experiences. Both, however, accept highly selective bodies of data.

The dynamic category is subject to precisely the opposite criticism. It includes such a vast body of data that the task of reducing it to meaningful proportions appears to some thinkers to be impossible. This criticism was voiced some years ago by Harry Elmer Barnes who maintained that any attempt to find a tenable cosmology or ontology in terms of scientific data was beyond

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the capacity of the humanmind.[22] Whether or not the criticisms levelled at the two categories are valid will concern us later; their primary importance at the moment is that they indicate the prescriptive function of categories. The adoption of a given category determines the nature and extent of the data considered admissible in the cognitive enterprise. The agathonic appears to be too restrictive; the dynamic too inclusive.

The second consequence which flows from the adoption of a given category fro Deity pertains to its effect upon religious values. The traditional attributes of God may be divided into two general classes: the moral-personal and the absolute or existential.[23] The first class includes those which belong to the realm of value, goodness, and character. The second class consists of those which belong to the realm of power, structure, being or existence. It is obvious of course, that the attributes of God which will eventually emerge from the agathonic approach belong to the moral-personal group. God will be so defined, specifically, as to become the most valuable object of human aspiration or contemplation, or as the primary sourceof such objects. There can be no question concerning this result. When one places God in the category of the most worthful objects known or knowable to man, the only admissible data are those which point to such object or objects. This means that God must be defined in value-categories since only value-data are considered admissible.

The attributes of God which emerge from the approach of the dynamic category are more absolute or existential in character. God as dominant phase or determinant behavior pattern of the existential medium [24] may not possess the list of value or character attributes which are found in the agathonic approach. Analysis of the total environing medium may prove that God possesses some or all of the moral-personal attributes which many consider essential to the nature of God. If critical analysis of admissible data warrants such conclusion, it will be accepted gratefully by those who adopt the dynamic approach. If, on the other hand, the facts which emerge from observation lead one to conclude that human values, as generally understood, are relatively unimportant in the local scheme of things, this conclusion may also have to be accepted. It will than be necessary for the contemporary thinker to adjust himself to a rigorous theology, one reminiscent of John Calvin and the Westminster Confession. It may be necessary for hi m to face the fact of God in much the same fashion that he contemplates the atomic bomb, with awe rather than sentimentality. It should be remembered, however, that religious values have been found in both approaches to God; they have not always been the same values, but they have served deep human needs.

The third implication is methodological in character. The adoption of a basic category for Deity determines, in the main, the method or methods which may be used inthe investigation of the remaining questions pertaining to the general problem of God. The prolonged discussion of the possible relevance of empirical methodology to philosophy of religion loses much of its significance in the light of this analysis. If God as possible object of investigation belongs to the category of perceptible entities, his nature is subject to investigation by empirical methods. The specific type of empirical method which may be used will have to be determined by further analysis of the dimensional factors involved, but the revelance of empiricism as such is no longer subject o question. If, on the other hand, one adopts Joad's category for Deity--as general name for an absolutely impercestible Realm--empiricism as method becomes impossible. God's specific nature will have to be determined by non-empirical methods--be rationalism, mysticism, intuitionism or revelationsm. This will be sufficient to indicate that the category for Deity which one adopts may preclude all use of empirical methodology and the perceptive processes upon which it rests.[25]

[illegible] at the two categories are valid. [illegible] before their primary [illegible] terms of the amount to that they [illegible] the presence of a function of [illegible] gories. The adoption of a given category determines the nature and extent of the data considered relevant in the cognitive enterprise. The age [illegible] those appears to be too restrictive for dynamic inquiries.

The second consequence which flows from the adoption of a given category for Deity pertains to the effect upon religious values. The traditional attributes of God may be divided into two general classes: the moral, personal and the absolute or substantial.[23] The first class includes those which belong to the realm of value, goodness, and character. The second class consists of those which belong to the realm of power, strength, being or existence. It is obvious of course, that the attributes of God which will eventually emerge from the agathonic approach belong to the moral-personal group. God will be so defined, specifically, as to become the most valuable object of human aspiration or contemplation, or as the primary concerned such object. There can be no question concerning this result. When one places God in the category of the most worthful objects known or knowable to man, the only admissible data are those which point to such object or objects. This means that God must be defined in value-categories since only value-data are considered admissible.

The attributes of God which emerge from the approach of the dynamic category are more absolute or substantial in character. God as dynamical phase or determinant behavior pattern of the substantial medium[24] may not possess the list of value or character attributes which are found in the agathonic approach. Analysis of the total environing medium may prove that God possesses some or all of the moral-personal attributes which many consider essential to the nature of God. A critical analysis of rationally data warrants such conclusions, it will be accepted probably by those who adopt the dynamic approach. If, on the other hand, the facts which emerge from observation lead one to conclude that human values, as generally understood, are relatively unimportant in the local scheme of things, this conclusion may also have to be accepted. It will then be necessary for the contemporary thinker to adjust himself to a religious theology, one reminiscent of John Calvin and the Westminster Confession. It may be necessary for us to face the fact of God in much the same fashion that he contemplates the atomic bomb, with awe rather than sentimentality. It should be remembered, however, that religious values have been found in both approaches to God; they have not always been the same values, but they have served deep human needs.

The third implication is methodological in character. The adoption of a basic category for Deity determines, in the main, the method or methods which may be used in the investigation of the remaining questions pertaining to the general problem of God. The prolonged discussion of the possible relevance of empirical methodology to philosophy of religion lose much of its significance in the light of this analysis. If God as possible object of human cognition belongs to the category of perceptible entities, his nature is subject to investigation by empirical methods. The specific type of empirical method which may be used will have to be determined by further analysis of the dimensional factors involved, but the relevance of empiricism as such is no longer subject to question. If, on the other hand, one adopts Deity's category for Deity—the general name for an absolutely imperceptible Deity—empiricism as method becomes impossible. God's specific nature will have to be determined by non-empirical methods—the rationalism, mysticism, intuitionism or revelationism. This will be sufficient to indicate that the category for Deity which one adopts may prejudice all use of empirical methodology and the numerous [illegible] upon which it rests.

The meaning of the term category which was implicit throughout the preceding discussion may not be defined. Categories, as indicated by the preceding analysis, denote comprehensive classes of entities, existent or subsistent, actual or ideal, real or imaginary, every member of which shares in a sufficient number of common characteristics to be grouped with others in some definite sense. Thus the category Deity means the general class to which all actual or possible entities or realities acknowledged to be divine belong.

Categories as this defined, are date-determinants, hypothesis-determinants and method-determinants because they define the general characteristics which all members of a given class must exhibit in order to be granted status in that class. When one classifies a given plant as a shrub, he circumscribes the areas he will investigate for data; he determines the nature of the hypotheses he will entertain; and, because of the two preceding commitments, he determines the character of the methods of investigation he may use. When one classifies endocrinology as a phase of physiology, he determines the nature and the extensionof his data--the human organisms and those related to it; he limits himself to certain hypotheses--those which pertain to the possible effects of glandular action upon given phases of organic structure; he likewise limits himself to certain methodologoes---those which can be used effectively with the data accepted as admissible to investigate the possible validity of the hypothesis considered possibly or probably true.

Categories then, as we are using the term, are data-determinants, hypothesis-determinants and method determinants. They are not to be identified with the Kantian categories defined as inherent psychic structures chich determine how we must preceive or conceive beaause human sensorium or understanding. They are, rather, methodoligical or linguistic devices which contribute to efficient definition and communication of meanings. As such, they serve both thought and action.

In the light of these considerations, it is evident that one must first clarify and vindicate the basic category for Deity if his further consideration of the nature of God is to be controlled by something other than unexamined and uncriticized assumptions. Important as categories may be in the connection, they are not sufficient in themselves They determine, among other things, the data considered admissible. After one has arrived at his basic category, it is then possible to collect and examine the relevant data. The results of such examination are normally made explicit in some concept. Concepts are thus general terms, but they belong to a different level of thinking than the categorical. Concepts may be defined as data-explicands; they denote, present, or make explicit the meaning or meanings derivable from the data circumscribed by categories.

Finally, there is still another level of thinking in the Reinterpretave area beyond the categorical and conceptual. It is concerned with the religious value or "availability" of the concept which emerges from the data made admissible by the category adopted. Stated in religious terms, it is the meaning of God for a worshipping individual or group. The God of each worshipper or worshipping group will be derived from some conceptual Deity, but will not be completely identical with the particular conception of every other person or group adopting the same general concept. An examination of the various God-concepts belonging to several philosophical traditions presented by Wieman and Meland some years ago will indicate the relevance of this observation.[26]

"Categorizing is the term [illegible] which was [illegible] the process by which [illegible] can not be defined. Categories are [illegible] by [illegible] preceding analysis. Hence [illegible] comparative [illegible] a criterion, [illegible] or [illegible], [illegible] or [illegible], [illegible] or [illegible] of [illegible] where in a sufficient number of common characteristics to be grouped [illegible] objects in some definite sense. Thus the [illegible] daily means the process [illegible] class to which all actual or possible entities in reality acknowledged in [illegible] divine being.

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IV

The third phase of religion suggested above consisted of Techniques. This term is used to denote the behaviors of persons and groups engaged in by them to achieve the values sought in religion. In traditional theological language, techniques include "ways of salvation," or "means of grace." Viewed in the light of the total religious life of mankind, some more inclusive term such as technique appears preferable to those developed in a given religious tradition It likewise suggests skill in religious living, something which would appear to be of primary importance. The list of techniques the world over is almost inexhaustible.[27] The knowledge problems at this level belong to the fields of individual and social psychologies. When one has defined the values to be sought religiously, and has accepted specific interpretations of man and God, then the question of efficient ways--modes of behavior--whereby these values may be realized, is before him. The specific types of behavior which are selected are determined first by the tradition to which one belongs, and secondly, to the success which attends their use. We are here in the practical realm of religious living, controlled of course by one's understanding of humannature and thenature of God. This is an area which has not been developed among the more liberal or recent movements in Christianity, but is nevertheless one of the most essential.

V

The cognitive quest for God is thus a complex one. It is too involved to be considered as a whole in one brief volume. We have considered the first, the function of religion in several articles,[28] and will have to content ourselves with the conclusions reached there for the present. We have considered the analysis of the religious problem at the categorical level of the Reinterpretative phase in a preliminary fashion in three articles which may be consulted for the approach to the problem of categories for Deity.[29] This analysis of the problem of knowledge in religion should clarify the issues which confront those who would "see religion steadily and see it whole." When we say, " I believe in God," we are making an affirmation whose complexity we overlook at our peril.

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1. Lewis, C. I., and Langford, C. H., Symbolic Logic, New York and London: The Century Co., 1932, p 3.
2. This analysis of religion is developed more fully in my "Preface to Theology," Religion in Life, Fall issue, 1932
3. A good summary of methods in this area may be found in Methods in Social Science, Stuart A. Rice, editor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931; or in the Fields and Methods of Sociology, L. L. Bernard, editor. New York: Ray Long and Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1934. Burgess, Ernest W., "Research Methods in Sociology," Twentieth Century Sociology, (ed) Gurvitch, G., and Moore, Wilbert E. New York The Philosophical Library, 1945.
4. An analysis of methods used in this attempt by contemporary students of the philosophy of religion was sketched some years ago in two articles: "Concerning Definitition," The Crozer Quarterly, X No. 4, Oct., 1933, 459 - 469; and "God as Dynamic Determinant," The Journal of Religion, XXIII, No. v, October 1943, 276-285.
5. Among those who approach the Reinterpretational Level in this manner must be included most of the important philosophers from Plato and Aristotle in the ancient world to C. Lloyd Morgan, Samuel Alexander, A. N. Whitehead, F. S. C. Northrop, E. S. Brightman, J. E. Boodin, Charles Hartshorne and many others. Theologians who adopt this approach would include F. R. Tennant, H. N. Wieman and others
6. Santayana, George. Reason in Religion, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, p 14.
7. Wieman, H. N. Religious Experience and Scientific Method, New York Macmillan Co., 1926, p 9.
8. Wieman, H. N. The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, New York; Macmillan Co., 1927.
9. Thomson, J. Arthur, Introduction to Science, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1911 p 105.
10. Cf. Joad, C. E. M. Matter, Life and Value, New York: Oxford University Press, 1929.
11. Cf. Wieman, H. N., in several of his works, and especially in "Can God Be Perceived?" The Journal of Religion, Jan 1943, and "Power and Goodness of God." Ibid., Oct 1943, The Source of Human Good, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946.
12. Cf, Northrop, F. S. C. Science and First Principles, New York: Macmillan Co 1931.
13 Plato, The Republic bk II, P 380
14 Matter, Life and Value pp. 375 ff
15 Joad, Present and Future of Christianity, New York, Macmillian Co. 1930 p 37
16 Matter, Life and Value, P 378
17 Ibid., pp 363 ff
18 Cf. "Faith and Knowledge," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1936) p. 774
19 The Physics, bks, vii and viii
20 Science and First Principles, New York, Macmillan Co., 1931 pp 120 ff., and 249 ff.
21 A Preface to Morals, New York: Macmillan Co., 1929, pp 136 ff.
22 The Twilight of Christianity, New York: Richard R. Smith 1931 pp 249 ff
23. Cf Brown, William Adams, An Outline of Christian Theology, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906, pp 102 ff.
24 By Existential Medium we refer to all that affects human beings either directly or indirectly. It is used throughout to designate all that in which men live, move, and have their being.
25 This fact was recognized by some of the men who participated in the discussion of Edwin R. Walker's article "Can Philosophy of Religion be Empirical?" which appeared in the Jounal of Religion, April 1939, but they did not take full advantage of it.

1. Lovejoy, C. E., and Greene, W. B., Philosophy Lives, New York and London, The Century Co., 1928, p 4.
2. This analysis of religion is developed more fully in my "Evidence to Theology," Religion in Life, Fall Issue, 1952
3. A good summary of methods in this area may be found in Methods in Social Science, Stuart A. Rice, editor, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931; or in the Fields and Methods of Sociology, L. L. Bernard, editor, New York: Ray Long and Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1934. Burgess, Ernest W., "Research Methods in Sociology," Twentieth Century Sociology, (ed) Gurvitch, G., and Moore, Wilbert E. New York The Philosophical Library, 1945.
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10. Ca. Mead, C. E. M. Matter, Life and Value, New York: Oxford University Press, 1929.
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12. Ca. Northrop, F. S. C. Science and First Principles, New York: Macmillan Co. 1931.
13 Plato, The Republic bk II, P 380
14 Matter, Life and Value pp. 372 ff
15 Joad, Present and Future of Christianity, New York, Macmillan Co. 1920 p. 77
16 Matter, Life and Value, P 378
17 Ibid., pp 383 ff
18 Ca. "Faith and Knowledge," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1936) p. 774
19 The Physics, bks, vii and viii
20 Science and First Principles, New York, Macmillan Co., 1931 pp 120 ff., and 249 ff.
21 A Preface to Morals, New York: Macmillan Co., 1929, pp 189 ff.
22 The Twilight of Christianity, New York: Richard R. Smith 1931 pp 249 ff
23. Ca Brown, William Adams, An Outline of Christian Theology, New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. pp 102 ff.
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26. Wieman, H. N. and Meland, B. E., American Philosophies of Religion. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1936.

29 Cf. "An Analytic Approach to the God-Concept," Religion in the Making, II No. 3, March 1942, 252--263; "The Cognitive Quest for God," The Journal of Religion, XXIII, no. 2, April 1943, 91-102; and "God as Dynamic Determinant," Ibid., 276-285

27 Heiler, Friedrich, Das Gebet, 5. Auflage, Muenchen: Verlag von Ernst Reinhardt, 1919, is an exhaustive study of one technique. The articles in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921, on such topics as "prayer" and "worship" also provide much material on various types of techniques.

28 Cf. my "The Significance of the Changing Function of Religion." The Journal of Religion, XII, No. 4, Oct., 1932, 556-570; "Concerning Definition," The Crozer Quarterly, X, No. 4, Oct., 1933, 458-479; " "Where Are We in Our Religious Thinking?" The Iliff Review, II No. 2 Spring, 1945, 224-234.

26. Wieman, H. N. and Jekund, E. E., American Philosophies of Religion, New York: Ginger and Brothers, Publishers, 1936.

29 Cf. "An Analytic Approach to the God Concept," Religion in the Making, No. 3, March 1942, 282-285; "The Cognitive Content for God," The Journal of Religion, XXIX, 2, April 1949, 91-102; and "God as Dynamic Personality," Ibid., 276-286

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28 Cf. my "The Significance of the Changing Function of Religion," The Journal of Religion, XII, No. 4, Oct., 1932, 556-570; "Concerning Definition," The Upper Quarterly, X, No. 4, Oct., 1933, 428-472; "Where Are We in Our Religious Thinking?" The BUC Review, X No. 3 Spring, 1945, 224-234.

II Philosophy in the Study of Religion

Josiah Royce, American Idealist of the past generation, proposed an analysis of religion and the place of philosophy in its study in an early volume entitled "The Religious Aspects of Philosophy" (1885). The primary task of religion was that of defining for men their duty; next, it must motivate them to do it; finally, it must "point out to them such things in the real world as shall help them to be steadfast in their devotion to duty."[1] He then defined philosophy as "a purely theoretic" discipline whose concern was that of defining for itself the nature of the real world, and to do so "it has to be perfectly indifferent to consequences....Theoretic philosphy knows no passion save the passion for truth, has no fear save the fear of error, cherishes no hope save the hope of theoretic success." (p.8). Religious philospphy shares with theoretic philosophy this interest in truth but accepts an additional responsibility, namely, that of exploring the nature of value. As he stated it, "It seeks not merely the truth, but the inspiring truth." (p.8). In its search for the inspiring truth concerning reality, it seeks first for that in the universe which may be of "Infinite Worth." If this cannot be found, it then seeks for that in this world which is "worth most." "It cannot make realities, but is determined to judge them."(p.9)

Royce located the philosophical interests in religion with reference to this analysis of religion. If religion's primary function is that of defining for men their duties, then it shares with philosophy an interest in "a moral code." If, furthermore, religion seeks for that in the universe which is of Infinite Worth or at least of highest worth, it shares with philosophy this quest for the "real" whose value may be determined once its nature has been discovered. With this analysis in mind, Royce organized his study of the religious aspects of philosophy about two problems: "The Search for a Moral Ideal," and "The Search for a Religious Truth."

From a sociological point of view, the late Emile Durkheim presented an analysis of religion similar to that of Royce. Religion, he wrote, "is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, which is to say, things set apart and forbidden--beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them."[2] Durkheim stressed two elements in his analysis: beliefs and practices. In the later phases of his discussion, however, he emphasized the function or significance of these beliefs and practices. All religions have one thing in common: the distinction between the profane and the sacred. "This division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought."[3]

The function of beliefs and practices was for Durkheim that of "upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and collective ideas which make its (society's) unity and personality."[4] He believed society to be

Hegel focused the philosophical interests in religion with reference to this analysis of religion. If religion's primary function is that of domining for man their duties, then it ensures with philosophy an interest in "social order". Furthermore, religion seeks for that in the universe which is infinite worth or at least of highest worth. It ensures with philosophy this quest for the "real" where truth may be defined once its nature has been discovered. With this analysis in mind, Hegel organized his study of the religious manifesta of philosophy about two problems: "The Search for a Moral Ideal," and "The Search for a Religious Truth."

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The function of beliefs and practices was for Durkheim that of "unifying and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and collective ideas which make its unity and personality."[7] He believed society to be

an economically self-constituting and self-creating being. Religion was one of primary institutions whereby this creative process was maintained at levels of high efficiency. Religious behavior was thus a complex form of group behavior designed to create and maintain social values by means of belief in the sacred and the performance of certain practices.

Consideration of analyses such as these, and many others, suggested the relevance of a formal analysis of religion which may serve as an analytic approach to the study of religion. The formal definition follows: Religion is a complex form of human behavior whose function or aim is that of achieving or conserving value or values by means of a reinterpretation of one's cosmic environment (Existential Medium) in whole or in part, and by means of overt or somatic activities or techniques. This formal definition includes three elements or phases which appear to be invariants in religious experience at all levels. Such formal definitions provide the student of religion with a convenient approach to the analysis of what is admittedly a complex and difficult problem.

I

For convenience, we may designate each of the three invariant phases of religion by a single term. The first is Function: The ends, aims, goals, purposes or values realized or believed to be realized religiously. The second is Reinterpretation, or the intellectual reworking of experience and the experienced world under the impulse of religious needs in order to define for oneself the nature of the objective referent--assuming its existence--of the religious response. Inasmuch as this intellectual reworking presupposes a common-sense of scientific understanding or interpretation of oneself and his world, it is better to speak of it has a reinterpretation. In this reinterpretation, many concepts emerge, from the "churinga" of the Australians studied by Durkheim to the "mana" of the Melanesians studied by Codrington and others, and to the Gods of the higher religions; from the "interior being" of the primitive Australian to the soul of modern man; from the protective and saving qualities to the primitive's "churinga" to the saviors of high religions. The reinterpretative phase of religions contains a large number of concepts believed to denote or designate available realities.

The third phase of religion consists of Techniques. Techniques may be defined as overt behaviors or somatic responses of persons to God or the functional equivalents in other religions. It is this phase of religion which includes the whole ritual or routine of religion; which made necessary, among other things, the development of the "holy man," priest or minister. Out of the necessity for correct technique and for collective support of one's beliefs, the specific institution known as the church grew. Reinterpretation and technique, designed to achieve, conserve, or promote religious values, may be viewed as the religious roots of the various religious institutions and the whole complex of relations with secular institutions so well presented in Joachim Wach's thoroughly documented "Sociology of Religion." The various fields which

[illegible] for a complex, form of study, [illegible] to [illegible] and an [illegible] means for means of [illegible] [illegible] and the performance of certain practices.

Phenomenological of analyses such as these, and many others, suggested the relevance of a formal analysis of religion which may serve as an analytic approach to the study of religion. The formal definition follows. Religion is a complex form of human behavior whose function or aim is that of conferring or concerning value or values by means of a relationship of man's cosmic environment (ideational ladder) in whole or in part, and by means of overt or somatic activities or behavior. This formal definition includes three elements or phases which appear to be invariable in religious experience of all levels. Such formal definitions provide the students of religion with a convenient approach to the analysis of what is admittedly a complex and difficult problem.

I

For convenience, we may designate each of the three important phrases of religion by a single term. The first is "numen." This means, simply, power, purpose or values realized or believed to be realized religiously. The second is "reinterpretation" or the intellectual reworking of experience and the external world under the impulse of religious needs in order to define for oneself the nature of the objective "numen"--assuming its existence--of the religious response. Lastly, we use this intellectual reworking presupposes a common-sense or authoritic understanding or interpretation of oneself and the world. It is better to speak of it as a reinterpretation. In this reinterpretation, many concepts emerge, from the "numina" of the Australians studied by Durkheim to the "mana" of the Melanesians studied by Codrington and others, and to the Gods of the higher religions; from the "interior being" of the primitive manifestation to the soul of modern man; from the primitive and saving qualities to the primitive's "charisma" to the saviour of high religions. The reinterpretative phase of religions contains a large number of concepts believed to denote or designate available realities.

The third phase of religion consists of Technique. Technique may be defined as overt behaviors or somatic responses of persons to God or the functional equivalents in other religions. It is this phase of religion which includes the whole ritual or routine of religion; which made necessary, among other things, the development of the "holy man," priest or minister. Out of the necessity for correct techniques and for collective support of man's beliefs, the specific institution known as the church grew. Reinterpretation and technique, designed to conserve, conserve, or promote religious values, may be viewed as the religious roots of the various religious institutions and the whole complex of religion, and as such, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] of the institutionalized forms in which they now exhibit themselves.

The investigation of religion, then, may be approached in terms of a formal analysis of the field. Some men are temperamentally fitted for the investigation of one area, others another area. When one views the field in its total complexity, he may well conclude that there is room for all types of temperament and for many kinds of intellectual interest.

Furthermore, the three-fold analysis of religion apparently forces one to a decision concerning the cognitive approach to the study of religion.[5] When religion is viewed as a simple, that is, non-complex form of experience, it is legitimate to ask the question: "What method or logic shall be used in religious thinking?" But when one confronts a complex form of human and cosmic behavior, he can no longer ask that question. He must first seek to analyse his subject into its several parts, and then determine what specific methodology is most appropriate in each area.[6]

II

The cognitive problems of religion may be approached from the point of view of any one of the three phases of the formal definition. At the same time, there appears to be some value in approaching them from the point of view of function. All human institutions exist, or did exist, for the purpose of serving some human need or needs. Thus specific needs have given rise to institutions called legal, medical, political, religious, to mention a few. They exist side by side in our various cultures. They may be distinguished variously. Thus one could distinguish the legal from the medical profession by observing that one uses precedents whereas the other uses drugs. A more natural distinction would be that of determining to what end or for what purpose precedents and drugs are used. This is, in my judgment, a proper mode of procedure in approaching the cognitive areas in religion.

Accepting under "acknowledgement," to use Lloyd Morgan's term, the institution--established orders, principles, laws and usages--called religion, we then investigate its specific nature to determine what specific contribution or contributions it has made and is making to those who practice it. This means that the problems at the functional level are normally confined to the broad field of social science, especially those areas named history, sociology and anthropology. The methods used in contemporary philosophy of religion are those normally used in the broad field denoted by the term "social sciences." The adequacy or inadequacy of the several methods used, and the ways in which they are employed thus becomes one of the major methodological problems in the philosophy of religion.

The significance of this problem may be observed by a

brief excursion into the psychology of religion. William James began his study of the psychology of religion by defining religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."[7] This theory of the nature of religion controlled his selection of data in his Gifford Lectures and led many others to adopt his method of "extreme cases,"[8] which tends to isolate individuals from tradition and society. Knight Dunlap defines religion as "man's attempt to do what he did not know how to do," and "to know that which it was impossible for him to know at the time."[9] These two instances are perhaps sufficient to indicate the determinative effect which the acceptance of a given definition of religion may have upon the several areas in theological education, and the consequent significance of proper methodology in the investigation of the nature of religion itself.

III

Reinterpretation, or the intellectual reworking of experience and the experienced world under the impulse of religious needs, represents the second phase of religion. It should be observed that the results of previous intellectual reworkings are constitutive elements in one's present religious experience, and that the interpretation of any given religious experience, significant or insignificant, will doubtless become a constituent factor in subsequent religious experiences. This represents probably the most inclusive and technical phase, from the cognitive point of view, of the whole religious complex. The significance of this statement may be indicated by the consideration of one of the problems which emerge here, namely, the problem of God.

The problem of God occurs at three levels: Categorial, Conceptual, and individual-particular. The term "category" as used here may be defined as "a comprehensive class of entities, existent or subsistent, actual or ideal, real or imaginary, every member of which shares in a sufficient number of common characteristics to be classified with the others in some definite sense."[10] Categories, so defined, are data-determinants: they determine the general area within which one may select admissible data in a given investigation. When one adopts "uebernatuerliche Maechte," as his category for Deity, as does Carl Clemen,[11] he has by that choice circumscribed the area from which data may be gathered and considered admissible. Everything relevant to supernatural Power is admissible; nothing else is.[12]

The relevance of categories to the cognitive quest for God may be further illustrated by examining a few contemporary theories. According to C. E. M. Joad, Deity belongs to the category of essentially and ultimately imperceptible realities. The reality which he would apply the name God is completely and irrevocably separated from matter and life and remains so eternally.[13] Henry Nelson Wieman, on the other hand, identifies God with the "creative event, which is "immediately accessible

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God with the "creative event," which is immediately accessible

to human living and human feeling in all the fulness of his concrete reality."[14] It is evident that Wieman and Joad have adopted quite different data-determinants as categories for God. One seeks for God in the concrete fulness of human living here and now; the other strives so to refine his highest form of awareness, namely mysticism, that he may catch an occasional glimpse of "the permanent, perfect and changeless" real to which he applies the name God. Still others, as for example, F. S. C. Northrop, adopt a dynamic category and views Deity as the dominant phase of the total Existential Medium.[15] One of the reasons, then, for the fifty-seven varieties of God-concepts found in America today is the adoption by different investigators of different categories for Deity.

Categories, then, serve as linguistic and methodological instruments whereby the extension of the term Deity is made specific and the data accepted as admissible for the further investigation of the problem are prescribed. But this is only the first step in the process whereby man's relationship with God is intellectually clarified and understood. The second level in the cognitive quest for God may be called the conceptual. We shall define concepts as general terms, less inclusive than categories, whose function is that of denoting, designating, presenting or making explicit the meaning or meanings which emerge from the investigation and comprehension of the data prescribed by the categories. Categories were defined as data-determinants; concepts may be defined as data-explicands. Categories prescribe data; concepts explicate them.[16] Thus the meaning of God which is implicit in the data prescribed by the category Deity becomes explicit in the conceptual formulations of the conceptions of God.

At the conceptual level one may change terms. At the categorial level, we have used the term Deity to designate the widest extension of the religious object. There is no real justification for making this distinction except linguistic convenience. There are many divine beings in the thought and practice of religious persons and groups the world over. In seeking for the greatest extensionality of the meanings which may be common to all of these conceptions, we need some inclusive term. Inasmuch as Deity is seldom used in the worship experience of the Christian whereas the term God is, it may be preferable to use Deity at the categorial level and God at the conceptual level.

Whereas many problems find their source at this level, two of them appear, at the moment, of primary significance. The first is epistemological, and is usually discussed in terms of "faith" and "reason," or "natural" and "revelational" theology.[17] Closely associated with this epistemological problem is the cosmological problem of the relation of Nature and the Supernatural. It is possible that these two problems are but two facets of the same basic issue, the initial attitude with which one approaches human society and the more immediate phases of his cosmic medium. It may not be a mere coincidence that Plato and Aristotle began their work shortly after the Atomic view of nature had been formulated by Democritus

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and Leucippus, or that modern Idealism took its rise shortly after Sir Isaac Newton formulated his mechanistic theory of nature. In the Platonic and in the Kantian tradition, knowledge gained experimentally was given a much lower rating than that gained by reason uncontaminated by too much observational data. In both traditions, nature was considered a human and divine footstool, and little more.[18]

The prescriptive character of the categories becomes operative at this level. If the category Deity includes within its extension only the "permanent, perfect and changeless" in reality, then certain God-concepts are precluded by definition. God as "creative event" cannot qualify; God as "Macrocosmic Atom" impressing order and form upon the world cannot qualify;[19] nor can God as "Dynamic Determinant," my own view, qualify.[20] Furthermore, Niebuhr's view of "The Holy Spirit as the spirit of God indwelling in man," cannot qualify.[21] Only that which may be included within the extension of the "permanent, perfect and changeless" can qualify.

The problem of the relation of God and the world, or nature, and the Supernatural, is likewise controlled, in part, by the prescriptive character of the categories. If, as it is assumed by some, Deity refers to that in the cosmic environment upon whom one is dependent for his religious values, then interest in the supernatural declines. Twenty-five years ago a revered teacher who had accepted this category could write: "The unknowableness of a transcendent being has now become a philosophical commonplace."[22] Now, with the current flowing in another direction, Erich Frank can close his study of philosophical understanding and religious truth with the statement that since God is not "of this world, it is not through reason, but through faith that we can have access to the Absolute."[23] The determinative nature of the categories is without doubt one of the primary problems in the study of the reinterpretative phase of religion.

No matter what the current interest may be at the conceptual level, the task is ever that of formulating the data considered to be admissible by the category adopted in a conception of maximal comprehensibility. This conception will be based upon a selection from among the mass of data made available under a given category. Furthermore, the selection actually made will be determined, in the main, by certain basic ontological assumptions. It is sufficient here to note that a given category normally provides a basis for development of many God-concepts having a given structure and reference, each of which may claim to provide maximal comprehensibility.

This brings us to the third or individual-particular level in the cognitive quest for God at the reinterpretive phase of religion. It is the level of psychsomatic or psychophysical prehension of God by the individual worshipper under the impulse of his religious needs. Eventually, the question of the "religious availability" of God must be raised with reference to every formulation at the conceptual level. There come times in the lives of men when they no longer speak of Deity or God, but

[illegible] in a work [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

of "my God." It is this phase of the reinterpretive problem which is normally of greatest interest in the church and least interest in the schools! Nevertheless, it is a problem which has a legitimate place in the study of religion analogous to that in medicine when a new theory of diagnosis or treatment is ready to be applied in actual situations.

It may be noted here that the God whom the individual prehends in worship[24] (or by whom the individual is prehended), is always conceived selectively with reference to the God conceptually defined. When the religious problem facing an individual is the oppressive weight of knowledge relevant to some vital issue, much of which he cannot comprehend, then God conceived in terms of maximal intellectual comprehensibility (God as omniscient, in traditional terms) is primary. He who has lost a beloved companion on life's highway will find God as the conserver of values, as a companion of the lonely way, the God whom he seeks. This is indicative of the tendency, necessary it would seem, to select or to emphasize different phases of the life of God as richly defined conceptually.

The process whereby we have moved from the categorial to the individual-particular level is one of increasing selectivity. The categories seek maximal extensionality so as to include all that belongs within the extension of the category Deity; concepts seek maximal comprehensibility of God defined in terms of the data prescribed by the categories, but conditioned by epistemological considerations which do not appear to be relevant at the categorial level; the particular-individual level seeks maximal availability of God in terms of personal need and aspirations. In the light of an analysis such as this, the exfoliation of concepts presented in the various histories of the philosophy of religion is understandable.

IV

This will be sufficient to indicate the nature of the cognitive levels in the reinterpretive phase of religion. We need to glance briefly at the third phase of the formal analysis, namely, the Technique phase. We defined techniques as overt responses or somatic behaviours. We refer, of course, to what are normally called "practices," worship, and the ritual or routine of religion. It is believed by many that this area is the most underdeveloped area in theological education. A recent survey of the ten theological schools of the Methodist church indicates that this is the case in that church.

The practical problem of providing better trained technicians for our churches and the development of better techniques both for public worship or private devotion is of high importance to all interested in the religious life of our times. The student of religion sees this as a problem in the area of individual and group psychology. Techniques are related to the function of religion--the goals which may be sought religiously as well as to the conceptions of God which one holds. If the goal of religion is that enhancing or enriching human

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life in terms of a shared quest for the highest values, then the general nature of the religious techniques will be predetermined. If, on the other hand, religion is concerned to relate individuals to God as "the Wholly Other," a different set of techniques may be indicated. This means that the study of the third phase of religion cannot be undertaking without careful consideration of the other two. The formal analysis of religion thus serves as a corrective and guide in the exploration of the several phases of this subject.

V

The study of religion means, then, the investigation of religion in each of its three phases: Function, reinterpretation, and techniques. The philosophy of religion will find its place in one or more of these several areas and their historical and sociological implications or expressions. Before its place can be determined, however, some conception of the meaning of the philosophy of religion must be developed.

In the thought of Josiah Royce, philosophy of religion was that phase of philosophy which was concerned with truth, and particularly with the "inspiring truth."[25] In this definition of the field, he was following the pattern established by Immanuel Kant, whose preface to the first edition of his "Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone," (1793) is still worth reading. Kant distinguished Biblical theology from "philosophical" theology. The former had two functions: That of caring "for the soul's welfare alone," and that of caring both for the soul's welfare and for "the welfare of the sciences."[26] But neither of these disciplines consisted in what for him was "philosophical theology." "Among the sciences, however, there is, over and against Biblical theology, a philosophical theology, which is an estate entrusted to another faculty. So long as this philosophical theology remains within the limits of reason alone, and for the confirmation and exposition makes use of history, sayings, books of all peoples, even the Bible, but only for itself, without wishing to carry these propositions into Biblical theology or to change the latter's public doctrines--a privilege of divines--it must have complete freedom to expand as far as its science reaches."[27] Kant thus distinguished philosophical theology from Biblical theology, which was much more inclusive then than now, in terms of the basic interests of each. Philosophy of religion or philosophical theology must serve reason; Biblical theology must serve the soul and the institutions of society. In more recent terminology, this means that theology and perhaps other phases of theological education owe their primary allegiance to the welfare of the individual person and the religious institutions, whereas the philosophy of religion must concern itself primarily with the investigation of the cognitive adequacy of the religious life.[28] The philosophy of religion may be based upon data gathered from many religions, including one's own, but it must not be determined in its conclusions, by either personal or institutional considerations, in so far as these can be excluded from one's consideration. Philosophy of religions must

V

The study of religion means, then, the investigation of religion in each of its three phases: functions, institutions, and techniques. The philosophy of religion will find its place in one or more of these several areas and their historical and sociological implications or consequences. Therefore its place can be determined. However, some conception of the meaning of the philosophy of religion must be developed.

In the thought of Jacob Boehme, philosophy of religion was that phase of philosophy which was concerned with dealing, not particularly with the "inspiring truth."[55] In this definition of the field, he was following the pattern established by Immanuel Kant, whose preface to the first edition of his "Religion Within the Limits of Human Alone," (1793) is entitled "Kant distinguished Biblical theology from philosophical theology. The former had two functions: the ending "for the sake of welfare alone," and that of ending both for the soul's welfare and for "the welfare of the citizens." The welfare of these dignities consisted in what for the philosophical theology, "among the ancients, however, there was one against Biblical theology, a philosophical theology, which in an esoteric manner to another tranquility. Among us this philosophical theology remains within the limits of reason alone, and for the confirmation and explanation of use of history, sayings, books of all peoples, even the Bible, but only for itself, without wishing to enter there upon additions into Biblical theology or to change the lawfully public church-use, privilege of divine--it must have complete freedom to expound as far as its science reaches."[56] Kant thus distinguished philosophical theology from Biblical theology, which was much more inclusive than this now. In terms of the legal interests of each, Philosophy of religion or philosophical theology must serve reason; Biblical theology must serve the moral and the institutions of society. In more recent terminology, this means that theology and religion either phase or the sociological education are their primary allegiance to the welfare of the individual person and the well-being institutions. However, the philosophy of religion must protect itself [illegible] merely with the immanentization of the objectives [illegible] religious life. The philosophy of religion may be based [illegible] such rational ideas [illegible] [illegible] must be determined by [illegible] [illegible]

be philosophical, that is, interested in a dispassionate quest for truth in all areas.

When it is said that the philosophy of religion must be "philosophical," it is recognized that there is much disagreement concerning precisely what is "philosophical". Our present purpose will be served if we may assume that philosophical thinking is that which is done by philosophers when engaged with the problems which are normally acknowledged to be "philosophical problems." This does not mean that all "philosophers" acknowledge the same set of problems as "philosophical" problems, but that any deviation from the historic pattern of philosophical problems must begin with that pattern, and that the area of problems cannot be said to have changed until a sufficient number of persons in the field who are acknowledged to be competent have accepted the changes, at least in principle.[29]

Among the basic interests normally acknowledged to be philosophical, three appear to have especial relevance to religious thought. They are epistemology, or the problem of knowledge; metaphysics or cosmology, or the nature of the "real" and its relations to the world and man; and axiology, often used for the problem of value. Every philosopher of religion may find himself, sooner or later, involved with each of these problems in his investigation of the several phases of the religious complex.

1. The epistemological problems emerge for the philosophy of religion at the functional level. As one examined various investigations in religion--in the Biblical, theological, historical or psychological fields--he discovers that each investigator finds it necessary to accept some theory of the nature of religion. If his work is religious in its orientation, it is evident that he must have some general conception of what comes within the bounds of his investigation. He needs a category as data-determinant to block out the area or areas which may contain admissible facts. Differences in the theories of the nature of religion soon become evident. The philosophically inclined investigator wonders why one student confines his attention to the lowest possible form of religions (Durkheim) whereas another examined the most extreme cases (William James, Wobbermin); why some insist that that only can be called religious which has a supernatural reference (Ott, Clemen), whereas others would say that religion must have a natural referent (Mathews, Smith, Wieman).

This leads him directly into the search for the methods used by these several competent investigators in substantiating or validating the views they have adopted. He soon learns that the methods used can be reduced, probably, to four: The Method of Agreement or Simple Enumeration; the method of Extreme Cases; the method of the Religio-psychological circle; and the method of Functional Analysis. He observes, also, that these methods are sometimes used under the vague generalization of "scientific method," without recognition of the fact that there are many "scientific" methods, and that some of them have little

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cogency whereas others have a great deal.[30]

2. In the reinterpretive phase of religion the area wherein many contemporary philosophers of religion find their deepest interest, the problems are related to a cluster of concepts: God, Jesus Christ, nature and the supernatural, man and society, reason and faith. In this area, one is plunged into the basic problems in epistemology and ontology, and here also, the relations between theology and philosophy of religion may become confused. It is possible, however, in the light of the analysis of the three levels in the cognitive quest presented above, to draw a rather useful line of demarcation.[31] We noted the problem at the categorial level was that of finding the extension of a given term, Deity. We may restate the task as that of finding the maximal extension of a term which would include the God-concept of the Christians and its functional equivalent in all the religions of the world. The problem at the conceptual level may be restated as that of finding the maximal comprehensibility in the God-concept of a given religion; and the problem at the level of the individual-particular is the maximal personal availability of the God defined conceptually. In this analysis of the general problem, the normal place to begin is at the conceptual level, the level of God-as-defined. One's interest may then lead him in the direction of the categorial level to determine whether or not the concept is based upon data which are drawn from a given category, and to question the validity of the category adopted. This is essentially a philosophical quest; as Kant stated it, an interest in the reasonableness of the conception without specific reference to its religious or institutional values. On the other hand, one may begin with the concept, and after satisfying himself as to its validity, may move toward the problem of its maximal availability to those in whose religious welfare he is interested. This is essentially the theological interest. It relates itself more directly with the needs of the pastor and people. The other interest is more philosophical. This does not mean it is necessarily divorced from value-considerations, but does mean that its effects are less immediate. As Whitehead observed, it may take hundreds, yes, even a thousand years for an idea of profound generality to become effective in human life.[32] The theologian, then, seeks maximal comprehensibility and maximal personal availability in his approach to God-concepts; the philosopher of religion seeks maximal comprehensibility and maximal extension or data-inclusiveness in his approach to the problem.

The philosopher of religion feels it to be his primary responsibility to move in the direction of maximal extensionability, to check his conclusions against the experiences of mankind, not only or merely against that of his own religious culture. The theologian shares this conceptual interest with the philosopher of religion, but recognizes it as his duty to move in the direction of maximal value to those whom he serves.[33]

Perhaps the primary reason for the tendency in philosophy of religion to move from the conceptual to the categorial level is found in the way in which categories are "deduced." If

II. In the redemptive phase of religion the sole warrant many contemporary philosophers of religion find their deepest interest. The problems are related to a cluster of concepts God, Jesus Christ, nature and the supernatural, man and society, reason and faith. In this area, one is plunged into the basic problems in epistemology and ontology, and here also, the relations between theology and philosophy of religion may become confused. It is possible, however, in the light of the analysis of the three levels in the cognitive quest, presented above, to draw a rather useful line of demarcation. We noted the problem at the categorial level was that of finding the extension of a given term, Deity. We may restate the task as that of finding the maximal extension of a term which would include the God-concept of the Christians and its functional equivalent in all the religions of the world. The problem at the conceptual level may be restated as that of finding the maximal comprehensibility in the God-concept of a given religion; and the problem at the level of the individual-particular is the maximal personal availability of the God defined conceptually. In this analysis of the general problem, the normal place to begin is at the conceptual level, the level of God-as-defined. One's interest may then lead him in the direction of the categorial level to determine whether or not the concept is based upon data which are drawn from a given category, and to question the validity of the category adopted. This is essentially a philosophical quest; an Kant stated it, an interest in the reasonableness of the conception without specific reference to its religious or institutional values. On the other hand, one may begin with the concept, and after satisfying himself as to its validity, may move toward the problem of its maximal availability to those in whose religious welfare he is interested. This is essentially the theological interest. It relates itself more directly with the needs of the pastor and people. The other interest is more philosophical. This does not mean it is necessarily divorced from value-considerations, but does mean that its effects are less immediate. As Whitehead observed, it may take hundreds, yes, even a thousand years for an idea of profound generality to become effective in human life.[3] The theologian, then, seeks maximal comprehensibility and maximal personal availability in his approach to God-concepts; the philosopher of religion seeks maximal comprehensibility and maximal extension or data-inclusiveness in his approach to the problem.

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Teaches the primary reason for the tendency in philosophy of religion to move from the conceptual to the categorial level is found in the way in which category is the "logical" or

categories are "data-determinants," that is to say, mark out the limits of data-admissibility, they are, in one sense of the word, apriori. They are presupposed when one begins to collect data, thus they must precede the utilization of empirical data. The category for deity, defined as the data-determinant which governs the admissibility of data which may be used at the conceptual level, cannot be supported, directly, by the examination of specific instances. It may be adopted either by postulation or deduction. If by postulation, then the question of its validity has merely been postponed, and may later have to be faced. If by deduction, then that from which it is deduced must first be established. In the case of the category for deity, we suggest that it is deduced, normally, from one's conception of the nature of religion. If religion is an attitude appropriate to some supernatural power (Otto, Clemen), then the category for deity will confine the search for data to the supernatural; if religion is devotion to the source of human good, conceived in terms of absolute immanence, (Wieman, Meland), then the data considered admissible in terms of this category will be found in the world of men and events.

It will be evident that these problems are closely related, on the one hand, to history, sociology and culture--in the attempt to determine the functional nature of religion as a cultural institution, and to metaphysics and epistemology--in the criticism of methodology and the development of metaphysics and cosmology. Furthermore they impinge consistently upon the problem of value. This is true because, hypothetically and provisionally, it appears possible to correlate one's interest in nature and the supernatural, reason and faith, with certain basic conceptions of and attitudes toward the more immediate aspects of one's Existential Medium, to which the name nature may be given.

The philosophy of religion, then, will find its place in the study of religion at those points where the methodological phases of epistemology becomes critical; where the cosmological interests are at stake, where men like Whitehead and Hartshorne in America and Alexander and Morgan in England have served so well in the development of systems worthy of utmost attention; and where problems of value emerge and demand attention. Here Urban, Perry, and Wieman deserve attention for their contributions to value theory in its relation to the Christian quest for the good life.

The relationship of the philosophy of religion to the other interests in the study of religion is another problem. We have indicated the way in which the relationship of philosophy and theology may be conceived. We have also noted by implication the way in which this discipline draws upon history and sociology for materials and guidance, and how in turn it may serve them by viewing their methods in the light of the epistemological field as such. The specific relationships to these and other fields requires further consideration. The present paper will serve, however, to indicate the general nature of the approach to such problems. It will have indicated, also, that the study of religion is itself so vast that the fullest cooperation of all fields will still leave much information to be gained.

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Boston, 1855, p. 7

[2]The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life, (Eng. trans. J. W. Swain, Glencoe, Ills. 1947, p. 47. First ed. 1915)

[3]Ibid., p.37

[4]Ibid, p.427

[5]"Cognitive" is used here to mean broadly what is generally known as "knowing" in its most inclusive sense. Cf. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, (1946), ch.I; Whitehead, A. N., The Function of Reason, (1929); Ledger Wood, The Analysis of Knowledge (1940), pp.16-24

[6] We are using the term methodology as "the systematic analysis and organization of the rational and experimental principles and process which must guide" an inquiry which deals with existent realities or functions of such realities. Greenwood, "Methodology" Dictionary of Philosophy, (1941) from whose definition the quotation comes, would confine methodology to sciences, or "the special sciences more particularly." This limitation is not necessarily valid. Analysis and organization of principles and processes, "rational and experimental" appear necessary in all investigations of man and his existential medium. Methodology is thus closely associated with "the ways of knowing," D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Religious Knowledge, pp. 9 passim employs the term in this manner.

[7] The Varieties of Religious Experience, (1902), p. 31

[8] Ibid., p. 3

[9] Religion: Its Functions in Human Life, (1946), pp. 287f. Whereas he calls this "proto-religion," it still controls both his selection of data and their interpretation.

[10]Bernhardt, "The Cognitive Quest for God," The Journal of Religion, XXIII, Ap. 1943, p. 92

[11]Grundriss der Religionsphilosophic (1934), p.3

[12]This use of the term "category" is similar to that of Ledger Wood, The Analysis of Knowledge,(1940), Chapter VIII. He defines a category as "a concept of high generality and wide application fabricated by the mind with direct or indirect reference to the experiential world and employed by the mind in the interpretation of that world." (Ibid., p152). An inspection of my definition, developed before I became acquainted with his, will show various differences but general agreement.

[13]Cf, his Matter, Life and Value, (1929)

[14]The Source of Human Good., (1946) p. 306.

[15]Cf. Science and First Principles, (1931)

[16]This view of the categories and concepts was presented in "The Cognitive Quest for God," The Journal of Religion, XXIII, Ap. 1943, pp. 92f. The relevance of categories to the problem of God was presented, in preliminary fashion, in "An Analytic Approach to the God-concept." Religion in the Making, II, March 1942, pp. 252-263. Ledger Wood, The Analysis of Knowledge (1940), chapter VIII, defines concepts similarly. However, we differ in the matter of the "deduction" of categories, and in the distinction between the "prescriptive" and the "explicative" roles attributed to them.

[17]Cf. Ferre, Nels F.S., Faith and Reason, (1946): Burtt, Types of Religious Philosophy (1939); Frank, Erich, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, (1945). The writings of the men associated with the Neo-orthodox school may be consulted for discussion of the relevance of faith and revelation.

[18]This distinction may be noted in Broad, C. D. Scientific Thought, (1923), pp. 155ff., and also in Whitehead, A. N., Process and Reality, (1929), pp. 180ff; Adventures of Ideas (1933), part II.

[19]This is Northrop's conception of God presented in the last chapter of his Science and First Principles, (1931).

[0]Bernhardt, "God as Dynamic Determinant," The Journal of Religion, XXIII, Oct, 1943, p. 276-285.
[1]Niebuhr, R., The Nature and Destiny of Man II, p.99
[2]Smith, G. B., Dictionary of Religion and Ethics, (1924)
[3]Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth (1945), p. 164.
[4]Cf. Whitehead, Process and Reality, (1929), pp. 334ff., for the way in which we are using the term "prehends," in a modified way. It is a term denoting a relationship between the worshipper and God which seems more appropriate than any other available.
[5]Cf. p. 68 above.
[6]Eng. trans. and notes by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson, (1934), pp. 7 ff.
[7]Ibid., p.8
[8]This general understanding of the nature of the philosophy of religion dominated the thought of many historians of the field: Pfleiderer, Otto, The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of Its History (sed. ed. 1883), I., 1f. Caldecott, A., The Philosophy of Religion in England and America (1901); Wach, J., "Religionsphilosophie," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, (1930); H. N. Wieman and B. E. Meland, American Philosophies of Religion, (1936). It is also characteristic of individual writers in various countries: Burtt, E. A. Types of Religious Philosophy, (1939); John Caird, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (1880); Carl Clemen, Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie (1934).
[29]Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, (1936) proposes a sharp delimitation of the field. Other points of view are presented in Collingwood, R. G., An Essay on Metaphysics, (1940); Emmett, D. M. The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, (1945); J. Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics (1941); Bergson, H., The Creative Mind, (1946); Whitehead, A. N., Process and Reality, (1929).
[30]Bernhardt, Wm. H., "Concerning Definition," The Crozer Quarterly, Vol. X (Oct., 1933), pp. 458-479; ibid., "The Cognitive Quest for God," The Journal of Religion, XXIII, No. 2, Ap. 1943, pp. 91ff, and "God as Dynamic Determinant," ibid., Oct., 1943, pp. 276ff.
[31]Cf. pp. 70f.
[32]Adventures of Ideas, (1932), p.220.
[33]It is interesting that both Kant and Whitehead reached conclusions concerning this phase of the work of the philosopher of religion at approximately the same age. Kant was 69 when he wrote Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), and Whitehead was 71 when he wrote The Adventures of Ideas (1932), which contains in the chapter on "The New Reformation," a good charter for the philosophy of religion.

THE TERM Absolute Transcendence is used to designate a widley held theology which stresses the otherness of God. Using the cosmos as a frame of reference, God is defined in terms which indicate his transcendence to the natural world, and to all that it contains. This transcendence may mean (1) spatial transcendence, (2) temporal transcendence, (3) qualitative transcendence or (4) epistemological transcendence. In every instance, the relation between the natural and the supernatural is one of discontinuity rather than continuity.

It is sometimes asserted that only one of these meanings is employed when God is said to be transcendent. Thus Emil Brunner stated that the transcendence which he attributes to God is primarily epistemological. Thus God may be present to both nature and history, but he cannot be known through any study of either or both.1 However, when one examines his view of human destiny, he is convinced that temporal and qualitative transcendence are implied. Furthermore, when we examine the basic assumptions upon which the logic of Absolute Transcendence is based, these differentiations in the meaning of transcendence will prove to be more or less insignificant.

To designate more specifically the type of religious thought we propose to examine, we shall list some of the better known men whose theology we have in mind. The Barthian group in Europe and their Neo-Orthodox adherents in America are both the best known and most extreme. Their writings are, in the main, extensive and excursive. Their obsession with the need for scriptural support for every statement they make, and their insistence that scriptural and traditional language is the only language in which theology can be written, makes their style prolix and diffuse. If one will spend an evening with the volumes produced by Karl Barth this tendency toward circumlocution will become painfully evident. Barth, Brunner and Paul Tillich are perhaps the best known Europeans;2 Reinlold Niebuhr is the most prolific of the American exponets of Absolute Transcendence, but he has many followers both in Great Britain and the United States. It is these men, then, whom we shall have in mind when we discuss the logic of Absolute Transcendence. Nels F. S. Ferre, though born in Sweden, was educated in the United States and is attempting to maintain the essential elements of Absolute Transcendence while at the same time using the language of Partial Immanence. How succesful he will be remains to be seen. The outlook is decidedly dark on the basis of what he has thus far produced. Gustav Aulen and Anders Nygren of the Lundensian school in Sweded are becoming better known to English students. Their divergencies from the positions of the men listed above is not significant so far as the logic of Absolute Transcendence is concerned.

It may appear paradoxical to attempt an analysis of the logic of Absolute Transcendence when its primary emphasis is a denial of the capacity of reason to reach truth in important fields.

* The Iliff Review Vol Vll, No. 1 Winter, 1950

In fact, D. C. Macintosh discussed this theology as a phase of "reactionary irrationalism."3 Nevertheless a "logic" characteristic of Absolute Transcendence more closely related to other schools of theological though than one imagines at first glance. It is this logic which we now examine.

The logic of Absolute TRANSCENDENCE ~~Immanence~~ rests upon the Law of Excluded Middle. This law as used here may be formulated as follows: Human life must achieve its pre-Fall status. If it cannot do so in "natural" terms, then its only recourse is to the supernatural. With this basic assumption, the method used in Absolute Transcendence is comparatively simple. Every evil found in personal life or society is attributed to human sin. All attempts at social reconstruction which stem from human or natural sources are judged by an absolute standard: I f they fail to reach perfection at any point, they are condemned. Finally, recourse is had to the scripture as a source o f Knowledge of God and as a guide to human action.

This type of logic comes to clear expression in Reinhold Niebuhr's work on the philosophy of history. 4 He begins with a refutation of the idea of history as a redemptive process, an idea held by many thinkers in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. It was believed that change was under way, and that all change was for the better. What this "better" meant underwent some change, of course. Niebuhr notes the following definitions of the term: To some it meant "increasing physical comfort and well-being;" to others it meant the unification of all mankind: To still others it meant the progressive democratization of all areas of life, and life in all areas: to still others it meant the growth of reason as dominant over natural impulses.5 More recently, there has been some agreement that freedom and rationality are the essential goals of history as a redemptive process. The growth of educational statistics and the spreading interest in the "common man" are indicative of this consensus. Virtue was believed to be a consequence of the achievement of democracyand intelligence. 6

We have observed an increase in educationin democratization. What are the results? Niebuhr answers this in his own inimitable way. Look at the mess in which the world now finds itself! What more is needed to provide absolute and complete refutation of the theory that history is a redemptive process? History for Niebuhr, is "not a realm of conflict."7 The conflict results from the rise of new"forces and forms of life," which challenge the old and established. There is also another conflict indicated by Niebuhr. It is that which grows out of man's relations to two worlds: the world of common sense, science and technology, and the world of thought, feelings and imagination. The first is the public world of events; the second the realm of personal appreciation and decision.8 There has been a steady development of knowledge and control in the realm of nature, but this has not been paralleled by comparable control in the sphere of the moral. Thus man finds it possible to do more things without at the same time reaching any clearer conceptions of the reason for so doing. He meets more people without at the same time entering into deeper fellowship with them. This is a suggestion presented with clarity and precision by E. G. Lee, in "Mass Man and Religion.

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History is the realm of the ambiguous: It gives evidence itself of no final goal, although it is over the scene of goals claiming finality. Meaning in history, for Niebuhr and the Absolute Transcendental school in general, means ultimate meaning. Since there is no ultimate meaning in history, and since it contains no final goal, history is rejected as non-redemptive. There is no redemption without finality and ultimacy for Absolute Transcendence. With this as the test of history, the result is not unexpected. History is dismissed as relative, unfinished, imperfect, and inadequate.

If history is not redemptive, where is salvation to be found? The answer is stated clearly by the men under consideration. There are but two possible sources from which help can come: From man and nature itself, or from God or the Absolutely Transendent. Man and nature having been proven inadequate, our hope is confined to God. And the God whom Niebuhr means is the God of the Bible. More than half of "Faith and History" is devoted to the presentation and application of the "Biblical" faith.

Barth, Brunner and others of this school use similar logics. They assume that perfection--the realization of unlimited possibilities--constitutes the goal of life. They observe, in the mean time, that everything is permeated with imperfections. Knowledge is relative; metaphysical systems are many, each claiming to be true and each asserting that without its use further knowledge is impossible. They observe the plans formulated which are presented as approaches to a higher life for mankind: The League of Nations, The United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact; they see various forms of goverment--monarchy, democracy, fascism and communism, each claiming to be superior to all of the others, and yet each bearing the marks of its own imperfections where every one may see them. Mankind, so they assume, was made for perfection, yet imperfection and worse abound.

This is also the logic of Recent Humanism. If God is, argue the Humanists, then man must be absolutely certain of His existence, and all evils must be removable within the foreseeable future. Yet when they look about themselves, what do they discover? Knowledge of God is impossible because of its very bulk, according to Harry Elmer Barnes;or man's knowledge of God is hypothetical and therfore relative, according to Walter Lippmann; or man stands in no need of God anyway,according to A. E. Haydon. Thus both the religious Absolutists and the religious Humanists agree that if God exists, the final fulfillment of human hopes is not only possible but inevitable.

But at this point agreement ceases. The Religious Humanist concludes that since absolutes are unavailable, there is no truth in the system of ideas presented. We noted the basis of this in a recent issue of this journal.[10] What does the Religious Absolutists do in the face of similar evidence?

Instead, in the words of the Ecclesiast, it "gives unto death so that final goal, although it is ever the same c. people dividing finality. Hence, in history, the relation and the Absolute Transcendental School in general, means ultimate meaning. Since there is no ultimate meaning in history, and since it contains no final goal, history is rejected as non-redemptive. There is no redemption without finality and ultimacy for Absolute Transcendence. With this as the test of history, the result is not unexpected. History is dismissed as relative, unfinished, imperfect, and inadequate.

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He assumes that the goals of God must find fulfillment, and that these goals include what we have here called perfection. If it cannot be found in historic processes, then it must be found in some tranhistorical situation. The same thing obtains in the case of truth. If there is absolute truth, an assumption made by the Absolutist, and if it cannot be found by means of human research and other methods of discovery, then God must provide men access to it in some other way. The way which these men accept as God's other method is revelation, and more specifically, the Biblical revelation. But method is not the fundamental question: Why assume that there is absolute truth, and that this absolute truth is a prerequisite to human salvation? Until this question is raised and insisted upon, the logic of Absolute Transcendence will maintain itself. If it is driven out of the scriptural stronghold, it will take refuge in the creeds; when these fall, it will take refuge in the "religious value of Jesus Christ," with the Ritschlians. Finally, with the Roman Catholic Church, it can take refuge in an infallible Pope. The basic factor in the logic of Absolute Transcendence is the assumption that there is an absolute truth without which life cannot achieve its higher levels, and that justice demands that it be available to us in some way. All other matters are secondary and peripheral.

Why assume the possibility of Absolute truth? The Absolutist believes he can justify this belief. In a recent book by E. C. Lee, "Mass Man and Religion," a book that won the United Nations Competition Prize of ten thousand pounds, a dirge is sung over the loss of absolutism in religion. Lee asserts that this loss has shaken life to its depths. With its removal, man lost his sense of worth, his feeling of individuality, and his personal dignity. He became "massman." He no longer lives, works and thinks as an individual; he thinks en masse, works en masse, lives en masse. The individual per se is becoming extinct; the mass is absorbing his meaning and his significance.11

These things have happened to man, according to Lee, because he has lost faith in any final direction for human living. Without an absolute goal of life, no moral demand can be absolute. If we do not know where we are going, how can we assume that any given change is absolutely right or necessary? Man no longer knows why he is here, why the world exists, or what his final destiny may be. That is to say, he may have theories which he accepts as half or more than half true, but no one of them is accepted as finally, ultimately, absolutely true. Under such circumstances, he takes refuge in the mass. At least, if he is headed the wrong way, he will not be alone in so doing! This is the situation, and this the reasoning which Lee believes produced mass man. What such men overlook, of course, is that those with whom they join themselves are as irrevocably lost as they are. The mass like the single individual, is also lost.

The solution which Lee offers is that it is necessary to restore faith in some Absolute. He does not believe we can restore the Absolute proposed by Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr and others since this assumes a world-view impossible for modern man .

In order that man, people or not, may live fully, and that human goals include work, he must have basic material provision. If it cannot be found in historic processes, then it must be found in some transhistorical situation. The same thing obtains in the case of truth. If there is absolute truth, on assumption made by the Absolutist, and if it cannot be found by means of human research and other methods of discovery, then God must provide man access to it in some other way. The way which these men accept as God's other method is revelation, and more specifically, the biblical revelation. But method is not the fundamental question: why assume that there is absolute truth, and that this absolute truth is a prerequisite to human salvation? Until this question is raised and insisted upon, the logic of absolute Transcendence will maintain itself. If it is driven out of the sort, that strong-hold, it will take refuge in the creeds; when these fail, it will take refuge in the "religious value of texts Christ," with the Traditions. Finally, with the Roman Catholic Church, it can take refuge in an infallible Pope. The basic factor in the logic of absolute Transcendence is the assumption that there is an absolute truth without which life cannot achieve its higher levels, and that justice demands that it be available to us in some way. All other matters are secondary and peripheral.

Why assume the possibility of Absolute truth? The Absolutist believes he can justify this belief. In a recent book by H. G. Lee, "Mass Man and Religion," a book that won the United Nations Competition Prize of ten thousand pounds, a charge is hung over the loss of absolutism in religion. Lee asserts that this loss has shaken life to its depths. With its removal, man lost his sense of worth, his feeling of individuality, and his personal dignity. He became "mass man." He no longer lives, works and thinks as an individual; he thinks en masse, works en masse, lives en masse. The individual per se is becoming extinct; the mass is absorbing his meaning and his significance.

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The solution yet in Lee's mind is that it is necessary to restore faith in some absolute. He does not believe in any restore this Absolute produced by Karth, Kierkegaard, Tillich and others since this version is unbelievable for modern man.

It must be an absolute which lies back of and beyond the myths and stories men tell to make moral demands meaningful to themselves. "What is the way out? The present spiritual difficulty, in the name of faith, demands a new exercise offaith. It demands that men should fight their way out of absolute claims. to an acknowledged truth above them."[12] There appear to be two affirmations in Lee's proposals. First, that men must have an absolute faith; but secondly, they dare not believe that they know what this absolute faith is, or what its source is. What men need is a "poise of spirit, a withholding of conviction from what is obviously temporal, and yet a reserve of conviction flung into what is eternal and universal."[13]

Stated in other language, the justification which is offered for the assumption that there isabsolute truth and absolute justice is that men need such belief if they are to remain men. It constitutes an absolute claim made by men upon the sources of their being for that which will permit them to remain human and humane. Despite any criticism one may offer of those who hold to the theory of Absolute Transcendence, he must admit that they are concerned with what they firmly believe to be the "crisis of our age." Any sttempt tosweep them aside as "reactionary irrationalists" cannot be taken seriously, at least not with reference to the leadership if the movement. They are thoroughly convinced that humanityis lost, in a personal and ultimate sense, and that its recovery of an absolute sense of moral direction. Relativity, so they claim, in so far as knowledge of the ultimate nature of things is concerned, is an ompossible basis for the maintenanceof human dignity and worth.

It is possible to understand this logic of Absolute Transcendence. It is recognized that human life at a relatively high level assumes the possession by persons of a given quantum of security and sighificance. These values were possible to men in a rural society in close and intimate relationships of family and community life. Families themselves were large; they supplied most if not all of their own food, clothing, shelter and even their own social life. In the neighborhood where they lived was the cemetery, its crude stones marking the passing generations, and the babes in arms symbolizing the coming and future generations. Security and signifficiance were there. There was continuity in the land one owned and cultivated; in the stable community life; in the family life spanning the three or more generations living under one roof. The very form of human existence made possible a rather high degree of security.

There was significance, also. The family had often cut its own farm out of the wilderness, or dug out the stones and built fences with them which encircled their livestock or protected their gardens. It was "our" family which did this; which built the homes, and dug the wills, and built the fences. Next door, half a mile or so away, dwelt another family which had done similar things on a comparable piece of ground. Together they built the school-house, the church, and the roads leading to them and to the markets.

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[illegible] to an [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Each individual and each family had a place in the community; each had literally built itself into the life and landscape about it. Significance, defined as status in the life and thought of others, found a natural home in such a culture.

This type of social life served as a matrix, also, for the growth and maintenance of the conception of an ultimate and unchanging goal for human life. The unchanging, or at least hardly perceptable changing of life of the times produced a mentality adjusted to permanence and finality. Thus the idea of an absolute truth embedded in a revealed Scripture, could maintain itself with little difficulty. It was the change to a dynamic culture by the industrial revolution in the past two centuries, and the consequent mobility of mankind, which produced the "new mentality." A mentality which accepts change, modification, revision, and invention as the basic characteristic ofreality. It is this change, with the concomitant expansion of the areas of tension in the modern world, which present to the Absolutist his problem. We can now reformulate it: How can one find the poise and serenity presumably normal in a static culture in a highly dynamic and competitive society? Like the ancient prophets, modern Absolutists would call men "back" to the ancient ways.

The Absolutist is fighting a real battle. Any man who fails to recognize the reality of the difficulty which they confront is actually more blind than they are. They are not concerned, primarily, with saving either the authority of scripture or the finality of traditional doctrines. They seek to save them becouse they believe that only through the Biblical tradition can individuals find security and significance, and cultures rise out of the morass engulfing them. To miss this interest of Absolutism in religious thought is to miss what is essential to it.

The rise of modern Absolute Transcendence and its growth f followed rather closely upon the rise and spread of absolutism in economic and political fields. Karl Marx devoted himself to the development of an absolute ethic for the poor and dispossessed when the effects of industrialization and increasing mobility became evident in the late nineteenth century. The loss of security and significance was felt more quickly in these realms than in the ethical and religious, and the reaction to it occurred earlier. Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany, as well as Communism in Russia, were later and overt responses to the same situation. Even the progressive socialization of western Europe and England appear to be oriented toward the same problem. The distinctive characteristic in each case is the same: The economic security and the sense of personal worth found in large families and an agricultural economy were gone or going rapidly, and men sought desperately for some mew foundations for human life.[15]

The logic of Absolute Transcendence is the logic of every absolutism of the present day. As such, it cannot be met by "logic- chopping," by purely academic criticism, or by pointing to more adequate interpretations of the crisis and to more efficient ways of meeting it.

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That mankind is facing a major crisis as a result of the emergence of new and revolutionary forces which are shaking the foundations of personal security and personal worth is evident to ever observant person. But this observation of itself does not justify the logic of Absolute Transcendence, or for that matter, of any other absolutism of our day. The adequacy of the Absolutist logic may be determined by raising two questions: (i) Is the specific logic of Absolute Transcendence necessary? (ii) If so, how feasible or possible is it? The second question may need some explication or justification. Granted that cancer is a source of danger to human survival, at least, at certain ages, and that a cure for it is necessary, if we are to live long and well, we still face the question: Can we find a cure for it, or must we adjust ourselves to relatively adequate healthand happiness in a world where cancer obtains?[16] One may thus agree with the Absolutists that some further basis for human life needs to be found in this highly dynamic age without at the same time accepting their specific solution to the problem. It is not enough to point to a desired goal. One must then consider the possibility of its achievement in whole or in significant part.

The first assertion of Absolute Transcendence concerns the nature of man's historical experience. They assume that neither nature nor history offer men any hope of a successful attack upon the present crisis. Hope for them is found only in non-historical or trans-historical forces and goals. How much truth is there in this assertion?

It may be observed that the progress which has occured in human history has resulted from pursuit of proximate goals with limited but definitely human knowledge. The lengthening of the span of haman life from an estimated twenty-five years at the beginning of the Christian era to more than sixty years in the west today did not depend upon absolute truth nor upon final goals. Physicians battle diseases despite the fact that they know each individual has a limited life-expectancy. The change from an economy of scarcity in agriculture to one of abundundance did not result from the possession of absolute knowledge. It was the result of piece-meal attack upon specific problems such as soil sterility, transportation, improvement of grains and stocks and similar interests.

It may be observed that the assumptions basic to scientific work are sometimes believed to be absolute presuppositions.[17] These assumptions may be treated by some scientists as final. At the same time, they are subject to change without prior notice whenever the results of experimental or theoretical inve tigations suggests the advisability of so doing. Thus nature is believed to be orderly. but this conception has been under attack for some time. This statement from the science editor of a highly respected newspaper presents one phase of this. "It is an humble and unpretentious science which now faces the world, for all its startling discoveries about stars and atoms. Most of the cocksure laws that once served to explain everthing, from the wheeling of the planets to the constitution of matter, have been swept away. In their stead we have statistical averages, statements of probabilities, theorems in higher geometries.

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Gone is ether of Maxwell, that extraordinary complex of gears, squirts, jellies, vortices, tenuitiesand rigidities which once served to explain the transmission of light, heat and magnetism. Gone is the 'force' that made stones fall to the ground. Gone, too, are cause and effect. This is a cosmos in which chance rules, in which there is room for free will--and hence for the poet, artist and mystic as an interpreter of reality."[18] This appeared in 1933, nine years before the achievement of the first chain reaction which resulted in the atom bomb. Scientific assumptions are regulative principles which control investigations. Their validity is canstantly under question. They determine the methods men use in the investigation of nature; they do not determine the conclusions which men will reach as a result of these investigations.

This means that the advances made in modern science with the consequent developments in modern technology arenot dependent either upon final goals nor upon absolute truth. It may be necessary,as Absolutists assert, to have ultimate truth and transhistorical goals to guide and stimulate men in their quest for security and significance in moral and religious realms, but they are not necessary for those who investigate the pain-producing factors in life, and devise means whereby the incedence of such factors is reduced. This is a solid body of evidence which denies the assertions of the Absolutists, a body of evidence which cannot be swept carelessly to one side. If those of us who seek to alleviate the social and political ills of mankind cannot function efficiently in terms of proximate goals and relative knowledge, we must confess that we are lesser men than those who function in matters of health, food production, and related values. This is a conclusion theologians and philosophers should be slow to accept.

We should investigate the possibility of adopting proximate goals and partial truth in our quest for a just and orderly society. There are no priori reasons why this approach will not achieve comparable goals in the ethical and religious fields. It has had comparatively good results in our treatment of criminals, We have been becoming progressively more humane in our treatment of those who for various reasons engage in activities which "impair and endanger its (the community's) internal peace and security."[19] When absolute or supernatural standards obtained in a society, little progress occured in the treatment of the criminal. When psychological and sociological factors bearing upon criminal behavior were subjected to critical investigation, it became possible to establish proximate goals and to work toward their achievement with the knowledge and skills available. The criminal became a person with problems for which society was believed to be in part responsible rather than a deviator from absolute standards. So far as the treatment of criminals is concerned, history has been, in part, a redemptive process. This is a fast which can be documented, and which has been so established.[20]

If this is true, then the logic of absolute transcendence must be modified. Its logic rests, as pointed out above, upon the Law of Excluded Middle: There is no middle ground between absolute truth and ultimate goals and no truth and no goals.

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History contains no absolute truth and no ultimate goals. Therefore, history contains no truth and no goals. It is not enough to prove that history contains no goals, proximate or ultimate, and no truth , proximate or ultimate. The evidence from the fields of agriculture and medicine indicates that history has contained proximate goals and proximate truth. In fact, the evidence available indicates that only in historic processes are there any significant goals and any usable truth. It was in historic situations that men learned the causes of suffering and untimely death, and discovered, piece-meal, how to avoid the first and postpone the second. It was in historic processes that men learned how to investigate the processes of nature and to turn them to human use: it was in historic processes that some steps have been taken to divert "man's inhumanity to man," in not all arears, certainly in some areas and to some degree. The evidence available does not support the thesis of Niebuhr and does not support others that only in absolute truth and in transhistory may we hope torealize some of the goals of human living.

The second question raised above concerning the logic of Absolute Transcendence may now be raised: Assuming that absolute truth and a final, transhistorical goal would be helpful in the realization of the ideals maintained by Absolute Transcendence, what are the chances that either is possible? In other words, how feasible are the proposals of the exponents of Absolute Transcendence? A brief glance at cultural development should enable us to answer these questions. Religion has always been oriented toward non-manipulative aspects of human experience. It has faced death, unpredictable disasters, incurable diseases; it has guided nations faced by others with superior power and aggressive tendencies, and has helped meet the conflicts and frustrations which result from human impulses checked by limiting environmental factors. These situations have meant the difference between happiness and unhappiness, between successful and unsuccessful living, between noise and serenity on the one hand and anxiety and distress on the other. Facing such conflicts and frustrations, men havesought in religion for ways whereby the non-manipulative conditions could be removed, or for compensation in a larger environment for the conflictsand frustrations here. It was in situations such as this that men have engaged in what John Dewey calls "the quest for certainty," and which he has documented at length.[21]

Since all knowledge which grows out of "action," Dewey's word for what we call behavioral verification, is relative knowledge or proximate knowledge and is therefore subject to change in the light of new experiences or deeper analysis of past experience, the "quest for certainty" has normally taken an-other direction. The ancient Greeks used the device of depreciating the world of nature, the realm of action and behavioral verification. Thus the uncertainty which characterized "natural" knowledge was an uncertainty confined to the realm of Being. Knowledge of Being had to be achieved by non-empirical means. The Platonic Theory of Reminiscences which assumes the presence in the soul at birth of all truth represents one such attempt to justify confidence in absolute truth.[22]

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The division of reality into levels is still characteristic of the "Great Tradition" in philosophy and in Absolutistic theologies.

Among primitive and savage peoples, this quest for certainty took the form of "Metanoesis." By metanoesis we mean the attempt to arrive at reliable knowledge by other than normal means.[23] Such peoples have used metanoesis at every point in human experience where the situation appeared to be precarious or non-manipulative. The story of augury, divinity, and other devices in the ancient world in the attempt to diagnose diseases is a pathetic tale, one which serves to refuteconclusively any attempted defense of metanoesis. The use of these and similar methods to forecast the results of impending battles, and most propitious times for initiating important ventures, and other matters of equal interest with similar failure or indifferent success attributable to coincidence, is well known. Certainly the evidence from man's long flightagainst disease and famine is sufficient to prove that truth is found by the questing mind of man in ways which can be charted, and whose results can be predicted with some accuracy. The quest for absolute certainty has been, to the present at least, a misguided quest. We have access to proximate truth, and possess methods and instruments whereby we may correct and refine it progressively. For better or worse, we must live with and by proximate, not absolute truth.

The basis uponwhich the theology of Absolute Transcendence rests is thus suject to serious criticism. Granted that a man can make absolute demands upon himself and his environment, this fact alone does nor guarantee him sucess in either situation. Nor is it possible to assume that since he can make absolute demands, and since neither man nor nature can fulfill them, that therefore there must be a supernatural realm where they may find fulfillment. Men have lived thus far in terms of proximate goals and proximate truth. They have won relief from many forms of pain-producing situations, and release from many forms of superstition and error by utilizing to the full the knowledge and idealism available. We are finite, and accordingly must be content with finite results. The logic of absolute demand presupposes that we are not. Whether in the aeons to come man may grow out of his finiteness is a matter which for the present must remain unknown. Honesty demands that we recognize our limitations, and then do our best within them to realize desirable proximate goals in terms of the most adequate information available tous. Time and energy devoted to the quest for absolute fulfillment apparently has little more chance for success than that devoted to the search for perpetual motion.

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1. Cf. Brunner, E., The Theology of Crisis, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1947, p 28
2. Ellrich has been an American citizen since 1940, but his background training and much of his teaching and writing are Continental
3. Macintosh, D. C., The Problem of Religious Knowledge, New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1940, Chapter XIX
4. Faith and History, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949
5. Ibid., Pp 4 ff
6. Ibid., pp 70 ff
7. Ibid., pp 224
8. It is worth observing that Emil Brunner has practically the same conception of history. "no decisions are made in nature; history is the sphere of decision." Brunner, E. LRevelation and Reason, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946, p 405
9. Published at New York: Harper and Brothers, (undated)
10. The Iliff Review III No. 2 Spring 1946, pp 71 ff
11. Lee, E. G., Mass Man and Religion, New York, Harper and Brothers (undated), Chapter iv.
12. Ibid., p 156
13. Ibid., p 157
15. Fascism may now be studied as a completed episode. It indicates the way in which an absolutist philosphy emerges from unsatisfactory and apparently non-manipulative situations. Cf. Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophy of Fascism," Foreign Affairs, Jan., 1929, pp 290-304; Spencer H. R. Government and Politics of Italy, New York 1932, Sontag H. W., The Fascist Government of Italy, New York, 1936; Laski, H The State in Theory and Practice, New York, 1935; Chamberlain, H. S., The World's Iron Age, New York, 1941
16. This is said despite the fact that cancer is now being cured, especially under certain circumstances. Before a more adequate method of treating it is found, men will be compelled to live in a world where cancer is ever a possibility.
17. Collingwood, R. G., An Essay on Metaphysics
18. Kaempffert, W., "An Humbled Science Faces the World," New York Times Book Review, Nov. 19, 1933.
19. Kirckwey, G. W., "Criminal Law," The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931, IV, 569
20. Hocking, W. E. in Human Nature and Its Remaking, New Haven Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1923, pp 188ff., traces this process in convincing fashion
21. Dewey, J., The Quest for Certainty, New York, Minton, Balch and Co. 1929
22. Memo. Iliff
23. This is developed at some length in my "Reason and Religion," The Journal of Bible and Religion," Vol XV, No. 3, July 1947 pp135f

[illegible] Theists, Congregationalists, Humanists and Absolute Immanentists. They agree that theology must be based upon experience, but differ profoundly in the meaning which they attribute to different types of experiences and in the significance which they are prepared to give to these different types. The result is, of course, the development of widely divergent theories in theology and philosophy of religion. Many theories may be offered to account for these differences. We propose, however, to investigate the hypothesis that the differences in these schools is due primarily to the adoption of different sets of initial assumptions. Involved in every theology - or philosophy of religion - is a logical method; basic to every method are certain assumptions, epistemological and often metaphysical in nature, which determine the degree of relevancy assigned to various types of data, and prescribe the test of truth which is believed to be applicable in the situation at hand. These basic assumptions are the water-sheds which determine the direction in which the theological stream shall flow. Until they have discovered and critically evaluated, it is doubtful that a given system is fairly understood or logically examined.

In the previous volume of this journal, the logic of Ecclesiastical Humanism was presented and criticised. We propose now to subject recent Theism to the same type of examination and evaluation.

The term Theism is used with at least two connotations today. In its more popular and inclusive meaning is may be defined as belief in God or Gods. Its antithesis in this case is atheism, defined as disbelief in God or Gods. In its more technical recent definition it may be said to mean that form of philosophy of religion in which the concept "person" is used as organizing principle; which conceives of God as essentially personal who not only transcends the world as its creator and sustainer, but who also dwells within it as its dynamic guide, inspirer, and empowerer in the development of ideal persons in an ideal society. This recent or "typical theistic personalism", to use Dean A. C. Knudson's term, probably derives from the philosophical thought of Leibniz (1646-1716), Berkeley (1685-1753), Kant (1724-1804), and Lotze (1817-1881).[1] It is this more recent theism we shall have in mind whenever we use the term, unless otherwise stated.

Involved in this form of Theism are at least three positive affirmations. The first defines the nature of God, the second the relation of God to man and the world, and the third the purposes of God for both man and the world. We shall examine these three affirmations in the writings of several well-known American theists. The men whose writings we shall consult are: W. Adams Brown, D. C. Macintosh, A. C. Knudson, H. F. Rall, H. P. Van Dusen, Walter Marshall Horton, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, R. T. Flewelling, and one who died some years ago, but who has had great influence upon this form of theism, the late Borden Parker Bowne. Many others might be listed, but these men are representative enough of the general approach to serve as typical examples.

The Nature of God -

Theism maintains that God is personal. As Bowne stated it years ago, "A world of persons with a Supreme Person at the head is the conception to which we are as a result of our critical reflections." [2] In various ways this conclusion is stated by contemporary Theists. "To us of the Western World, taught by Jesus to think of God as Father, the Word God suggests a personal spirit, in some true sense akin to us, though infinitely superior, who has revealed himself

* The Iliff Review, Vol. IV, No. 1, Winter, 1947

to us through the Cross of Christ as redemptive love."3 Brightman defines God as "a Supreme Person who embodies the highest goodness; that is, he is the source both of existence and value."4 H.P. Van Dusen approaches this problem from the point of view of value. He believes that values are impossible apart from persons; that they are "themselves the expressions of the life and vision and intent of persons,"5 and therefore, if they are objective to individual persons or even the whole human race, they presuppose as the basis of their existence that "the Source and Purposer of the cosmic process in which our values appear must be thought of as personal."6 Walter Marshall Horton, after defining God as fully as the empirically-derived definition, "is a vast cosmic drift or trend toward harmony, fellowship, and mutual aid, whereby our efforts to create a just equilibrium in human affairs are supported or sustained."7 But this conception fails to satisfy what he believes to be the demands of religious faith, so he selects two great Christian figures, the late Baron Von Huegel and the late Studdert-Kennedy, who are noted for their emphasis upon certain aspects of deity. Studdert-Kennedy is selected because of his insistence upon the Christ-likeness of God. God, for him, was essentially a Cosmic Christ, and so such, profoundly personal. On the basis of Kennedy's 'insight,' Horton affirmed the personality of God.8 Harris Franklyn Ball, in his more recent works as well as his earlier ones, insists upon the personal nature of God. Approaching this problem from the point of view of moral values, he believes God must be personal if these moral values are not to be subject to the destructivesness of things or brute force. "To believe in God means to believe that the final being and power in this world is not things or brute force, but a personal Spirit that is good. For these ideals and values cannot live as mere abstractions. Beauty exists only for minds that see and appreciate. Love and righteousness are mere abstractions except as they live in beings that can love and follow what is just and true. The world of moral experience points to God and depends on him. And in history, when men have ceased to believe in God the world of moral ideals has lost its reality for man and its authority for his life; and then human socie y moves on to collapse."9

There can be little doubt, in the light of any adequate examination of the writings of the men suggested, that they agree that God must be personal in some real sense. God is, in his essential nature, personal; so at least say the recent Theists.

Since the concept "personality" is so important in recent Theism, it is necessary to determine as precisely as possible the meaning conveyed by it. According to Bowne, "The essential meaning of personality is self-hood, self-consciousness, self-control, and power to know. These elements have no corporeal significance or limitation. Any being, finite or infinite, which has knowledge and self-consciousness and self-control is personal; for the term has no other meaning."10 Furthermore, this entity entitled personality is incommensurable with those entities called "things."11 Brightman, a former student and sympathetic interpreter of Bowne, defines this general position as follows: "A self, then, is any conscious experience or process taken as a whole and as experiencing itself." And, as such, it is the "synthesizer of unity and multiplicity...Selfhood, then, is unity in variety, the true synthesis of the manifold."12 The same position is held, with minor variations, by other Personalists such as Knudson and Flewelling.13

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[illegible] "Personality" is so important in recent theology, it is [illegible] easy to determine as precisely as possible the meaning conveyed by [illegible] according to Bonn, "The essential meaning of personality is self-hood, self-[illegible] achievement, self-control, and power to know. These elements have [illegible] and significance or limitation. Any being, finite or infinite, which has [illegible] Judge and self-consciousness and self-control is personal; for the term has no other meaning."10 Furthermore, this ability enabled personality to be [illegible] available with those attributes called "things"11. Highlighting a [illegible] and unmistakable independence of Bonn, contrasts this general [illegible] as follows, then, in any consciousness conscious or possessed being [illegible] responsibility herself." And, as such, it is the "prerequisite of [illegible] activity. Definitely, then, is unity in variety, the term [illegible] Bonn."12 This case position is held, with minor variations, by [illegible] such as Brunner and Tillich.13

From a somewhat different approach, Horton reaches similar conclusions. He apparently has the same difficulty with the concept soul that he has with the concept God, namely, discontent with what the empirically-derived data permits him to hold. Personality may be defined, he states, "as a complex aggregate 'built up' out of simpler elements."14 These simpler elements are reflexes, which, when conditioned by the experiences of life, combine to form habits. The self or personality is a function of the psychophysical organization, or more specifically, of the habits in whose terms the fundamental biological impulses find expression. Thus far, Horton appears to have a monistic view of the human person; at least, he has so defined the self that the dualism of body-mind seems impossible. But he finds himself dissatisfied with this empirically-derived conception, especially when the problem of immortality is before him. Unable to find a basis for personal immortality in this view, he proceeds to add to it. He now defines personality somewhat differently. "Personality is not the product of the individual organism alone but of a process of interaction between a group of organisms--a process into which the whole cosmic environment ultimately enters as a supreme determining factor. Personality, as it grows, becomes less and less dependent upon its physical taproot, and more and more dependent upon social and cosmic sustenance."15 In this way, Horton attempts to pave the way for belief in the persistence of the personality or self after the death or dissolution of the body.

This leaves us, in effect, precisely where Bowne insisted one had to be. The self is an entity separate and separable from the body, and characterized by intelligence, will, purpose, and some degree of self-direction or freedom. And God as personal must have these characteristics, at least. He has intelligence, self-consciousness, will, and purpose in his relations to our next problems.

Important as the term person is in the thinking of recent Theism, it does not exhaust the meaning which they assign to the term God. He is also transcendent and immanent.

God and the World

A. C. Knudson believes that the Theistic conception of God involves these three attributes: absoluteness, personality, and goodness. By absolute he means "the independent and self-existent cause or ground of a dependent world."16 This Absolute God is the creator of the world.17 As independent and self-existent cause, ground, or creator of the cosmos, God is of necessity transcendent to it. He must be more than that which he created, especially if he is believed to exist independently of it. The essential element in transcendence as emphasized by recent Theism is separation from the natural world in which human beings live, move and have their being. God must be other-than and more-than the world precisely because without being this he cannot help man in his difficulties. Professor Horton relates an incident which took place in a non-academic group to which he was apparently speaking. A woman in the group remarked, "I wish that you would talk to us some time about 'the immoteness of God."18 The woman was referring to the recent conceptions of God, or pseudo-deities which do not hold God to be a transcendent reality interpenetrating the world of nature; the gods to whom one would not pray for rain, for health or for a job. If this element of transcendence is maintained, and God is believed to be a being who is free from the control and irreversibility of natural processes, then there is the possibility that he may step in and help in

time of need. This is the point which one may find if he examines carefully W. Adam Brown's study of the supernatural, "God at Work." In discussing four characteristics of 'miracle faith' he mentions (i) man's sense of wonder aroused by various events; (ii) his consciousness of enlightenment, that is, his discovery of meaning in these events; (iii) his consciousness of enlargement of his resources, and (iv) his desire for certainty. Concerning the third characteristic, namely, man's counsciousness of an enlargement of his resources, Professor Brown wrote: "Here we reach the very heart of the religious man's belief in miracles. It is the way he confesses his faith in a God who can do new things, and who is doing them. The questions of religion are never theoretical merely. They spring from a practical interest. Conscious of a hundred needs, outward and inward, the need of healing, of comfort, of forgineness, of renewal, of enfranchisement, man looks about him for some source of help adequate to his necessity. Is there or is there not some power that can meet his needs, heal his sickness, assuage his sorrow, bot out his guilt, renew his vitality, lift him above the limitations of his environment? Is God, or is he not, alive and free, able to meet present needs as well as the needs of the past, to act here and to act today? Miracle answers this question in the affirmative."19 And it is precisely this point of view that Horton stressed in his distussion entitled "The Future of Theism," printed as an epilogue to his "Theism and the Scientific Spirit." Whereas he believes we must have smaller and more human Gods, he is interested in a God who is other than the system of conditions called 'the natural world.' God, to be practically useful, must, according to Horton, be able to do things in the physical as well as in the moral and spiritual world.20 In other cases, the help sought is not physical. God is required as transcendent in order to help us understand the natural world. In his attempt to support his view that God is personal, Knudson insisted that "the only rational ground for affirming an Absolute is that its existence helps us to explain the world of appearances, and if it is in itself entirely unknowable, it manifestly cannot serve as a principle of explanation."21 At this point Knudson was following in the footsteps of Borden Parker Bowne who found it impossible to form 'clear notions' about the world without positing God as personal and transcendent. Transcendence, from this point of view, is demanded by the inadequaces of the individual or of the world in which he lives, or by both.

As transcendent, then, God is conceived to be a Being who is not identifiable either with man, society, or the natural cosmos. He is a separate and free being, able to affect man, society, and the natural world as he may will to do.

Immanence is always united with transcendence in the thought of recent Theism. The emphasis upon the immanence of God in the thought of Borden Parker Bowne reached the point where it approached pantheism. Bishop McConnell, in his biography of Bowne, says:22

> "The questioner now asks if Bowne did not, after all, glide into pantheism in the teaching that the physical organisms are flowing forms of the divine activity. Can we hold the curious position that the body is from God while the self is not? To which Bowne always replied that his view of the material world was pantheistic, in that all comes casually from God. The self, with its measure of self-consciousness and self-determination, stands over against God in enough independence to scape from pantheism, as its free choice slightly, though really, influence or affect even the Infinite in dealings with the material world. If pantheism seems more emlarging and expansive than personalism, Bowne had at hand the reply that there is scant relief in an expansiveness which expands God into all the evils of the universe."

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"The question now asks if Donne did not, after all, glide into pantheism in the teaching that the physical organisms are flowing forms of the Spirit in the teaching that the physical organisms are flowing forms of the Spirit in activity. Can we hold the curious position that the body is form but not the self is not? To which Donne always replied that his view of the self was punctuated, in that all comes casually from God. The self with its measure of self-consciousness and self-determination, stands against God in enough independence to escape from pantheism, as the choice slightly through influence or affect even the [illegible] dealing with the material world. If pantheism seems more satisfying and expansive than personalism, Donne had at hand the reply that there is relief in an expansiveness which expands God into all the evils of the universe."

Van Dusen finds God "in the immanent force or drive which appears to be pushing, or pulling, the process of evolution onward and upward toward ever more signidicant forms of reality in the direction of a Realm of Values. This upward nisus is God's purpose."23 Knudson remains closer to Bowne's point of view regarding immanence. The subject is treated by him in connection with God as absolute under the heading of 'omnipresence.' "It means that space constitutes no barrier or limitation to the divine power. The divine activity extends to all parts of the universe, and is as controlling in one part as in another."24 He uses the term 'devine agency' to express the activity of God in the world, and identifies the 'ultimate cosmic energy,' whatever it may be, with God's will.25 In this way, nature and its physical products become 'flowing forms of the divine activity.' D. C. Macintosh, while insisting upon God's presence in the world, yet insists upon a differential presence. "Experimental religion, on the contrary, is based upon the assumption that God is not equally present in all phases of the universe,but becomes more fully immanent as he is revealed in the promotion of the spiritual life in response to man's right religious adjustment."26 This does not deny the presence of God in all the universe, his omnipresence, but stresses his presence in the moral and spiritual aspects of existence, namely, in man and society.

The significance of this emphasis upon the immanence of God who is transcendent as well is probably three-fold. (i). It enables this group of religious leaders to come to terms with science. This is clearly evident in a study of the work of the late Borden Parker Bowne. Bowne was born in 1847, and graduated from New York University in 1871. These were eventful years, for as Bishop McConnell points out," it was " from 1867 to 1871 that the view of the universe brought about by the scientific temper generated by Darwin's "Origin of Species" was beginning to make itself felt in American colleges. Darwin's book had been in circulation for seven or eight years when Bowne entered college, and was causing a good deal of terror among those who held the old orthodox views of the method of creation. Practically from the outset Bowne seized the truth that evolution as a theory of methods is harmless and as a theory of causes is worthless. It is from the quickness and certainty with which he grasped this essential that the temper of his criticism of the Darwinian movement is to be understood."27 Bowne, by dividing causes into primary and secondary, and identifying the will and activity of God with primary causation, reduced secondary causes, those operative in the phenomenal world--that with which science had to do--to relative insignificance. In so far as they were significant it was as expressions of the divine will. It is no wonder that one of Bowne's most influential students could say that the Royce-Bowne influence undoubtedly stunted my interest in natural science for some time; the teadhing that science is merely phenomenal left me with a feeling of the exalted superiority of purely metaphysical knowledge and the relative unimportance of science."28 As the transcendence of God thus enabled men to face nature with the conviction that there existed a power other-than and more-than nature which could protect them against its impersonal power, so the immanence of God enabled them to approach nature with a more 'companionable interest,' to use one of Hocking's happy phrases, because they viewed it as in some fashion directly attributable to God.

(ii). The immanence of God serves also to validate man's subjective experience of communion with deity. H. F. Rall defines religion as "a personal fellowship morally conditioned."29 This fellowship with God means not only companionship in a given task in which the overt activity of the individual is important, but it also means private prayer, communion, and what Daniel Evans called 'intrasubjective intercourse.' This emphasis upon immanence, the presence of God within man and within the natural world, solves, by definition at least, one of the significant problems in religion today, namely, the problem of the relationship of the God subjectively experienced with the God objectively defined. It is comparatively simple, so far as such metaphysical problems go, to define God in terms of man's subjective experience with ' an other.' It is also relatively

do--to relative insignificance. In so far as they were significant it was as expressions of the divine will. It is no wonder that one of Bowne's most influential students could say that the Royce-Bowne influence undoubtedly strengthened idealists in their belief in the reality of the spiritual world.

easy to find evidence for God as a given phase or behavior of man's subjective medium. But the problem then faced is that of identifying the God of subjective experience with the God objectively defined. Recent Theism, by emphasizing the immanence of God, has been in position to deal with this question in more or less satisfactory fashion. Van Dusen states the proposition clearly. "The conception of God to which a study of reality in its factual aspects points is that of a Cosmic Power, purposing god, Creator of a steadily advancing world-process which has found its present culmination in our planet in the emergence of free, intelligent, moral creatures whom he invites to join with him in the further creation of an ideal world." 30 Thus the same purposive Power which is shaping the external world and society at large is also the Cosmic Power which created us and invites us to share with him in the task under way. That is to say, evidence points to the conclusion that the same type of activity is at work in the cosmic creative process as is at work in the life of man. The experience of God is creative, constructive, and purposive in both places, and may therefore be presumed to be the same. (iii) Finally, the conception of God as immanent brings closer to man the possibility of cosmic support of human values. One of the values sought in religion is such support in the struffle for the good things of life. With God as the basic energy of which all is made, as Bowne, Knudson and others maintain or as casually effective everywhere (omnipresent, as Macintosh, Rall, and others believe), there is grounds for believing that man has divine support in his struggle for the best. These three values, then, must be included in any attempt to estimate the significance of the conception of God's relation to the world called immanence.

The Purpose of God

In so far as religion concerns itself with the problem of the cosmic significance of human values, it must reach some conclusions as to the purposes of God, especially as they impinge upon man and his world. Theism, along with all other philosophies of religion which deal positively with the concept of God, involves a conception of God's purposes for the world. Briefly stated, Theism believes that the purpose of God, so far as it affects this planet, is the creation or development of ideal persons in an ideal society. According to William Adams Brown, "when you ask a religious man the meaning of the world in which he lives, he will tell you that it is a scene in which God is revealing his presence. If he is a Christian, he will tell you that it is the school in which he is fitting men for fellowship with himself."31 God is then defined as the being in whom the values for which man strives--truth, justice, goodness, and beauty--are already fully realized. Furthermore, God is seeking to make their realization possible for men.32 The social aspect of this purpose was likewise clearly affirmed by Brown. "Whether it come soon or late, by sudden crisis or through slow development, the Kingdom of God will be a society in which men and women live as children of God should live. When we see social relationships everywhere controlled by the principles which Jesus illustrated in his own life--the principles of trust, of love, of generous and unselfish service--we shall know that the Kingdom is here."33 Horton believes religion's peculiar nature may be defined as "the art and science of the ideal life."34 H. F. Rall discusses the purposes of God for the world in a significant chapter on the "Democracy of God." He believes that both God and democracy view humanity as sacred; that God's purpose as well as his method in dealin with men is freedom; men are persuaded, not coerced; and that the ideal of the free life applies to the group as well as to individuals. In a sentence he summarizes the heart of this view: "The goal of God is a free humanity, men who believe because the truth of God has spoken to their minds, men who love and obey because the law is within their hearts, men who have found a free life and the fullest life in fellowship with God."35 Van Dusen stated it just as definitely in his discussion of God in terms of an interpretation of values. The summary of his conclusions begins with this remark:

The Purpose of God

In so far as religious concerns itself with the problem of the cosmic significance of human values, it much rests some conclusions as to the purpose of God, particularly as they impinge upon man and his world. Thinkers alone with all philosophies of religion which deal meaningfully with the concept of God in a conception of God's purposes for the world. Partially studying the nature of God, so far as it affects this planet. According to these purposes of God, so far as it affects social society. According to certain of God's purposes in an ideal society. Accordingly to certain theories, when you ask: religious man the meaning of the world in which he lives, he will tell you that it is a scene in which God is working out his will. Ask him what is the will of God in the world, he will tell you that it is the school in which God is at Christlikeness with himself."31 God is then defined as the man for fellowship with himself, brotherhood, justice, goodness, and humanness values for which man strives. Furthermore, God is seeking to make this reality realized. Furthermore, God is seeking to make this reality realized for man.32 The moral aspect of this purpose was illustrated by Jesus. "Whether it were more or less, by sudden crisis or slow and gradual growth, the Kingdom of God will be a reality in which man and woman live in the fellowship of God through Jesus Christ. Thus we see moral relationships were the stuff of God through Jesus Christ. Thus we see moral relationships were the stuff of God through Jesus Christ. Thus we see moral relationships were the stuff

"It tells us of One whose nature in its outreach toward man is deeply personal; whose desire for our humanity is two-fold--the perfecting of individual human spirits and the gradual development on earth of a perfect society."36 According to contemporary Theism, therefore, in so far as God has purposes for his creation, these purposes focus in man and society upon this planet.

This view of the purposes of God answers positively two important human questions. the first is this: What is the goal or end of human existence? If God's purpose can be stated exhaustively in terms of the development of ideal persons in an ideal society, then the answer to this first question is, obviously, that the goal of human existence is the perfecting of individual and social life.37 The second question is this: How important is man, a denizen of a small planet circling about a second rate sun, in the total scheme of things? The answer is that he is the most important factor in all creation, that for which everything else exists. For, as the late Gerald Birney Smith stated it, Theism "assumes that all the vared processes in the evolution of the universe can be gathered up into a single divine purpose,"38 namely, the perfection of man. Thus man becomes the chief actor on the cosmic stage whose setting is as pointed out by Van Dusen,39 relatively unimportant even though it is fixed.

Recent Theism is, thus, a form of religious philosophy in which the concept person is central: God is essentially personal and all creation exists for personal ends. The two foci in the cosmic scene are personal, God as Supreme Person and man as a finite, growing, and perfectible person. Furthermore, God is both transcendent and immanent: transcendent as creator and controller, immanent as guide, inspirer, and empowerer. The world, finally, is anthropocentric. It exists for personal ends, and may be called the theater of human activities, the stage on which man plays his part in response to Divine promptings.

"It helps us [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

1. Cf. Knudson, A. C., "The Doctrine of God," New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1930. The Abingdon Press, p. 291.
2. "Personalism." Boston and New York, 1908. Houghton Mifflin Co., pp. 277f
3. Brown, W. Adams, "God at Work." New York and London, 1933. Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 133.
4. "Introduction to Philosophy." New York, 1925. Henry Holt and Co., p. 329.
5. "The Plain Man Seeks for God." New York and London, 1933. Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 129.
6. "Op. cit.," p. 129.
7. "Theism and the Modern Mood," New York and London, 1930. Harper and Brother, p.117.
8. Cf. also, Horton: "A Psychological Approach to Theology." New York and London, 1931. Harper and Brothers, pp. 207f.
9. Rall, H. F., " A Faith for Today." New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. 1936. The Abingdon Press, pp. 57f; "Christianity," 1940, p. 151.
10. "Op. cit.," p. 266.
11. Bowne, B. P., "Metaphysics," New York and London, 1898 (revised edition). Harper and Brothers, pp. 345f.
12. "Op. cit.," pp. 191-192.
13. Cf. Knudson, op. cit., pp. 293f.; Flewelling, R. T., "Creative Personality," New York, 1926. The Macmillan Co., pp. 283f.
14. "A Psychological Approach to Theology." p. 52.
15. "Ibid., p. 256. (Italics in tsxt).
16. "The Doctrine of God," p. 245.
17. "Ibid.," p. 261.
18. "Theism and the Scientific Spirit," New York and London 1933, Harper and Brothers, p. 207.
19. P. 90.
20. Cf. "Theism and the Scientific Spirit," p. 211.
21. "The Doctrine of God." p. 301.
22. F. J McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1929. The Abingdon Press, p. 146.
23. "The Plain Man Seeks For God," p. 105. Cf. also, his "God in These Times, New York, 1935, pp. 71 ff.
24. The Doctrine of God, p 275
25. Ibid., p 278

26. Theology as an Empirical Science, New York, 1919,Macmillan Co., p 188
27. McConnell, Borden Parker Browne, p 26.
28. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Religion as Truth"in Contemporary American Theology, edited by Vergilius Ferm, New York 1932, The Round Table Press, Inc., p 57.
29. The Meaning of God, Nashville, 1935. Cokesbury Press, p 137
30. The Plain Man Seeks for God. p 105
31. Beliefs That Matter, New York 1928. p 77
32. Ibid., p 77
33. Ibid., p 59
34. Psychological Approach to Theology, p.71
35. The Meaning of God, p 69
36. The Plain Man Seeks for God, p 142
37. Cf.E. S. Brightman, Moral Laws, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1933,pp242ff.
38. Current Christian Thinking, Chicago, 1928.
39. The Plain Man Seeks for God, pp 143ff.

1. [illegible] "[illegible]," New York, [illegible], [illegible]
1930. The Abingdon Press, p. 413.
2. "Personality." London and New York, 1926. Houghton Mifflin Co., pp. 477f.
3. Brown, W. Adams, "God as Love." New York and London, 1927. Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 122.
4. "Introduction to Philosophy." New York, 1923. Henry Holt and Co., p. 329.
5. "The Plain Man Seeks for God." New York and London, 1933. Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 129.
6. "Op. cit.," p. 129.
7. "Freedom and the Modern Mood," New York and London, 1930. Harper and Brothers, p.117.
8. Cf. also, Horton: "A Psychological Approach to Theology." New York and London, 1931. Harper and Brothers, pp. 207f.
9. Hall, H. F., " A Faith for Today." New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. 1926. The Abingdon Press, pp. 37f; "Christianity," 1940, p. 131.
10. "Op. cit.," p. 266.
11. Bowne, S. P., "Metaphysics," New York and London, 1898 (revised edition). Harper and Brothers, pp. 345f.
12. "Op. cit.," pp. 191-192.
13. Cf. Knudson, op. cit., pp. 293f.; Flewelling, R. T., "Creative Personality," New York, 1926. The Macmillan Co., pp. 283f.
14. "A Psychological Approach to Theology," p. 52.
15. "Ibid., p. 255. (Italics in text).
16. "The Doctrine of God," p. 245.
17. "Ibid.," p. 261.
18. "Freedom and the Scientific Spirit," New York and London 1933, Harper and Brothers, p. 207.
19. P. 90.
20. Cf. "Freedom and the Scientific Spirit," p. 211.
21. "The Doctrine of God." p. 301.
22. T. J McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1929. The Abingdon Press, p. 140.
23. "The Plain Man Seeks For God," p. 105; Cf. also, his "God in These Times, New York, 1935, pp. 71 ff.
24. The Doctrine of God, p 275
25. Ibid., p 278

26. Theology as an Empirical Science, New York, 1919,Macmillan Co., p 185
27. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p 26.
28. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Religion as Truth"in Contemporary American Theology, edited by Vergilius Ferm, New York 1932, The Round Table Press, Inc., p 37.
29. The Meaning of God, Nashville, 1935. Cokesbury Press, p 137
30. The Plain Man Seeks for God. p 105
31. Beliefs That Matter, New York 1928. p 77
32. Ibid., p 77
33. Ibid., p 39
34. Psychological Approach to Theology, p.72
35. The Meaning of God, p 69
36. The Plain Man Seeks for God, p 142
37. C.E. S. Wrightman, Moral Laws, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1933,pp242f.
38. Current Christian Thinking, Chicago, 1928.
39. The Plain Man Seeks for God, pp 142f.

IV. The Logic of Recent Theism, Part 2*

As a Philosophy of religion, recent Theism seeks to justify the conclusions which it presents. In so doing, it has developed a type of reasoning which may be called, for convenience, the logic of theism. This logic is based on certain postulates or assumptions. Whitehead speaks of these assumptions as "instinctive convictions" such as undergird every living science. "In the first place, there can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an Order of Things and, in particular, of an Order of Nature. I have used the word 'instinctive' advisedly. It does not matter what men say in words, so long as their activities are controlled by settled instincts."[40] It is these "settled convictions," more or less consciously held, which are designed by the words "basic assumptions" in this discussion. They are basic since they provide the foundations upon which systems are built, and they are assumptions in that they provide the court of last appeal to the thinker who uses them. As such, they are normally assumed rather than justified.

Basic assumptions, as courts of final appeal, are not beyond critical analysis and evaluation. They are accepted as a basis upon which to proceed. Every step in the resultant cognitive venture then becomes a form of critical evaluation. Our present interest is that of presenting as adequately as possible the basic assumptions of recent theism. In the next section, we shall present our evaluation.

Probably the clearest statement of the basic assumption of recent Theism was made by Borden Parker Bowne. He stated it in this manner: "Whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as a real in default of positive disproof."[41] The meaning which Bowne put into these words is suggested by a statement in the preceding pages of the same volume. "There is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far more powerful factors than the logical interest. Hence, in its practical unfolding the mind makes a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deducations or speculative necessities, but a kind of modus vivendi with the universe. They represent the conditions of our fullest life, and are at bottom expressions of our practical and ideal interests or necessities. And these are reached as articulate principles by which we live. The law the logician lays down is this: Nothing may be believed which is not proved. The law the mind actually follows is this: Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof."* This criterion, namely, that whatever ministers to man's needs, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and religious, may be held as true until pisitively disproved, was used by Bowne in his discussions of religious problems.

This is, as one may readily observe, a form of religious pragmatism, and was used by Bowne in all of his later studies of religious beliefs.[42] "If Christianity were not a world-power, a great spiritual force here and now, its origin and history would be a matter of profound indifference to all but a few antiquarians. The miracles, too, are to be studied in connection with history, and not as isolated and detached wonders. Miracles without moral meaning and religious bearings have as little credibility as the exploits of Jack the Giant Killer, or the story of Aladdin's Lamp."[43] Thus Bowne

* The Iliff Review. Vol. IV, No. 1, Winter, 1947

suggests his pragmatic or instrumentalistic approach. Doctrines which have no moral value or religious significance are not candidates for credibility. If, on the other hand, they have moral and religious significance, then they are presumably true.

This assumption was restated by A. C. Knudson in this manner: "Personalism finds the ontologically real only in personality."[44] If, as he believes, one has direct contact with ultimate reality only in personality, it is not far to the corollary that the one criterion for determining the truth of metaphysical theories is persoality and its needs. Whatever is in harmony with personality, and whatever contributes to the satisfaction of personal interests may be held as true until it is positively disproved. Any change in such views must be compelled by the logic of events. This makes it possible for the Theists to study man and his needs, and to assume that what is true for man--that is, what satisfies man's interests--is true for reality as a whole.[45]

A further word concerning Knudson's restatement of thisposition may be in order. Whereas Bowne's statement is epistemological--a test of truth, or a method of thinking about metaphysical problems, Knudson's statement is metaphysical. If, according to him, "Personalism finds the ontologically real only in personality," then a conclusion has already been reached regarding the nature of ultimate reality. Ultimate reality is personal, and therefore we human beings find ontological reality only in personality. From this it is but a short step to the test of truth, namely, whatever personality demands may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof. As we shall point out in our evaluation of the Theistic logic, every criticism of the Theistic logic pragmatism finally comes face to face with this metaphysical assumption. Failure to take this into consideration is probably the reason for the failure of critics to make much impression upon this school of thought. Theists believe that their critics have failed to meet the vital point of their argument and so long as they believe this, they have little reason to worry.

We shall now examine the writings of several representative American Theists to discover whether or lnot they make significant use of this criterion of truth.

In his debate on God with H. N. Wieman and M. C. Otto, D. C. Macintosh stated his basic assumption in one sentence: "We have the moral right to believe as we must in order to live as we ought--if we can (logically and physi psychologically) and, more particularly, if we do."[46] This proposition will be much easier to understand, I believe, if we view it in the light of the analysis presented by Bowne than by following the unnecessarily complex analysis presented by Macintosh in his debate. Bowne's statement , let us repeat, is this: "Whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof." Without suggesting that Macintosh was influenced by Bowne, we draw attention to the fact that these two statements have essentially the same meaning. According to both men, all men have some basic, vital, and significant needs; certain beliefs about God, the world, and man are essential if these needs are to be fully satisfied; these necessary (morally and religiously necessary, not logically or scientifically necessary) beliefs may be held, and must be held, unless they are positively disproved. Macintosh is quite specific at this point. If you cannot hold them logically, psychologically, or practically (which is what I understand him to mean by the last few words for his basic assumption, "and more particularly, if we do") then of course you do not. Both men, therefore, say that the theologicns must begin with man's religious, and perhaps moral needs. These needs will suggest the most valuable beliefs about existents and the existentian medium

[illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [

Such beliefs must then be subjected to two tests: (i) Are they contradicted by scientific or other types of positive knowledge? (ii) Do they help us realize the values they were developed to serve? If the beliefs meet both of these tests satisfactorily, they are held to be true.

It will be observed that these beliefs are subjected, in fact, to but one positive test namely, that of man's religious and moral experience. They must meet man's religious needs satisfactorily. The other, or speculative test, is negative. The given beliefs need not find positive support in contemporary science and philosophy; they need but be of such nature as to be permitted by contemporary science and philosophy. In Bowne's language, they must not be positively disproved by science and philosophy. Thus recent Theism, as exemplified in Bowne and Macintosh, is a form of religious pragmatism or instrumentalism. Ideas are instruments in the achievements of the highest religious and moral values; their validity or truth is determined by their practical value for the religious and moral life.

Macintosh has used this method in several of his studies in theology in 1919, in a discussion of the unity of God, he argues as follows: "Practical experience in religion not only demands, but at its best it is assured of at least one God. But granted that this God is k he absolute One, absolutely sufficient for man's needs, it follows that no more than one is needed. Unless there is adequate empirical evidence of the existence of more than one God, jor unless monotheism should prove to be metaphysically indefensible, this suggestion of one and only one God should be allowed to stand. The burden of proof rests upon the person who affirms polytheism as against monotheism."[47] Here again we note the reliance upon religious experience, with the provision that the theory suggested mustnot be proved untrue by other positive evidence. In a later book, after stating that belief in God depends primarily upon religious experience and not upon philosophical argument, Macintosh raised the question of the nature or character of God. He believed that faith in God and faith in Moral optimism are in extricably bound together. By "Moral Optimism" he means "a fundamental attitude of confidence in the cosmos, together with a full sense o f man's moral responsibility."[48] For Moral Optimism, however, God must have a certain character. "What is meant is that the God of moral optimism, however superpersonal he may possibly be in some unknown and unimaginable sense, is most reasonably thought of as at least personal in the sense of being conscious, intelligent, purposive, working consciously and rationally toward an end in which the conservation of human personality and values is included. Furthermore, such an essentially personal God, working dependably for such an ideal and always adequate for man's absolute dependence and trust, must be regarded as completely moral, perfect in holiness and in self-giving love."[49] That is to say, Macintosh discovers certain moral and religious needs in man. He next raises the questin: What type of God is necessary if these needs are to meet their highest satisfaction? His conclusion is that the Theistic view is the most adequate for these demands. He then asks: Can we hold to this conception in view of the facts of experience? He answers this by considering the objections to the theory based upon the (i) the presence of evil, and (ii) the nature of revelation. He finds that it is possible so to interpret evil that it does not positively negate the Theistic conception. This attempt positively to disprove the Theistic view is thus refuted. He believes it possible to reinterpret or redefine the concept of revelation so that it becomes equivalent to the discover of God in human experience. Since men can and do live 'personally' with something or somewhat in their existential medium, this is considered validation of the view that God reveals himself to man. Thus he disposes of a second attempted disproof.

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It will be observed that these beliefs are subjected, in fact, to but one positive test, namely, that of man's religious and moral experience. They must meet man's religious needs satisfactorily. The other, or negative test, is negative. The given beliefs need not find positive support in contemporary science and philosophy; they need but be of such nature as to be permitted by contemporary science and philosophy. In Bowne's language, they must not be positively disproved by science and philosophy. Thus recent Theism, as exemplified in Bowne and Macintosh, is a form of religious pragmatism or instrumentalism. Ideas are instruments in the achievements of the highest religious and moral values; their validity or truth is determined by their practical value for the religious and moral life.

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The position of Macintosh is thus similar to that of Bowne. He begins with man's needs, particularly man's religio-moral needs. He then states that whatever beliefs are demanded if these needs are to be adequately met may be held in default of positive disproof. His next step is that of examining the attempted disproofs. If he can show they are not necessarily fatal to his position, he rests his case. Stated as an opponent in debate might state it, his method is this: I need this type of God. Until somebody disproves his existence, I propose to believe in him.

The basic logic of Thism is also discoverable in the writings of Walter Marshall Horton. In an early book, he proposed the following partial definition of God. "God is a vast cosmic drift or trend toward harmony, fellowship, and mutual aid, whereby our efforts to create a just equilibrium in human affairs are supported and sustained."[50] He insisted that this conception was not based upon faith, but that "it is an empirical fact, capable of social verification--a fact as objective asthose great star drifts which astronomers are able to chart after years of patient observation. This is a fact of tremendous religious significance, if true."[51] Thus far he relied upon positive evidence of a complex type and not merely upon religious experience. But he refused to stop with this provisional definition. He insisted the Christian faith demanded more in its God than that, and he added two attributes to the definition proposed. The first was Divine Greatness, by which he meant "transcendente, prior initiative, self--sufficiency, (as) emphasized by Von Huegel, the Catholic mystic.[52] God as transcendent is above the world, "surveying and controlling the cosmic process from a point of rest lying above and beyond it."[53] But, as the late Gerald Birney Smith pointed out, God as transcendent in this sense is kunknowable.[54] Thus God, lying above and beyond the cosmic process, is lying above and beyond the possibility of proof or disproof.

Horton was fully aware of this fact, and sought to buttress this weak beam in his theological structure by means of an analogue taken from organic evolution. According to biological theory, changes in organic life are responses to changes in the environment. If, according to Horton, changes in organic life are responses to prior changes in the environment, then we may well argue that the changes in the environment are responses to prior changes in an environment of the evolutionary environment. He thus explained changes in the environment of organic life by positing a second environment. God, as transcendent, is this extra-environment. It is his prior initiative which has produced life its myriad forms.[55]

There appear to be certain difficulties involved in this effort to add reasonableness to Hornton's conception of the transcendence of God. The first of the transcendence of God is found in the fact that evolutionary thought is based upon the theory of "resident forces." This means that the energy and initiative responsible for changes in any process are to be sought in the process itself rather than inaany transcendent realm.[56] Thus changes in the environment serve as occasions rathernthan causes of organic change. Furthermore, then Horton begins to discuss geological changes he has left the field of organic evolution, in its strictest sense, and has entered the field of geology. In that field, he will find the reasons suggested for the changes which have had definite, but contributory effects in the organic realm. But more important than this difficulty is the one which is known as "infinite regress." When he assumes that everything must have a prior cause, it is logically impossible for him to stop this side of infinity, unless he limits the cause-effect sequence. There is general recognition of the fact, which would appear obvious, that certain concepts are of limited applicability onl . This principle of limited applicability would suggest that the cause--effect

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sequence is one which applies within the existential world, and that any attempt apply it beyond the existential world leads to confusion. Thus it is true that all life lives by eating, or by incorporating bits of its environment. While this is true, one cannot make this a universal principle. One can say that most of that which man eats, likewise eats, that is, incorporates part of the environment within itself. But in only two or three removes, the statement loses its significance. One comes to electfons and protons, and one does not find incorporation, even in a very broad sense, applicable there. Furthermore to attempt to apply this principle to the total universe would be ludicrous. It is the recognition of this obvious fact which suggests that the principle of limited applicability must be kept in mind when one is discussing fundamental issues. We must conclude therefore, that Hortons attempt to validate this conception of transcendence is a failure, and admission made that the sole reason for adding this attribute to his empirically--derived conception of God is that man's religious needs apparently demand it.

The second attribute suggested by Horton is likewise affirmed without adequate evidential support. It is that God is Christ-like. He considers it to be one of the great intuitions of the race, and believes that it must be affirmed if we are to find in God that which will meet adequately the demands of our religions and moral natures. It must be noted that the type of reasoning found with reference to this two attributes, transcendence and Christ-likeness, is religious pragmatism and instrumentalism. Man's religious and moral nature demand a certain type of God. Unless belief in such God is fundamentally unreasonable, jor is positively disproved, one may assume its truth. That the concept of transcendence is not unreasonable, and therefore is permissible, Horton tried to show by his analogy from organic evolution. Since we need that type of God, and since neither science nor philosophy positively disprove this view, we may accept it as true on the basis of religious pragmatism. It satisfies our religious and moral interests.

The logic of recent Theism is thus based upon the assumption that reality including God, must be such as to satisfy our deepest and highest needs. Every theory concerning the nature of God which fails to meet the test of human satisfaction is viewed with suspicion; every theory which meets this test is accepted as true in default of positive disproof. It may be observed that this is a logic which has high interest value, and that the theories validated by it will have much socially-cohesive significance. The fact remains, however, that there is a difference in cognitive quality between theories which are socially-cohesive and those which are validated by comparison with objective data. It is this fact which makes necessary critical examination of the former type of theories for their probably truth-value. To this we shall return in a future issue.

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40. ~~Science and the Modern World, New York, 1925, p 5~~
41. The philosophy of Theism, New York, 1887, p 25
42. Cf. his The Divine Immanence, Boston and New York, 1905. The Houghton Mifflin Company.

* Ibid, pp 13-14

43. Ibid., p 85. Dr. E. T. Ramsdell in three discussions of "The Religious Pragmatism of Bowne," which appeared in the Autumn of "The Personalist," deals with the pragmatic elements in Bowne's philosophical and religious thought although my own position regarding Bowne was developed many years before, this recent study supports the conclusions reached. Cf. Abstracts of Theses, The University of Chicago, Humanist Series, Vol. VI 1927-1928, pp. 417f. for abstract of my doctoral thesis on "The Influence of Borden Parker Bowne upon Theological Thought in the Methodist Episcopal Church."
44. The Philosophy of Personalism, New York and Cincinnati, 1927, p 66
45. Cf. Ramsdell, "The Religious Pragmatism of Borden Parker Bowne, (1847--1910) The Personalist. Vol 15, No. 4 (Autumn 1934) pp 308 ff1., for development of the theme that 'interest satisfaction' was Bowne's test of religious truth.
46. "The Christian Century", April 20 1932, p 511
47. Theology as an Impirical Science, New York, 1919, pp 190 f.
48. The Reasonableness of Christianity, p 46.
49. Ibid., p 78
50 Theism and the Modern Mood, p 117
51. Ibid., p 117
52. Ibid., p 161
53. Ibid., p 162
54. Cf. "God" in The Dictionary of Religion and Ethics, edited Shailer Mathews and G. B. Smith, New York, 1923, p 186
55. Cr. Theism and the Modern Mood, p 163f
56. Cf. G. P. Conger New Views of Evolution, New York, 1929, pp 17-18

[illegible]

[illegible] p. [illegible] A paper read in Bruce Barton's [illegible] of "The Religion of Science or Science," which appeared in the January issue of "The Pentecostal Herald," with the permission of Dr. Bruce Barton in Science in Science and religion and religion. Although although my proposition regarding Science was developed in [illegible] Science, this recent study supports the conclusions reached. [illegible] Contemporary Theses, The University of Chicago, Microcopy Series, [illegible] 1927-1928, pp. 411. for abstract of my doctoral thesis on "The [illegible] of Borden Parker Bowne Upon Theological Thought in the Methodist [illegible] Church."

44. The Philosophy of Personalism, New York and Cincinnati, [illegible] p. [illegible]
45. Cf. Hamelin, "The Religious Evolution of Bowne Parker Bowne (1847--1910) The Personalist. Vol 15, No. 4 (Autumn 1934) pp 264 [illegible] for development of the theme that 'inherent activity' was [illegible] of religious truth.
46. "The Christian Century", April 25 1932. p 511
47. Theology as an Empirical Science, New York, 1919, pp 199 f.
48. The Reasonableness of Christianity, p 46.
49. Ibid., p 75
50 Theism and the Modern Mood, p 117
51. Ibid., p 117
52. Ibid., p 161
53. Ibid., p 162
54. Cf. "God" in The Dictionary of Religion and Religion, edited Charles Matthews and C. P. Smith, New York, 1923, p 185
55. Cf. Theism and the Modern Mood, p 163
56. Cf. C. F. Cooper New Views of Evolution, New York, 1929, pp 17-18

IV. The Logic of Recent Theism, Part 3 *

In preceding issues of this journal, we have sketched two phases of the philosophy of religion known as recent Theism. We considered its structural ideas and its pragmatic, instrumentalistic or voluntaristic logic. Granted that this philosophy of religion has high interest-value for many persons, the questions of its possible truth-value must be considered. It should be observed that negative conclusions concerning the adequacy of its logic does not in itself condemn a system. It its present logic is discovered to be inadequate, a more adequate logic may be found to support it. Unless this is done, however, the system is suspect.

I

The use of the terms 'pragmatism', 'instrumentalism', and 'voluntarism' in the preceding paragraph may give rise to interminable discussions. If any of the persons considered object to these names, the effort required to prove either that they do or do not belong where we have placed them would hardly be worth the making. We are concerned with the basic reasoning used by them in supporting their philosophies of religion, not in classifying them in some neat category. The basic logic underlying recent Theism was stated specifically by the late Borden Parker Bowne: "Whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof."[1] If by one's total nature is meant the rational, emotional, esthetic and voluntary interests or capacities, then this test would include everything, both cognitive and non-cognitive, in our experience. But Bowne meant something much more specific than that. By way of introduction to his basic assumption, he wrote: "Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far more powerful factors than the logical interest. Hence, in its practical unfolding the mind makes a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions or speculative necessities, but a kind of "modus vivendi" with the universe. They represent the conditions of our fullest life; and are at bottom expressions of our practical interests or necessities. And these are reached as articulate principles, not by speculative construction, but by analysis of practical life. Life is richer and deeper than speculation, and contains implicitly the principles by which we live."[2] The basic logic of Theism, therefore, is a logic reared upon beliefs which find their justification in human value-considerations. The important cognitive problem is not that of deriving these pictures of reality; it is that of so relating onself to environing conditions that life is preserved and enriched.

That this is the basic logic of recent Theism has been indicated in the two preceding parts of this study. It may be worth while to consider two examples selected more or less at random from the available literature to remind ourselves of this. In his discussion of the nature of God, E. S. Brightman considered pantheism as a possible theory. He rejected it summarily, not because the objective facts failed to support it, but because it implied a God who sinned in our sinning. Such a God could not serve the needs of Christians as Brightman conceives them. God defined in pantheistic terms loses his moral and spiritual values according to Brightman and to that extent becomes objectionable to man in his quest for more significant living.[3] The same argument is to be found in Walter Marshall Horton's earlier writings. In "Theism and the Modern Mood," (1930), he defined God in empirical terms, and then proceeded to add the two attributes of Christlikeness and transcendence

* The Iliff Review, Vol. V, No. 1, Winter, 1948

The use of the terms 'pragmatism', 'instrumentalism', and 'voluntarism' in the preceding paragraph may give rise to interminable discussions. M any of the persons considered object to these names, the effort required to prove either that they do or do not belong where we have placed them would hardly be worth the making. We are concerned with the basic reasoning used by them in supporting their philosophies of religion, not in classifying them in some neat category. The basic logic underlying recent Thelsm was stated specifically by the late Borden Parker Bowne: "Whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof."[1] If by one's total nature is meant the rational, emotional, esthetic and volunteer interests or capacities, then this test would include everything, both cognitive and conative. In our experience, But Bowne meant something much more specific than that. By way of introduction to his basic assumption, he wrote "Man's will, conscience, emotion, aspiration, and these are far more powerful factors than the logical interest. Hence, in its practical unfolding the mind shows a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions or speculative necessities, but a kind of "modus vivendi" with the universe. They represent the conditions of our fullest life; and are at bottom expressions of our practical interests or necessities. And these are required as articulate principles, not by speculative construction, but by analysis of practical life. Life is richer and deeper than speculation, and contains implicitly the principles by which we live."[2] The basic logic of Thelsm, therefore, is a logic rooted upon beliefs which find their justification in human value-considerations. The important cognitive problem is not that of deriving these pictures of reality; it is that of so relating oneself to envisioning conditions that life is preserved and enriched.

That this is the basic logic of recent Thelsm has been indicated in the two preceding parts of this study. It may be worth while to consider two examples selected more or less at random from the available literature to round out our salves of this. In his discussion of the nature of God, E. S. Brightman considered pantheism as a possible theory. He rejected it summarily, not because the objective idealist failed to support it, but because it implied a God who

aimed in our aiming. Such a God could not serve the needs of Christians as Brightman conceives them. God defined in pantheistic terms loses his moral and spiritual values according to Brightman and to that extent becomes objectionable to man in his quest for more significant living.[3] The same argument is to be found in Walter Marshall Horton's earlier writings. In "Thelsm and the Modern Mood," (1930), he defined God in empirical terms, and then succeeded to add the two attributes of Christlikeness and transcendence

* The Hill Review, Vol. V, No. 1, Winter, 1948

to his empirically-derived conception. These attributes were not added because the relevant objective data made them necessary; they were added because Horton believed that the most effective idea of God should include them. These two illustrations suggest the way in which recent Theism uses value considerations as the basis of its logic.

There are several forms of this "life-is-deeper-than-logic" type of thinking. We shall consider two of them. The first is presented concisely in William James' famous lecture on "The Will to Believe." (1896). According to James, it is legitimate to adopt a faith which one has voluntarily accepted. This is especially true in the case of certain propositions called "live options". He analyzed hypotheses into those which were "living" and those which were "dead". Those which represented real possibilities were "living", whereas those which had no such appeal were "dead." He used the illustration of belief in the Mahdi or Imam. To an Arab, belief in the Mahdi was a live possibility; to a Christian, it was not. "This shows that deadness and aliveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker. The maximum of aliveness in an hypothesis means a willingness to act irrevocably."[4] The next step in his argument consisted in an analysis of options. An option is a decision between two hypotheses. Options may be living or dead, 'forced' or 'avoidable', 'momentous' or 'trivial'. The options represented by the first of these paired terms - forced, living and momentous - are genuine options.

James decided that whenever one faces a genuine option which cannot be decided upon intellectual grounds, he must decide it in terms of his 'passional' nature. In Bowne's language - whatever is required by our total nature may, and James would say 'must', be accepted in default of positive disproof, or according to James, in default of positive verifiability.[5] James further stated that a living and momentous option is 'forced' whenever failure to decide itself constitutes a negative decision. Thus failure to act when some worthy cause is at stake may result in the loss of the cause. In this case, the failure to act was a vote of no confidence and contributed to the defeat of the cause. Thus we "make" some things true by accepting them and acting 'as if' they were true.

To the extent that live, momentous options are forced, and for which the objective evidence is insufficient to compel an 'intellectual' decision, the will to believe may be well accepted. We turn now to the structural ideas of recent Theism to determine whether or not they constitute live options which force us to decide for or against them in default of positive evidence.

II

Recent theism consists in three closely integrated structural ideas: God as personal; man as self and body; the teleological destiny of man and the world.[6] Each of these conceptions may be of concern to the contemporary. What one believes about the nature of God and man will have its effects, presumably, upon his choices relative to the "cold" war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. What one believes about the relation of this earth to the being and purposes of God may also effect man's enthusiasm for things here and now. Thus the problems posed by recent Theism may be considered living and perhaps momentous. The question may be asked, however, whether or not they are 'forced.'

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It will be remembered that a 'forced option' is one which cannot be decided upon 'intellectual grounds,' but which nevertheless must be decided. "Our passionalnnature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision---just like deciding yes or no--and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth."[7] Granted then that the structural ideas of recent Theism represent genuine options and that in some degree at least failure to decide itself constitutes a dicision, is it true that these problems cannot, be decided upon intellectual grounds and that accordingly they must be subjected to pragmatic decision?

Some recent Theists would deny this. Brightman is ready to rest his case upon the test of coherence. He believes that the pragmatic test actually becomes the coherence test, i.e., that that idea is presumably true which is at once self-consistent--free from internal contradictions--and which may also be integrated harmoniously with all other true ideas as well as the relevant facts. He adds that it must serve to "establish explanatory and interpretative relations between various parts of experience" when this is defined inclusively.[8] It may be observed however, that the test of coherence may itself have a pragmatic basis. If one accepts Bowne's basic assumption, then the coherence test consists in the possibility of so interpreting the data of science and common-sense in such terms as will satisfy the demands of the western interpretation of lmankind's religious needs.[9] Every culture will have its own test of coherence. Bowne was prepared to consider the moral consequences of a doctrine determinative of its truth. "If Christianity were not a world-power, a great spiritual force here andnow, its origins and history would be a matter of profound indifference to all but a few antiquarians. The miracles, too, are to be studied in connection with the history, and not as isolated and detached wonders. Miracles without moral and religious bearing have as little credibility as the exploits of Jack, the Giant Killer, or the story of Aladdin's Lamp"[10] Bowne was very much interested in a coherent system of thought, but saw no possibility of arriving at "clear notions" without primary reliance upon the practical demands of life. Thus both Bowne and Brightman appear to rely rather heavily upon the practical rather than the theoretical 'reason'. And the same thing is true of other members of the recent theistic group.

It is necessary therefore to examine critically the view that recent Theism actually presents us with a live option in its conception of God. It should be observed that Bowne maintained that only "relevant" ideas are worthy of consideration. He based his interest in Christianity upon the fact that it was a "great spiritual force here and now." If God is acutally personal, transcendent, and immanent, and seeks to develop ideal persons inan ideal society, then there should be empirical evidence to support this conception both in history and in contemporary society. Furthermore, the physical envir onment should give unquestioned support to this enterprise. By implication, therefore, we may say that recent Theism, is, according to some of its spokesmen, an hypothesis or series of integrated hypotheses which are, and must be, subject to empirical verification. We do not confront a "forced" option for the reason that the hypothesis, by definition, one for which objective evidence must be available. If no affirmations were made concerning living persons and cultural evolution, then the option might be 'forced' in the sense that it could not be resolved intellectually. But in this case, primary reliance is placed upon "experience," and experience is primary in empiricism.

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When this hypothesis is approached empirically, the evidence for it is by no means conclusive. One of the most incisive thinkers of the group, E. S. Brightman, recognized this fact nearly twenty years ago, and attempted to meet it by the development of "The Given" as an explanation of God's slowness in realizing his goals. By the "Given" Brightman means certain restrictions within the nature of God which hinder Him from achieving His goals as rapidly as He desires. Evil, then, is due in part to certain necessary limitations within the nature of God. Thus God conforms to the structural ideas of recent Theism, but is prevented or hindered by internal conflict from shoing by His deeds what He purposes to do, at least he cannot show His purposes so clearly that they can be discerned by impartial observers.[11] The reliance upon value--considerations, in their attempts to validate their theories is eloquent evidence of their acceptance of the judgment that empirical data do not make these theories necessary.

But recent Theists are not ready to accept this conclusion. At this point they turn to the logic of Ecclesiastical Humanism as presented in this journal in the Spring, 1946 issue. Ecclesiastical Humanism rested its case upon the Law of Excluded Middle, namely, that between contradictories there is no middle ground. Traditional Theism and Ecclesiastical Humanism were presented as contradictories. Contradictory terms are such that if A is true, the B is necessarily false, and, if A is false, then B is necessarily true. After disproving--to their own satisfaction--that traditional Theism could not be true, they accepted Ecclesiastical Humanism as true.

Recent Theists use muchthe same type of test. Accepting mechanism as a non-teleological or anti--teleological explanation of the total universe on the one hand, and recent Theism as a teleological explanation of it on the other, recent Theists believe the issue here presented is a 'live' or 'forced' option. There is evidence for both mechanism and purpose, but there is not sufficient evidence for either to compel universal assent. With the evidence so divided, one should choose the 'higher' or most 'useful' explanation. So stated, there appears to be little choice, and teleology is accepted.[12]

But the validity of this argument depends upon the question of the applicability of the Law of Excluded Middle in this case. We found that the logic of Ecclesiastical Humanism failed at this point because several other possible explanations were available. It appears true also in the case of recent Theism that there are other possibilities. Many years ago, the late W. G. Everett observed that the universe appeared to be a "kingdom of many ends," and human destiny was doubtless one of them. According to his hypothesis, mechanism and teleology and perhaps other interests could find a place in a comprehensive view of reality as a whole. The point of view called Absolute Immanence to be presented in a future issue suggests another possibility. Consequently, the choice between mechanism on the one lhand and teleological Theism on the other is by no means a 'forced' option. There are other hypotheses available. Accordingly, the conditions which James laid down asnecessary before one could legitamately use "the will to believe" do not obtain in the case of recent Theism's God-concept. It does not face a forced option between mechanism and its view of God. There are other possibilities at hand. This means that the issue must be fought out in the 'intellectual' rather than the 'passional' realm.

III

The second form of pragmatic logic which is often employed by recent Theists is the voluntaristic logic of the late F. S. C. Schiller (1864-1937). As a student at Oxford University when Darwin's theories on evolution were gaining populari support, he became profoundly impressed by the fact that life was purposive and engaged in the constant struggle for more efficient living. At the same time,

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he was taught classical logic in his courses which appeared to him to be completely divorced from living issues. The result was the development of a "humanistic" logic, one in which the human worth of ideas was emphasized. Later, he moved toward a "voluntaristic" logic in which the significance of man's choices was given a dominant place. He was, until the end of his life, profoundly concerned with the human efficiency of thinking. His impatience with formal logic and his continued polemic against it is but another expression of his interest in a logic of efficiency.

Schiller deserves much credit for his emphasis. Religion is admittedly one of mankind's major interests. As such, it utilizes thinking in the furtherance of its quests. If one considers religion to be the means whereby individuals and groups find significant meaning even and especially in unsatisfactory and inescapable situations, then the practical efficiency of thinking is essential to intelligent and efficient religious living. If, furthermore, God is the name which religious persons give to the Dynamic Determinant of their total Existential Medium, Schiller's emphasis upon the human worth of thinking must be given high rating. Religion is one of lmankind's most serious concerns. As such, it can have little to do with verbalisms and logical legerdemain.

Granted, then, that the primary interest of Schiller is important, let us see what it means for the logic of Theism. Truth, according to Schiller, means the successful conclusion of a purposive cognitive quest. "For in point of fact our thinking is volitional through and through. It is set going by desires and purposes; it is driven onwards by the urgency of problems. It pursues ends which appear to it as good and is pervaded and steered by values of all kinds. Truth itself moved us, not because it is distant and unattainable, disinterested and dispassionate but becauseeit is near and dear to our hearts; it is felt to be a value and worth achieving, even at the sacrifice of ignobler aims and lesser values."[13] This indicates the trend of Schiller's thought; truth is equivalent to the successful conclusion of a cognitive venture. It is the possible satisfaction of basic and felt n which impels us to think, and our thinking is successful and efficient if it helps us reach the desired culmination. Thinking is thus one phase of man's quest for values. It is successful to the extent that it eventuates in satisfactory ways of believing and acting; it is unsuccessful to the extent that it does not. This accounts for Schiller's persistent attack upon formal logic: it bore no human fruits.

This phase of Schiller's voluntaristic logic is subject to serious question, a fact of which he was aware. He insisted that choices must be made which are favorable to the interestsof the thinker. At the same time, he insisted that whether or not they would prove to be favorable in practice had to be determined by 'application' to specific situations. Indeterminism, for example, at the human level is verified in the actual practice of acting "freely". The process whereby a truth-claim becomes a truth was described in the following way. First, some person must make a truth-claim. Thinking thus begins with a problematic situation confronting some person. Secondly, the truth sought is always "the most valuable judgment possible under the conditions of its making," and is preferred by its formulator to all the other possibilities of which he is aware.[14] Thirdly, verification is a matter of continued practice or application of the truth to living situations. If the hypothesis functions as it should, so that its formulator finds it preferable to all other possibilities, it is considered to be true, at least for the time being.

Truth is thus equated with satisfactory outcomes or consummations. It is at this point that most recent Theists become interested in volunaristic logic. They, too, seek the most satisfactory outcomes in their quest for God and for optimistic attitudes toward the consummation of human enterprises. But this demand for "preferable" outcomes is an intellectual hazard for the religious

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Moreover, he may develop the more comprehensive or general conceptions of God and human destiny, and accept the satisfaction derived from the contemplation of this hypothesis rather than from psychosomatic experience, as proof of the truth of the theory. This, as we noted above, apparently prompted Brightman to deny pantheism and Horton to deny absolute immanence. Thinking must be prepared to accept actual conditions, whether or not a given thinker 'prefers' them.

This principle--that preference is no substitute for objective verification is readily recognized in other fields. The physician who examines a patient seeks to determine the source of illness and to reach the most hopeful prognosis. If, however, he is a physician worthy of his profession, he must diagnoze the conditions he observes whether or not either he or the patient 'prefers' this. Intelligent treatment is possible only when the 'facts' in the case have been determined. Among these, the 'fact' that the patient prefers to recover must be accepted. At the same time, it is not a relevant fact in trying to decide whether the patient has an infected appendix or an inoperable cancer. Truth, as a factual report of existent conditions, is a highly prized commodity in medicine. It should also be in philosophy and religion.

The definition of God as personal and partially immanent may be preferable to many Occidentals. This is a psychological fact to the extent that it is a verifiable report of our preferences. As such, it may lead us into long and involved processes of reasoning in the endeavor to find grounds for believing it. As a candidate for truth, however, this hypothesis must be verified, first, by asking how it may be proved, and then by making the tests specified. Our "preference" for this view of God will serve as a motiviational factor compelling us to explore every possibility; it must not be accepted in place of actual verificatory operations.

Schiller drew attention to this danger in an article under the intriguing title "Truthseekers and Soothsayers."[15] "Truthseekers" were defined as those who approached the cognitive situatinn seeking for the best possible solution. Their interest was the most advantageous resolution of the difficulty in hand. Truthseekers are not absolutists since they are ever on the alert for better solutions than those held at present. Truth is for the truthseekers something which is essentially progressive and based upon selections of the relevant data.

"Soothsayers" approach the problem of truth with essentially different interests. They seek to satisfy or 'sooth' themselves and others emotionally rather than to reach conclusions based upon experimentation or practice. In this connection, Schiller regretted that the connection between "sooth" and "soothe" had been lost, and would have welcomed its re-establishment. "It would serve to indicate a very important sentimental function of absolute truth as a sort of 'paregorical imperative,' and would distinguish it very neatly from its humdrum everyday uses."

This distinction between "truthseekers" and "soothsayers" was made by Schiller to call attention to truth as a human instrument in the quest for actual and preferable consummations. It was thus something different in principle from the "truths" which were believed to be "absolute" and inapplicable to the human situation of everyday living.

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[illegible] to deny possibilities and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

We may approach the evaluation of voluntaristic logic by an examination of its applicability to the several problems in religious thinking. The primary contention involved in pragmatic and voluntaristic logic in this connection is that certain ideas may be "made true" by human choices and human activity. William James stated that sometimes it is our faith "in a fact which helps to create the fact."[17] Schiller believed that "true" and "false" were "valuations," and that truth is "made" in the process of verification.[18] Thus both James and Schiller view the cognitive process as a phase of mankind's struggle for survival and life--enrichment. If one succeeds in making an idea come true which enables him to achieve his goals, this is the truth in the specific situation. If he fails to make the idea yield good results, whatever other significance it may have is presumably irrelevant.

This is in essence the logic of efficiency, and is basic to British and American pragmatism, instrumentalism, humanism and voluntarism. It has been used by American theologians and philosophers of religion who may not care to call themselvesbby these names. The point is that they consider the "value" of an idea as its primary validation. As indicated in the previous discussions of "The Logic of Recent Theism," this type of thinking is utilized in whole or in part by most of them.

Let us admit at once that this form of thinking is valid in some areas of religious thinking. Religion represents the attempt to achieve specific values by means of a reinterpretation of man and his cosmic Environment and through the use of various techniques.[19] Techniques are defined as overt behaviors engaged in by individuals and groups for the purpose of achieving values believed to be religious. The Logic of Efficiency appears to be perfectly adapted to the solution of the problems posed by techniques. Is prayer more effective than meditation? or sacramentalism than ethical and social activity interpreted as cooperation with God in the realizatbon of the good life? The answer must be determined in actual practice. What is the effect of the persistent use of certain techniques upon the lives of those who employ them? Here truth is 'made' in the actual practice of the implications of specific hypotheses. To the extent the recent Theists rely upon the logic of efficiency innthe area of the techniques of religion, they are to be commended for their insight.

When we face the problem of God, however, the situation is quite different. The term God emerges from the second or reinterpretive phase of religious experience. When men find it impossible to change external conditions to meet their subjective interests, some reference is normally made to the Existential Medium, the more inclusive Environment upon which they have relied for the conservation of their religious values, and in cooperation with whice they have sought these values. In so far as this is true, the reality called God must be subjected to two tests: (1) the test of objective existence, and (2) that of religious value or availability. The logic of efficiency of recent Theists apparently ignores the first of these two tests. There is profound interest in the religious significance of various God-concepts, but there does not appear to be a correspondingly deep interest in their truth-values. It should be obvious that a non-existent reality is not actually 'available,' and to the extent that persons rely upon such non-existent reality they may find "comfort" in their beliefs, but it is a comfort derived from fiction rather than fact. Eventually, when some crucial test is made, the fictional character of such a non-existent Deity will become evident. This is but to say that it is impossible to ignore the test of objective existence no matterhow deep our concern for "religious values" in a given conception of God may be.

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This is in essence the logic of efficiency, and is basic to British and American pragmatism, instrumentalism, humanism and voluntarism. It has been used by American theologians and philosophers of religion who may not care to call themselves by those names. The point is that they consider the "value" of an idea as its primary validation. As indicated in the previous discussions of "The Logic of Recent Theism," this type of thinking is utilized in whole or in part by most of them.

Let us admit at once that this form of thinking is valid in some areas of religious thinking. Religion represents the attempt to achieve specific values by means of a reinterpretation of man and his cosmic Environment and through the use of various techniques.[8] Techniques are defined as overt behaviour engaged in by individuals and groups for the purpose of achieving values believed to be religious. The logic of Efficiency appears to be peculiarly adapted to the solution of the problems posed by techniques. Is prayer more efficacious than meditation? or sacramentalism than ethical and social activity interpreted as cooperation with God in the realization of the Good Life? The answer must be determined in actual practice. What is the effect of the penitent use of certain techniques upon the life of those who employ them? Here truth is 'made' in the actual practice of the implications of specific hypotheses. To the extent the recent Theists rely upon the logic of efficiency in the area of the techniques of religion, they are to be commended for their insight.

When we face the problem of God, however, the situation is quite different. The term God emerges from the second or reinterpretive phase of religious experience. When man find it impossible to change external conditions to meet their subjective interests, some reference is normally made to the Ultimate Medium, the more inclusive Environment upon which they have relied for the conservation of their religious values, and in cooperation with which they have sought these values. In so far as this is true, the reality called God must be subjected to two tests: (1) the test of objective existence, and (2) that of religious value or availability. The logic of efficiency of recent Theists apparently ignores the first of these two tests. There is profound interest in the religious significance of various God-concepts, but there does not appear to be a corresponding deep interest in their truth-values. It should be obvious that a non-existent reality is not actually 'available,' and to the extent that persons rely upon such non-existent reality they may find "comfort" in their beliefs, but it is a comfort derived from fictions rather than facts. Inevitably when some crucial test is made, the fictional character of such a non-existent Deity will become evident. This is but to say that it is impossible to ignore the test of objective existence no matterhow deep our concern for "a religious value" in a given conception of God may be.

This means that the best reliable "the right to believe" in any idea is that

satisfies given religious demands may not be considered legitimate. One has "the right to believe" in the God defined by recent Theism when the objective evidence supports this view, butnot otherwise.

The next question follows normally: can we "make" the Theistic conception of God true by voluntarily accepting it and then acting on that basis? Let us suppose that a given group of philosophers were determined to "make" Hegel's theory of the dialectical development of history true. Would their determination to believe this, and their subsequent behavior as though it were true actually remake history to conform to this theory? The answer appears clear: if history actually developed as Hegel has affirmed, the question of whether or not we believed it is irrelevant. If it did not, then all the affirmations of persons would make no difference to it. The past remains what it was. Our understanding of it may change with growing information and new hypotheses. These newer hypotheses may approximate more closely what actually occurred, but they do not make or unmake what has been.

It is rather difficult to understand how our beliefs would change the nature or structure of reality. If the Idealistic conception of reality is approximately true--if reality is essentially non-spatial, suprasensuous or valuational--then it would appear impossible to change it by acting as if it were different. Conversely, if the organic view of reality is a more approximate view of it, then all the denials of the Idealists would appear to be irrelevant. It does not appear possible to "remake" reality either by thinking about it or even by acting as if the more desired view were correct.

Schiller, it should be observed, recognized the limitations of the "truth-making" function of thought. When he considered the problem of metaphysics, he concluded that no system had "coercive" qualities. It was an individual "creation," and as such might be 'useful' to its creator, but not to others. "In the last resort every genuine and heartfelt metaphysic is a poem, and derives its unity and aesthetic appeal from the personal vision and imagination of its 'maker' or poet.[20] The human mind cannot transform reality into any form itchooses, nor can human activity transform more than the superficial phases of the world, even with atomic fission. The voluntaristic logic of Schiller is excellent within the limits set for it, namely, the sphere in which we can transform or "make" things conform to our desires by means of our actions. It is obvious, or should be, that the basic characteristics or characteristics of the totality within which we live, move and have our being cannot be so changed. They may be understood, and we may continuously revise our conceptions as our knowledge grows, but some consideration should be given to the difference between changing reality and changing our understanding of it.

We may summarize this phase of our discussion briefly. The logic of efficiency is certainly applicable to the area of religious techniques. We may determine the efficacy of prayer, mysticism, formal worship and asceticism in the field of religion by testing them out in actual experience, and probably in no other way. But this should not lead to the assumption that because voluntarism is operationally effective in one area it is the same in all. When we change the nature of the problems with which we deal, we must consider the changes in our methods which may be required. An examination indicates that thenature of God--defining God in objective rather than subjective terms--is not "made" or "remade" by thinking or even by acting. The logic which appears most adequate here will be presented in a future issue when we consider the logic of Absolute Immanence. Here we must be content to point out the difficulties in the logic based upon "the will to believe"

The next question follows in logical sequence: are we justified in the Idealistic conception of the future by voluntarily accepting it and then acting on that basis? Let us suppose that a given group of philosophers were undermined to "make" Hegel's theory of the dialectical development of history true. Would their determination to believe this, and their subsequent behavior as though it were true actually remake history to conform to this theory? The answer appears clear: if history actually developed as Hegel has affirmed, the question of whether or not we believed it is irrelevant. If it did not, then all the affirmations of persons would make no difference to it. The past remains what it was. Our understanding of it may change with growing information and new hypotheses. These newer hypotheses may approximate more closely what actually occurred, but they do not make or remake what has been.

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and Voluntarism in investigating the specific problem of the nature of God.

V

Another phase of the logic of recent Theism deserves attention. It is the basic assumption upon which some of its logic is abased. In Bowne's terms, as quoted above, "Whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof."[21] It may be granted that this is the way in which common-sense thinking is done, as Bowne affirmed, but this does not mean such thinking must be accepted uncritically, if at all. If one accepts this view, the result may be a logic of wishes, or urges or basic drives. The organism has no desire for extinction: one may say, therefore, that our total nature "calls for" continued existence upon this planet, or in some "erotic paradise" of the Trobriand Islanders, or even in the most sacred heaven of the medieval Christian. This may be accepted, if the facts justify it, as a correct reading of man as a biological creature, except in so far as he fails to achieve satisfactory adjustments and turns "against himself." At the same time, this biological or even axiological demand cannot be accepted as legislative for the universe. Man lives and man dies. The fact that he does not wish to die must be given consideration, but cannot be accepted as proving his immortality sithout considerable of additional support.

It may be true that many people wish to believe in God as defined by recent Theism. The fact that this is the case must be accepted as a commentary upon man andhis interests, but it cannot be accepted as proof that this theory is true. It may be accepted as the driving force or impelling motive back of much theological thinking, but may not be accepted as a substitute for the "active" persistent, andcareful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds which support it, and the further conclusions to which it leads," which John Dewey believes is the essence of reflective thought.[22] If one begins with the assumption that reality must be such as to satisfy our "total natures," we may, already, have accepted our conclusions before the cognitive process is actually under way. It would appear more reasonable to examine a human being to determine what his needs and interests may be, and then examine his environment to determine whether or not it is such as to satisfy these needs and interests fully. This is, of course, the method which is used in other than theological fields. There appears to be no grounds upon which theology can adopt a method which gives it such an advantage over all others. The sociologist must study man and his socio-physical environment; the political scientist must do the same. Upon what grounds can we excuse the theologian from examining the total environment within which man is found if he wishes to define thenature of that environment, or especially that phase of it which is Divine?

Among recent Theists, thisquestion is answered in terms of the view that man is organic to nature. As such, he reflects nature inhhimself and is reflected therein. To the extent that man is organic to nature---continuous with and immanent in--he may be examined as a "fair sample" of what this reality is. Thus the problems of ontology or being may be resolved by beginning with man as the datum. What, then, is true of man is true of nature.[23]

But this conception is subject to further analysis. It is doubtless true that man is organic to nature, i.e., that he is immanent in and continuous with the organic life on this planet and is dependent upon both the planet and the sun for sis sustenance. If one wishes to investigate the life of this planet, it is essential that man be given serious consideration. He is part and a product of a long evolutionary process which goes back at least to the simplest forms of life empirically recoverable. Furthermore, he is one of the more complex of the existing forms, and is perhaps the most complex which has ever existed

on the earth. Granted all this, how much relevance should be given to the study of man when our concern is with astronomy or even geology? Man, in these studies, becomes a minor factor as a datum. He may be important, epistemologically, as the one who is thinking, but he is not important as a datum. This is but to say that whereas man is organic to part of nature, the life on the earth, he is by no means organic to all of nature.

This means that if we begin with the assumption that man is the basic datum in terms of which we shall understand God as the basic factor in all reality, we have practically begged the question at the start. This may be a conclusion we reach at the end of our thinking. We must not begin with assumptions which preclude us from reaching any other conclusions.

VI

We are left, then, with the view that recent Theism appears to be a brave attempt to interpret man and his total environment, jincluding God. It provides the foundation for many beliefs which would be quite serviceable for anxious and troubled persons. At the same time, its basic logic isnot above suspicion. Its primary defect lies in the attempt to rely upon human choices or decisions as legislative for reality. William James was careful to insist that we had the "right to believe" only in such areas where our choices vitally affected the truth of our prbpositions; where failure to choose meant a negative choice. Schiller also confined himself to such human and social situations where the individual's choice actually served to "make" true the proposition he had accepted. When it came to metaphysical questions, he was unwilling to think of systematic metaphysics as more than "poems," whose appeal lay in the personal vision and imagination of their "makers."

The logic of recent Theism is excellent in the area of religious techniques, in the areas where we seek to find more efficient methods of relating ourselves to God. It does not appear to be nearly as effective when we seek to understand the nature of God, unless indeed, God is nor more than an idea or poem which may prove satisfying to us.

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1. The Philosophy of Theism, (1887) p 25.
2. Ibid., pp 13f
4. James, W., The Will to Believeland Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1896) pp 2f
3. Brightman, E. S., A Philosophy of Religion, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), pp 126-219.
5. Ibid., p 11
6. Vide, The Iliff Review, Winter, 1947, pp 35ff
7. The Will to Believe, p 11
8. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion. p 128.
9. F. C. S. Schiller, Logic for Use, (1930), pp 137--144, presents a drastic criticism of coherence as a test of truth. Since he was an adherentof recent Theism, this criticism may well be given serious consideration.
10. Bowne, B. P. The Immancnet of God,(1905) p 85. In his Theory of Thought and Knowledge (1897) he placed great emphasis upon the practical in antithesis to the speculative and logical. Vide especially pp 367-385.
11. Brightman, The Problem of God, (1930), for a first discussion of "The Given". A good summary of his early statement is published as "The Given and Its Critics" in Religion in Life, I Winter, 1932, 1, pp 134-145. Brightman h he here attempts to meet the first criticisms of his theory.
12. Vide Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, Chapter 12.
13. Schiller, Our Human Truths, (New York, 1939) pp 292f.
14. Schiller, Logic for Use. pp 106ff
15. The Personalist, July, 1934, pp 209-218
16. Ibid., p 215
17. The Will to Believe, p 25
18. "Truthseekers and Soothsayers," The Personalist, XV, p 213
19. This analysis of religion was presented in "Where Are We In Our Religious Thinking?" The Iliff Review, Vol II, No. 2 Spring 1945 pp 233ff
20. Logic for Use, pp453f.
21. Vide p 35, above
22. How We Think, (1910) p 6. In his voluminous work Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (1938), Dewey has elaborated this definition at some length.
23. Vide, A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. (second ed., 1920) pp 178f., and 210f., for a restrained statement of thisposition. A. C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism, (1927), p 66, states one view of it specifically.

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The philosophy of religion called Absolute Immanence is a relatively new development in American religious thinking. God is defined in wholly immanent terms. This does not mean that God does not transcent a given individual, or the whole human race, or even the world as now known. It does mean that no positive affirmations are made concerning God as a reality presumably transcending the Existential Medium, namely, that in which we live and move and have our being. If God is known, he must be a knowable reality. As such, nothing can be said about God as transcendent to the universe, or as suprarational. God as defined by this school of religious thought is wholly, completely or absolutely immanent. It may not be correct to speak of God as "immanent", so far as some members of the group are concerned. "Immanence" suggests a transcendent Reality which is in whole or part indentifiable with something else. Immanence as here used is rather an epistemological than a metaphysical term. It indicates the direction which cognition must take if it is investigate the nature of God.

The growth of this theory can be sketched quite briefly. In 1859, when Darwin published "The Origin of Species," many Protestant thinkers recognized some of the implications of his conclusions. The Issue centered in the authority of the Bible. It was evident to many that one must adopy the evolutionary viewpoint and reject the special creation theory presented variously in the Old Testament. There appeared to be no way of reconciling the two conceptions. Those those faith was linked up inextricably with the inerrant Scripture fought the new theory bitterly. But one is inclined to think that the basic issue lay elsewhere. It was faith in a miracle-working God which was threatened by the evolutionary theory, and this belief presupposed the transcendence and free activity of God. If the present world and man were results of determinable factors such as Darwin indicated, then men were at the mercy of these causes rather than, through God's help, master of them. This conception of God needed some support, which these men found in the doctrine of an inerrant Scripture. Once this was shaken, belief in God as supernatural miracle-worker became difficult to maintain.

At the same time , other men were slowly coming to terms with the evolutionary conception. Among others, George Trumbull Ladd and Bordon Parker Bowne, saw the possibility of reinterpreting the concept so that it would not endanger the Christian faith as they understood it. Gradually, they began to view nature as the method selected by God for achieving his divine purposes. The impact of the growing prestige of science, and the gradual recognition of nature as relm of rich possibilities, led these men to bring God part way to nature. This movement culminated in Partial Immannence, or more popularly, Theism. Absolute Immanence represents a further development of this general trend.

This general position can hardly be called a "school" or a"movement." It is, so far as American though is concerned, a tendency more or less characteistic of loosely associated groups of students. Shailer Mathews, Gerald Birney Smith, Henry Nelson Wieman, Bernard E. Meland, Harold A Bosey, Bernard M. Loomer, numerous British and American philosophers and theologians can be listed as more or less in accord with this tendency.. Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan, Jan C. Smuts and A. N. Whitehead are among the better known philosophers whose thought has been determinative. Since this is not an history of the tendency, but rather an attempt to unearth its basic assumptions, we shall select two men whose writings are most widely known to students of religion: Shailer Mathews and Henry Nelson Wieman. An analysis of their positions will serve to indicate the general nature of this philosophy of religion, and the scope of the problems presented by it.

*The Iliff Review, Vol. VI, No. 2, Spring, 1949

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Dean Mathews developed the theory, in some detail, that theology consists in social patterns used to justify the attempt to achieve values religiously. The source of religion was found in man's attempt to escape annihilation. Furthermore, it represented one of mankind's two ways of adjustment to environmental factors. The first is the impersonal approach, represented today by science and technology; the second is a personal approach, represented by religion. "In its ultimate nature the behavior represented by the word religion can be described as a phase of the life-process which seeks by control or cooperation to gain help from those elements of its conmich environment upon which men feel themselves dependent, by setting up social--that is, personal--relations with them".[2] God is that in one's cosmic environment with which one established such personal relations. In more specific language, he defined God as the personality-producing and personality-responsive phase of man's environment. If man is a product of his invironment, and is he finds it possible to establish personal--that is, social--relations with is environment, he needs some name to designate the reality so described. Mathews proposed to use the term which he belived had been used historically for this prupose, namely, God.

But God is more than is stated thus far. Every concept which men have used to denote God has been one which expressed relations whose content was derived from some social pattern. The fact that the concept implied relat'ons proves that it refers to reality, since "only realities can be in relations."[3] God is, therefore, definable as "reality conceived in patterns."[4] "Pattern was a basic concept in Mathews' thought. He defined it as "a social institution or practice used to give content and inteligibility to otherwise unrationalized beliefs."[5] Unless one is prepared to assert that religious experience is wholly delusive, men have found help in it. In some way, not yet completely understandable, men can establish personal relations with the personality-producing forces in their environment, and find value in such relationship. But men are in part rational. They must find some intellectual justification for this attempt to realize values religiously. They have found justification in terms of analogy. They have used the enalogy of the sovereign with all of the corollaries which flow from it. In this way they found it possible to seek for values in terms of personal relations with, not a person, but the personality-producing forces in the environment. This quest for values could be integrated into their rational world-view by means of a socially acceptable analogy.

According to Mathews' theology, God was personal, but not a personality. The God of traditional throught was thoroughly individual and could be pictured in imagination. When an increasingly mature intellectual began to conseive God in unversal terms, individuality became an hindrance. The concept "spirit" was then introduced to denote personality without what had been it necessary correlate, namely, individuality. But the concept "spirit" gradually lost it status in psychological literature. When it lost it "social acceptability," it had to be replaced. Mathews proposed the term "organism" in it place. God as organic may be personal in that men may establish personal relations with him, but he is not an individual, and therefore not a personality.[6]

This position may be summarized briefly. God is the religious name for the personality-producing and personality-responsive Factor in our cosmic medium. He is within this cosmic medium, since only within it are relations possible. Since God is a reality in relations, he is an experiential reality.

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The concepts religion and God, in Mathews' thought, lacked specific content. As a life-long friend and colleague once remarked, "they were delightfully vague. God as personally-responsive appears to be a meaningful conception, but this meaning was difficult to determine. Reglgion, as the system of personal or social relations with the personality-producing Factor was likewise, on the surface, a meaningful proposition. But when one sought to isolate the specific values deribavle from this relationship, the answers given were not too precise. Usually, the good Dean has recourse to analogy when pressed at this point. "What delp does one get from the sun? Get out into the sunshine and find out?" So with God: try these personal relations and see what happens!

This is a problem faced by all contemporary religious thinkers. When growing information concerning man and his world provided precise information concerning man and his world provided precise information of the causes of rain, sickness and health, and even of moral failures and successes, the basis for belief in miracle gradually disappeared. With the loss of confidence in the inerrancy of the Scriptures, one could no longer assure that the ills of life will be conpensated for by the blisses of eternity. These changes in belief have made necessary changes in the claims men have made in religion. Despite the usual claim that religion is the only hope for modern man, even Neo-Orthodox thinkers no longer expect God to do what we can possibly do. And the nineteenth century Liberals and their contemporary disciples, relying as they do upon some vaguely defined Law of Progress, have become hesitant in their claims today. Finally, the Communists whose reliance upon a metaphysical principle enbedded in their Dialectis of Economic History, still wage relentless "cold war" as if they believed man had to do most of it himself. Mathews belonged to his generation in his search for a modern interpretation of the function of religion.

This is the problem to which Henry Nelson Wieman has devoted a long and industrious life. His first volume appeared to be wholly devoted to the problem of God defined as that something upon which man was most dependent for his most inclusive values. At the same time, the book was devoted to another problem, namely, the contribution which religion presumably could make to scientific method if human values were to be preserved and enhanced. Wieman feared the appearance of the coldly impersonal scientist whose interest in objective research had killed in him all of the finer sensitivities which make life significant. "Spontaneity, creativity, and mutual appreciation, can never be manufactured by scientific method." Mysticism, as a primary religious technique, was needed for the creation and development of these qualities.[7]

In a more recent work, "The Source of Human Good" (1946), Wieman defined God as the Creative Event which is the only source of these human and humane values. He approaches the meaning of Creative Event through a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values. The former is a structure of events whose qualities are more or less exclusive. This structure of events contains its own qualities. Its relationships with other events is relatively unimportant. Intrinsic value "may be defined as a structure of events endowing each happening as it occurs with qualities derived from other events in the structure." 8 The following paragraph summarizes quite well the activity of the Creative Event: "When good increases, a process of reorganization is going on, generating new meanings, intergrating them with the old, endowing each event as it occurs with a wider range of reference, molding the life of man into a more deeply unified totality of meaning. The wide diversities, varieties, and contrasts of all the parts of man's life are being progressively transformed into a more richly inclusive whole. The several parts of his live are connected in mutual support, vivifying and enhancing one another in the creation of a more inclusive unity of events and possibilities. This process of reorganization is what we shall call the 'creative event.' It is creative good, standing in contrast to both kinds of neutral goods we have been considering". 9

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According to this conception of the Creative Event, human life is in the hands of God. Apart from God, he is helpless; committed to God, the future is filled with undreamed of possibilities. This means that sensitivity to the workings of the Creative Event is a prerequisite to the achievement of the highest human values. Fixity of belief is as repugnant to Wieman as it is to Count Korzybski; contentment and pride, as obstructive of human good to Wieman as to Niebuhr and Tillich. God as creative event has nursed the life of man from earliest beginnings to its present condition. If man will give himself in complete devotion to God, the future is open; if he fails to do so, a new Dark Ages looms before us.

God is thus an essential phase or structure of our cosmic medium. As such, he is absolutely immanent. He is not identifiable with the total universe, but only with that phase of it which is the source of human good. From this poin cof view, religion does not take the place of science or the technologies. It is responsible for providing the conditions within which the highest good is possible. This begins becomes evident in Wieman's consideration of the four subevents which constitute the Creative Event as such: (i) emerging awareness of qualitative meaning derived from communication with others; (ii) the intergration of emerging qualitative meaning with the meanings one already possesses, resulting in personality development; (iii) a resultant expansion and enrichment of the appreciable world as a consequence of the preceding sub-events; and (iv) an expanded and deepened community between those who participate in the creative event. 10

Wieman has provided some specific content for the idea of God which Mathews proposed. The personality-producing and personally-responsive forces now become the Creative Event with its four subevents. Furthermore, he has put specific content into the values which one may receive from adopting "personal" relations with the personality-producing forces. He has answered specifically the charges of both Neo-Orthodox and Neo-Scholastic spokesmen and they alone have answers to the basic questions posed by modern man.. Whether or not his answers are justifiable or acceptabe remains to be seen..It must be admitted that together, Mathews and Wieman have proposed specific and intelligent answers to the quest for meaning in religion for modern man.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF ABSOLUTE IMMANENCE

The logic of Absolute Immanence, as exemplified in the writings of Mathews and Wieman, rests upto two basic assumptions. The first is: Human needs, including the religious are natural needs, and their satisfaction, in so far as it is possible, results from adjustment and readjustment of the relations between man and his social and cosmic environment. This means that man is organic to nature, that he and nature are inextricable parts one of the other. Man may "hunger" for God, but this hunger is a natural hunger whose satisfaction must be found either in the total environment or some phase of it.

The acceptance of this assumption determines in several ways the systems erected upon it. In the first place, if one assumes that religious needs are natural needs, and must find their satisfaction in the relation of man with his existential medium, the demand for extra-cosmic Gods becomes irrelevant. Horton's proposal that we need a God of divine greatness who transcends the whole cosmic process in order to satisfy religious needs adequately, becomes a problem in human psychology and cultural history rather than an accepted truch. It is true that men have sought for the kind of God Horton envisages; their reasons for so doing, however, may not be above suspicion. Men have often sought in religion for the impossible: namely, for powers other than the world to save them from the exigencies of this world. Religion in other words, has often been a "short cut" to values, to use T. V. Smith's suggestive phrase.[11] Persons with highly developed ethical perceptions have often despaired

God is thus no conceptual place or abstractness of our needs nothing. As such, he is absolutely immanent. He is not identifiable with the local universe, but only with that phase of it which is the source of human good. From this point of view religion does not take the place of science or the technologies. It is reasonable for providing the conditions within which the highest good is possible. This begins to become evident in Hegel's consideration of the four subverses which constitute the Creative Event as such: (i) energies, awareness of qualitative meaning derived from communication with others; (ii) the interpretation of emerging qualitative meaning with the meaning one already possesses, resulting in personality development (iii) a resultant expansion and enrichment of the appreciable world as a consequence of the preceding sub-events; and (iv) an expanded and deepened community between those who participate in the creative event. 10

Hegel has provided some specific content for his idea of God which Whitehead presupposed. The personality-producing and personality-responsive forces now become the Creative Event with the four subverses. Furthermore, he has put specific content into the values which one may receive from adopting "personal" relations with the personality producing forces. He has answered specifically the charges of both Feuerbach and Nietzsche and Scholastic spokesmen and they alone. [illegible] reasons to the basic questions posed by modern man. Whether or not his answers are justifiable or acceptable remains to be seen. It must be admitted that Feuerbach, Nietzsche and Hegel have proposed specific and intelligent answers to the quest for meaning in religion for modern man.

MAGIC ASPECTS OF AN NEW IMAGINATION

The logic of Absolute Immanence, as exemplified in the writings of Whitehead and Hegel, rests upon two basic assumptions. The first is: Human needs, including the religious needs are natural needs, and their satisfaction, in so far as it is possible, results from adjustment and readjustment of the relations between man and his social and cosmic environment. This means that man is organic to nature, that he and nature are interrelatable parts of the other. Man may "hunger" for God, but this hunger is natural hunger which can be satisfied only in the total environment of some place of it.

The acceptance of this assumption determines in several ways the problems created upon it. In the first place, if one assumes that religious needs are natural needs and must find their satisfaction in the relation of man with his substantial nature, the demand for extra-cosmic Gods becomes irrelevant. Whitehead proposed that we need a God of divine persuasion who transcends the whole cosmic process in order to satisfy religious needs adequately, becomes a problem in human psychology and cultural history rather than an unsolved crisis. It is true that men have sought for the kind of God Hegel envisages; their reasons for so doing, however, may not be above suspicion. Man have often sought in religion for the impossible: escaping the powers other than the world to save them from the originators of this world. [illegible] in other words, has often been a "short cut" to values. [illegible] "faith" [illegible] have often displaced [illegible] with highly developed cultural personalities [illegible] have [illegible] place.

of realizing the highest good by human efforts, and have sought in God the the power they themselves lacked. This ideal interest is commendable, but the fact is that we live in a world where imperfection is no novelty, and where men must find their higher satisfactions in moving toward the higher plateaus of moral living.

A second factor responsible for the demand for an extra-cosmic God is the depreciatory judgment placed upon nature or that part of our total Existential Medium directly or indirectly observable. Beginning with the Atomists in ancient Greece, men have persistently read out of nature the values experienced there, and have either denied their reality or placed them in some supra-sensible realm where, presumably, they remain untouched by the imperfections of this world. God, therefore, has been conceived as other than andapart from the existential medium. In the face of these demands, the Absolute Immanentalist asks for a clarification of the meaning of such terms as "nature", "cosmic environment," "human nature," and related terms. The problem apparently lies in the initial presuppositions with which men approach the realities denoted by these terms rather than in the realities themselves.[12] When this tendency toward the depreciation of the more immediate phases of the existential medium is noted, and corrected, the need for extra-cosmic cources of religious satisfaction may be reduced greatly.

The second result of the adoption of the assumption hat religious needs are natural and may find their satisfaction within the existential medium is a loss of interest in "absolutes." Relativity permeates religions thinking as well as other types. For this reason the demand for absolute power and absolute goodness in God fails to evoke much interest from the Absolute Immentalist. Adequate power, even if it is not absolute, is available to man in his efforts to reorganize his habits and his environment. Goodness if not absolute, at least intrinsic and creative, is also available if one will seek it. Rather than seeking for extra-cosmic power and goodness, the Absolute Immentalist believes men shoud devote themselves to the search for an utilization of the power which is here and the goodness which is possible.

This suggestion leads directly to the second assumption basic to the logic of Absolute Immanence. It is the: The "New Mentality" developed during the past four hundred years must become operative in religious thinking. By the "new mentality," we mean as themodern attitude toward cognition. As Whitehead phrased it, man of all ages have been interested either in "facts" as such or in "general Principles," but "it is this union ofpassionate interest in detailed facts with equal devotion to abstract generalization which forms the novelty of our present society."[13] It is an interest in clear and precise formulation of hypotheses--general principles, if you will--with complete devotion to public facts, which constitutes the "new mentality," an interest characteristic of Absolute Immanentalists. There is the basic interest in "stubborn and irreducible facts" characteristic of the traditional empiricist, but there is also the insistent upon the careful andhonest clarification of hypotheses. It is clarification and verfication of hypotheses which constitutes the new mentality.

The adoption of this assumption has specific effects u on thelogic ofAbsolute Immanence. In the first place, it denies all epistemological "short cuts" of every kind. This means that "faith" as an epistemological concept becomes meaningless; that paradox must be viewed as evidence of confusion rather than a way to clear and cogent thinking. All attempts to circumvent the normal cognitive processes are viewed with the greatest suspicion, and are asked to present their logical credentials.

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[illegible] ing themselves, [illegible] this idea, however, is commendable, for [illegible] in a world where immediacy is no virtue, and where man must find [illegible] satisfactions in moving toward the higher pleasure of moral living.

A second factor responsible for the demand for an extra-realm God is the desire for any judgment placed upon nature or that part of our human [illegible] or indirect, observable. Beginning with the Pleasure in ancient Greece, man has persistently read out of nature the values supposedly in it, and have either denied their reality or placed them in some super-sensible realm where, presumably, they are unaffected by the imperfections of this world. God therefore, has been variously [illegible] other than subject from the material realm. In the face of this [illegible] immaterial [illegible] of the meaning of such terms as "nature" [illegible] environment." "Human nature," and related terms. The problem is [illegible] artificial presuppositions with which such approaches the reality [illegible] rather than in the realities themselves. [illegible] the moral, and [illegible] the more immediate [illegible] for environmental [illegible] satisfaction may be reduced [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] union objectivistic intellectual unbelief." 3. It is an interest in [illegible] tradition which forms the foundation of our personal existence, if you will--with complete and precise formulation of hypotheses--general principles, if you will--with complete devotion to public tests, which constitutes the "non normality" an interest characterized of Absolute Immaterialism. There is the basic interest in "stubborn and irrevocable facts" characteristic of the scientific complicity, but there is also the implication upon the careful authoritative classification of hypotheses. It is a justification and verification of hypotheses within constituted the new normality.

The adoption of this attitude has specific effects on the behavior characteristic Immanence. In the first place, it denies all quasi-metaphysical "first cause." I every [illegible]. This means also "faith" as an epistemological concept, [illegible] and [illegible] pseudo paradox must be closed as evidence of [illegible] cooperative processes and [illegible] thinking. All [illegible] to observation and [illegible] [illegible] with the [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]

The second consequence sharpens the issue somewhat. It is that the "new mentality" tends to emphasis behavioral verification as its primary test of truth. This is evident in Mathews' emphasis upon the pragmatic outcomes of religious beliefs, and his refusal to consider theology as in any significant way metaphysical. It is also evident in Wieman's insistence that God is a "perceptual" object, and that religious thinking must proceed by way of "sensory observation, experimental behavior and inference."[15] This is a point which needs more clarification than it has received thus far. At the same time, the significance of Absolute Immanence such as a philosophy of religion depends upon rather close reliance upon it. Once this fails to meet criticism,[16] the way is open to a return to any of the other schools of thought.

THE LOGIC OF ABSOLUTE IMMANENCE:
A Critique

The logic of Absolute Immanence rests upon two assumptions: (i) Religious needs are continuous with other human needs, and find their satisfaction on the same level where they arise; and (ii) Religious thinking is also continuous with other forms of human thinking and must utilize recent methodologies in solving its problems.

Dean Mathews, accepting these basic assumptions, derived from them a form of Qualified Pragmatism. He believed the concept God is true precisely to the extent that it proves useful to groups of people. The general principle underlying Pragmatism is this: That idea is presumably true whose consequences in action are in harmony with anticipated action and results. Applies to Mathews' conception of God, it meant that the truth-value of the idea was exhaustively determinable in terms of its religious value to the individuals and groups which believe it.[17]

This qualified pragmatism controlled Mathews' study of Christianity. He observed that the conceptions of God held by given groups were always formulated in terms of some social pattern, predominantly political. God was at various times, King, Emperor, Feudal Lord, Monarch, Father. What is the truth-value of these several patterns? To this question, Mathews answered that these social patterns were used in order to justify the establishment of personal relations with the personality-producing and personally-responsive Activity in our cosmic environment. The proper question is not: Does this Activity have the characteristics of King, Monarch, or Father? but rather: Does this pattern help persons to extablish help-receiving relations with reality so conceived? In other words, the question of the objective truth of the referent of the concept God is replaced by pragmatic considerations found in human living.

This logic has been subjected to critical evaluation by various theologians and philosphers. It is , in the main, identical with the logic of recent Theism, discussed in previous issues of this journal, and subject to the criticisms of that logic.[18] We shall have occasion to consider this again, when the significance of the several logics is before us. It is sufficient here to observe that this form of religious pragmatism may be applicable in the field of worship--when one seeks to determine the relative efficiency of various forms of religious techniques, but its relevance to the problem of God, defined as an objective reality, is questionable.

The "new Mentality"[19] described by Whitehead has been adopted as completely by Henry Nelson Wieman as by any other man I know. He defined truth as "any specifiable structure pertaining to events and their possibilities. Truth is not knowledge, but must be potential knowledge."[20] Truth is then a character of events which may be made specific. In its form as potentially specifiable, it consists of truth. When it has been specified, in language or meaningful symbols, then this truth has become knowledge. Truth is thus the linguistically specifiable structures of events which may be apprehended or comprehended by persons.

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God is precisely such an event. The Creative Event as such is specificity; it has has specific structures and is a specific structure. When we have specified it or some phase of it in linguistic terms; we have knowledge of this creative event. But knowledge of this Creative Event depends upon the performance of two basic operations. The first is the clarification of the hypothesis under investigation. The second is that of verifying the clarified hypothesis. This process includes three elements - Wieman calls them "tests of Truth". 21 The first is observation; the second agreement among observers; the third is coherence.

Wieman defines observation as a "series of perceptual events in which selective attention distinguishes a structure of interrelatedness running through the series." 22 By perceptual event, he means "everything within and without the biological organism which experiment can demonstrate makes a difference to conscious awareness when the perceptual reaction occurs." 23 This makes specific what Whitehead meant when he said that the new mentality was concerned about the relation of general principles to "stubborn and irreducible facts." These facts become known to persons by means of observation, and Wieman would say, through a series of perceptual events. The perceptual event as defined in contestualistic terms includes both of the object - however described - and the perceiver.

It is evident that Wieman believes God to be a perceptual object or perceptual event. God is known, if he is known, only by way of perception. Wieman is careful to distinguish the automatic and habitual selectivity involved in the perception of small objects from that which is required to perceive God. The distinction may be made clear by comparing the processes whereby men observe skulls and vestigial remains and that thereby they "observe" evolution. Wieman believes in both instances, the proper cognitive term is "perception." 24 This would appear to confuse "object" and "theory" in ways hardly justifiable. Nevertheless, Wieman has been insistent that only if God is actually perceived do we have cognitive knowledge of him.

Furthermore, such cognitive knowledge must be supplemented by agreement among observers. This is not "social verification" in any superficial sense of that term; it means that every qualified observer must see approximately the same thing under similar conditions, or doubt is cast upon the veridical character of the observations. Finally the propositions verified by observation must not contradict others so supported. This is the test of "coherence". We may define this method in the following terms: That proposition is presumably true which can be integrated harmoniously with all other propositions believed to be true. Wieman thus believes that our ideas concerning the nature of God must be subjected to three tests: (i) they must be supported by observational data; (ii) this data must be observed or observable by numerous observers in comparable circumstances; (iii) they must be supported by whatever other truths we hold rather than contradicted by them.

Those who are familiar with epistemological literature will recognize Wieman's method as related to Logical Empiricism. Logical Empiricism, by general agreement, is a new formulation in many variant forms, of the "new mentality". As is true of many new movements, it has extremes which would be denied by Absolute Immanentalists in religious thought; at the same time, it has at least two central emphases which constitute the heart of the logic of Absolute Immanence. The first is the analysis of meaning. Shailer Mathews spent much of his time with the question: Precisely what is the meaning or content of any given idea of God? Wieman has kept the concept "meaning" right at the center of his thought. Others have been less concerned with "meaning" than with "analysis". To them, "vagueness of meaning is the mind's original sin," in the words of M.T.McClure. In either case, however, the task is that of clarification

[illegible] the specific [illegible] phase of [illegible] edge of this [illegible] given by the [illegible] verifying the [illegible] is then "[illegible]" [illegible] importance; the third is [illegible]

Wieman defines observation as a "pattern of [illegible] events in which [illegible] distinguish [illegible] perceptual events, he means everything [illegible] opportunity [illegible] makes a difference to [illegible] final reaction [illegible] This makes [illegible] the new mentality was [illegible] about the relation of [illegible] and its [illegible] "These facts become known [illegible] and Wieman would say, through a series of perceptual events. The [illegible] defined in [illegible] terms [illegible] - between [illegible] and the perceiver.

It is evident that Wieman believes God to be a perceptual object [illegible] God is known, if he is known, only by way of perception. [illegible] distinguish the [illegible] and [illegible] in the [illegible] objects from that which is required to perceive God. The [illegible] by comparing the processes whereby men observe [illegible] that thereby [illegible]. Wieman [illegible] "This would [illegible]

Furthermore, [illegible] must be [illegible] by rigorously [illegible] "factual verification" in any [illegible] meant that every [illegible] must [illegible] the same [illegible] conditions, or doubt is cast upon the veridical character of the [illegible] the propositions verified by observation must not contradict others so supported. [illegible] is the test of "coherence". We may define this method in the following [illegible] proposition is presumably true which can be integrated harmoniously with all other propositions believed to be true. Wieman [illegible] that are ideas concerning the nature of God must be subjected to three tests: (i) they must be supported by [illegible] data; (ii) this data must be observed or observable by competent observers [illegible] comparable circumstances; (iii) they must be supported by whatever other truths we hold rather than contradicted by them.

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To clarify means to remove ambiguity, confusion, vagueness. Precision means to define precisely or describe accurately. 24

The second emphasis consists in an almost exclusive reliance upon empirical data as verificatory material. Mathews insisted that the socially-cohesive effect of a given conception of God - "reality conceived in patterns" - represented its highest value. Wieman asserts that God must be a "perceptual event" and that our knowledge of God must be empirically-derived and observationally verified. This places the logic of Absolute Immanence in the empirical field, and as such, makes it subject to the criticisms of empirical logic in general. Every specific form of logical method has certain weaknesses, and is thus subject to criticism. We may assume, however, that if the basic assumptions fundamental to a given logic are relatively sound, then the method based upon it may be continuously improved until it becomes a useful cognitive instrument. With this in mind, we shall examine the two assumptions basic to the logical empiricism of Absolute Immanence. 26

The first assumption of Absolute Immanence implies that religious needs are "natural" rather than "supernatural" - human rather than extra human. Mathews believed that there were sources of help in the cosmos for those who established social relations with them. There was nothing particularly extraordinary about these sources of power; they were continuous with the other cosmic processes. Wieman believes that the Creative Event is a source of help to humanity in terms of reorganizing persons and the conditions under which they live. Here again, the help received is natural; it is continuous with other sources, and the values achieved are continuous with other values.

The primary criticism of this position comes from those whom we call Absolute Transcendentalists, or Neo-Orthodox. As we shall indicate, in a future issue, their criticism rests upon the fallacy of initial definition. By this we mean that certain values and realities are asserted by them to be so different from "natural" values and realities that they can find no source within the existential medium. 27 Precisely what is natural or not is not written upon the object or experience itself. It is a judgment based upon certain assumptions concerning the nature of nature and its potentialities and richness. This, then, is a proposition whose truth must be investigated, not a judgment self-evidently true. Since this is the case there are no prior reasons why religious needs may not be accepted as natural needs, and their satisfaction be presumably be found in the adjustment of intra-cosmic relations. Positive evidence for this conclusion will be presented in a later chapter.

The second assumption of the logic of Absolute Immanence was this: Religious thought is in harmony with much of the scientific and empirical thinking of the modern world; it accept the same rigorous logic as other and comparable studies. Specifically, this means that hypotheses must be clarified and stated precisely, and then subjected to empirical verification.

This assumption rests upon the acceptance of a given category for Deity. If Deity is a transcendent reality as the Absolute Transcendentalists assert, then behavioral verification is irrelevant. If, on the other hand, God is a dynamic reality, which is either directly or indirectly experiential, then the logic of Absolute Immanence becomes the only adequate logic. As indicated in another connection, the only method of validating categories for Deity is tradition, or more technically, deduction from previously established theories. 28 From this point of view, God is "Heavenly Father", "Creator of Heaven and Earth," or "Creative Event". The logic of Absolute Immanence is the proper logic to be used in the investigation of the consequences of God conceived as a dynamic reality in the existential medium. The real contribution the religious thinker is that of perfecting this logic, and using it as effectively as possible. At best, his knowledge of God will be imperfect and incomplete. With these assumptions and the logic based upon them, the knowledge we have should be relatively true knowledge. And this will be real gain.

1 A comparison of Ladd's "The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture", New York, 1885, Vol. I, pp. 236 ff., with his "philosophy of Religion", New York, 1905, vol. II, chapter 18, will indicate the changes suggested. The theory was not accepted by Ladd in either of these works as a theory of origins as such; it was reinterpreted theistically in both. At the same time, Ladd's theories of scriptures and of ontology had undergone real change. In the first volume, he sought to defend supernaturalism; in the second, he sought to avoid materialism.

2 Mathews, Shailer, "Social Problems and the Idea of God". THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION XI, No. 2, (April, 1931), p. 163.

3 Mathews, S., "The Growth of the Idea of God". New York: The MacMillan Co., 1931, p. 21

4 Mathews S., The Atonement and the Social Process, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930, p.

5 Ibid., p. 31.

6 The Growth of the Idea of God, p. 233

7 Wieman, H.N., Religious Experience and Scientific Method, New York: The MacMillan Co. 1926, p. 143

8 Wieman, The Source of Human Good, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, p. 55

9 Ibid., p. 56

10 Ibid., pp. 58-69

11 The Philosophic Way of Life, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929

12 Cf. my "Cognitive Quest for God," THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, vol. XXIII, No. 2, April, 1943, pp. 99 ff.

13 Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1925, p.

14 Cf. my "Reason in Religion", THE JOURNAL OF BIBLE AND RELIGION, vol. XV, No. 3, July, 1947, pp. 133 ff., for further reading in the place of metanoesis in religious thinking.

15 Wieman, "God is More than we can Think", CHRISTENDOM, I, Spring, 1936, p. 433 and his "Can God be Perceived?", THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, January, 1943.

16 Cf. Werkmeister, W.H., The Basis and Structure of Knowledge, New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1948, pp 40ff. for a summary of such criticisms.

17 Cf. Mathews, THE GROWTH OF THE IDEA OF GOD, pp. 229 ff.

18 Cf. my "Logic of Recent Theism, Part III", Iliff Review, Winter, 1948, pp. 35ff Other criticisms of this general position may be found in Robinson, D.S., The God of the Liberal Christian, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1926, chapter II; Pratt, J.B., The Religious Consciousness, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1920, p. 336; Perry, R.B., "What is the Good of Religion?", in RELIGION AND MODERN LIFE, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.

19 Cf. p. 89 above

20 Cf. The Source of Human Good, p. 164

21 Source of Human Good, p. 211

22 Ibid., pp. 211ff.

23 Ibid., pp. 182

24 Cf. Wieman, "Can God be Perceived?", THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. XXIII, Jan. 1943, No. 1, p. 26f.

25 The development of symbolic logic represents one phase of this demand for precision, accuracy, clarification. The rapid growth of interest in language and semantics is attributable, in large measure, to this same demand.

26 A good review of the literature of this logic is found in Hervert Feigl's "Logical Empiricism," in TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY, ed. Dagobert D. Runes, New York: Philosophical Library, 1947.

27 Cf. my "Cognitive Quest for God," THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, vol. XXIII, No. 2, April, 1943, pp. 99ff.

28 Cf. my "God as Dynamic Determinant," THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, vol. XXIII, No. 4, Oct., 1943, pp. 276ff., and "Analytic Approach to the God-Concept," RELIGION IN THE MAKING, vol. II, March, 1942, No., 3, pp. 252 ff.

VI The Presupposition of Absolute Demand *

R. G. Collingwood, in a significant essay, divides presuppositions into two classes: Relative and Absolute. The first are those which are used by the several sciences and disciplines in the investigation of their fields. As such they are used as though they were final. At the same time, each individual who uses them wishes, eventually, to determine whether or not they are true. The second class, or "absolute" presuppositions are of such nature that they are never subject to question. In fact, Collingwood asserts that it would be "nonsense" or "pseudo-metaphysics" even to ask whether or not they could be true.1 In this and the next paper we propose to consider the basic assumptions discussed in the preceding papers as absolute presuppositions.

I

The analysis of the several logics discussed previously exposed two absolute or primary presuppositions. The first and most widely held may be stated as follows: Human needs must find absolute fulfillment either here or hereafter. This presupposition controls the logic of Absolute Transendence. According to this logic, human reason is believed to be incapable of achieving the truth required for human "salvation," and human skill and ingenuity are incapable of achieving the Good Society, the Kingdom of God, or Salvation. Normally, such conclusions would give rise to the question: What basis is there for assuming that goals as defined are legitimate, or may ever be satisfied in detail? The fact that this question is never given serious consideration indicates that the presupposition of Absolute Demand or Absolute Fulfillment is "absolute" so far as Absolute Transcendence is concerned. As a result, these men seek for transhistorical fulfillment of the goals believed unrealizable in human history.

Religious Humanists apparently adopt the same presupposition in absolute form. They assume that if religion is valid, religious needs must find absolute fulfillment or final satisfaction. Since neither nature nor history provide such absolute fulfillment, religion is rejected as invalid. In neither instance was the presupposition seriously questioned, and this, according to Collingwood, is precisely the mark of an absolute presupposition.2

The second absolute presupposition unearthed in the preceding papers may be called "The Presupposition of Predictable Possibility." This means that the theologians who adopt this presupposition accept a given theology as relatively true.

*The Iliff Review, Vol. VII, Spring, 1950

I

They believe that the religious life is the capacity of man for value-receiving and value-conserving relations with the reality called "God". They seek the most adequate and valid interpretations of man and the totality within which he lives and the most efficient techniques whereby religious values may be discovered and realized. They refuse to consider the possibility that either absolute truth or absolute fulfillment of any felt need is possible. Consequently, they devote themselves to the search for the most firmly established facts and most highly verified hypotheses. We are calling this the Presupposition of Predictable Possibility because the cognitive task which they have accepted is that of predicting the highest possibilities which confront man, and the determination of the most efficient means of realizing, to the fullest degree possible, these predictable possibilities. The vigor with which these men reject the possibility of absolute fulfillment indicates that to them predictable possibility is an absolute presupposition.3

large in absolute is more

If we accept Collingwood's definition of an absolute presupposition as one which can never be transformed into a proposition, i.e., some statement whose truth or falsity may be fruitfully questioned, then these two presuppositions are absolute. There appears to be no conceivable way whereby we can prove beyond reasonable doubt that (i) human needs are absolutely satisfiable, or are (ii) only relatively satisfiable. If the Kantian conception of absolute justice as the basic fact about reality is true, and if God, the immortal soul and heaven are actual realities, then, presumably, man's highest ideals are realizable in the hereafter even though they may not be so in the present. At the same time, the hereafter as defined by Kant and those who adopt the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment, is of such nature that it cannot be investigated directly by man's normal cognitive equipment. Theoretically, there are no conditions known to us whose realization would either prove or disprove the Presupposition of Absolute Satisfaction of human hopes.

The same conclusion appears necessary in the case of the Presupposition of Predictable Possibility. Since it is conceivable that reality may be such as is defined in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and even Whitehead, we can never be certain that it is true that human needs are satisfiable only approximately, and then only in terms of the serious application of human intelligence and inventiveness to the system of conditions in which man now lives or may live in some future time continuous with the present. Here, then, are two absolute presuppositions accepted and used by different groups of men, neither of which can be proved either true or false.

The apparent consequence of this conclusion is scepticism or at least agnosticism. If our systematic formulations are based upon presuppositions whose validity can never be determined, then it is possible that any or all of the systems formulated may be false. This fear haunts the adherents of Absolute

[illegible] They [illegible] are [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Transcendence, an inference which cannot be avoided in the light of their attempts to justify their "faith." Reinhold Niebuhr, in recent work, asserts that there is a limited possibility of proving the truth of the Christian view of life and history as given in the Christian "revelation" by indicating (i) that it provides the only real possibility of clarifying the perennial human predicament, and (ii) that it redeems man from his natural tendency to aggravate this predicament by commitment to false or partial attempts to escape it.4 The specter of scepticism may not appear to haunt the adherents of Predictable Possibility to the same degree only because they have accustomed themselves to the need for a continuous revision of their theories. In actual fact, however, they must accept the same possibility since their primary presupposition is likewise maintained without adequate cognitive support.

II

It may be observed that there appears to be some justification for the use of the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment, at least in so far as human knowledge is concerned. Collingwood asserts that whereas such presuppositions can never become propositions and therefore candidates for truth, they may find some justification if they make life possible and intelligible in a given culture.5 He then asks the question: What absolute presuppositions were held by Newtonians, Kantians and Einsteinians? The task is thus an historical one. When an investigator has determined what absolute presuppositions were held at a given time, or are held at the present time, this is all that he can possibly know about the justification of absolute presuppositions. Their validity consists in the fact that they are believed.

This suggests a recent form of epistemology known as the Sociology of Knowledge. The primary concept at the center of this interpretation of the knowledge situation is the social nature of the self. According to the late George H. Mead, "the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct."6 This means, by implication at least, that one must think as the community to which he belongs thinks because it provides the attitudes and concepts which constitute his personality. Thinking is thus a function of community, of the culture and tradition of which the thinker is a product.

This means that the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment, to the extent that it serves as foundation for the religious culture of the western world, becomes a necessary presupposition since it constitutes our primary frame of reference. The late Karl Mannheim, one of the leading exponents of the Sociology of Knowledge, observed that the attempt to impose absolute standards requires a type of culture to which this is congenial. A democratic form of education does not provide the conditions for absolute standards. If such absolute standards are believed

presuppositions, an inference which cannot be avoided so long as any of their attempts to justify their "faith," Kathanold Ashburn, in recent work, asserts that there is a limited possibility of proving the truth of the Christian view of life and history as given in the Christian "revelation" by indicating (i) that it provides the only real possibility of clarifying the personal human predicament, and (ii) that it enables man from his natural tendency to aggravate this predicament by commitment to false or partial attempts to escape it.4 The spectre of scepticism may not appear to haunt the adherents of Predictable Possibility to the same degree only because they have accustomed themselves to the need for a continuous revision of their theories. In actual fact, however, they must accept the same possibility since their primary presupposition is likewise maintained without adequate cognitive support.

II

It may be observed that there appears to be some justification for the use of the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment, at least in so far as human knowledge is concerned. Contingency asserts that whenever such presuppositions can never become propositions and therefore candidates for truth, they may find some justification if they make life possible and intelligible in a given culture.5 We then raise the question: What absolute presuppositions were held by Westminster, Kantians and Nineteenth-century the task is thus an historical one. When an investigator has determined what absolute presuppositions were held at a given time, or are held at the present time, this is all that he can possibly know about the justification of absolute presuppositions. Their validity consists in the fact that they are believed.

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desirable, it will be quickly to note, the [illegible] in democratic countries to accommodate it.?

The exponents of the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment have shown their wisdom in refusing to adopt this proposed support for their position. Knowledge, from the point of view of the Sociology of Knowledge, is always relevant to a given culture and a given period in the history of that culture. Pre-Copernican Europeans and post-Copernicans may belong to the same general culture, but they lived at different periods in it. Consequently, what appeared self-evidently true to the pre-Copernican did not appear so to the post-Copernican. The presuppositions basic to the earlier culture had been replaced by another set, which in turn determined the thinking of those who were dependent upon them. The Newtonian formulation of the basic nature of the cosmos was published in 1687, and provided a new or at least revised set of absolute presuppositions which are still functionally efficient at certain cultural levels in the Occident. They are being replaced, progressively, by newer views.

The conclusion which follows from these considerations may be summarized briefly: Absolute Presuppositions, as Collingwood defines them, are absolute only in the sense that they are not subject to conversion into propositions. They are not absolutely "true" except in so far as they represent what is believed by a given culture to be the final court of appeal in any epistemological controversy. As such, they provide no real basis for the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment characteristic of certain schools of religious thought.

III

Attention was drawn, above, to another type of attempted justification of the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment. This is a form of the pragmatic argument used by Niebuhr in several of his works. He has been a consistent champion of human rights from his early days as a pastor. He has been and is profoundly concerned about human relations and with the sufferings that result from maladjustments at the personal and institutional levels. He traces much of our difficulty to human pride: The tendency on the part of individuals and groups to make themselves absolute. Niebuhr believes this results from their failure to recognize their basic limitations and inadequacies in both thinking and action. He believes that the only salvation open to man from the sin of pride, and escape from its terrible consequences, is faith in God as the only Unlimited or Unconditioned Being. By implication, this means that every person is limited and conditioned, or, in traditional language, a sinner.

This conviction is shared by others who have adopted this presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment or Absolute Demand, even though many of them do not have Niebuhr's wide acquaintance

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This conception is viewed by a Christ who leads a life of presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment or Absolute Freedom, yet through many of them he has been [illegible]

with the social issues of our day. Some of them are concerned to the problem of personal assurance. They believe that such assurance is possible only to those who have faith in God as Absolutely Transcendent. As a group, therefore, the adherents of the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment are interested in those conceptions of God and in such patterns of behavior as will assure men that their highest aspirations will find fulfillment, if not here on earth, then certainly in some transhistorical realm. Furthermore, they believe faith in God as Transcendent is absolutely necessary if men are to realize the highest predictable possibilities in the human situation, both here and hereafter. Their appeal to the Supernatural is thus, in significant degree, a device for the realization of predictable goals here and now. To that extent, they are basing an absolute epistemology upon pragmatic or relativistic considerations.

This is true, also, of the Religious Humanists. Max C. Otto stated it precisely in his proposal that men give up belief in and the attempt at communion with God for the sake of constructive social action. He believed interest in God meant energy directed toward nonutilitarian goals.8

This is sufficient to indicate that the epistemological consequences of the adoption of the presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment is scepticism or at least agnosticism. The adherents of this position freely admit the inability of human reason to justify their "faith". Having made this admission, they apparently fear to rest in this state of scepticism. Accordingly, they appeal to pragmatic considerations to provide some relief from an unsatisfactory scepticism. But it should be evident that one cannot at the same time deny the relevance of human reason to a given problem and then propose to use it to bolster up what cannot, by definition, be so bolstered. They appear to face rather difficult alternatives: They must either admit that they are sceptics so far as human reason and religious beliefs are concerned, or that their attempts to use human reason consists in what the late Morris R. Cohen called "vital lies",9 i.e., ideas believed not because they are considered logically cogent but because we cannot live without them.

IV

This conclusion does not dispose of either Absolute Transcendence or Religious Humanism. Their obvious retort is: "You, too." The same epistemological flaw which vitiates every attempt to arrive at absolute truth also prevents one from arriving at relative truth. This comment was made some years ago by George E. Moore in his "A Defense of Common Sense".10 He stated that he "knew" that some ideas were "true" and that when he said "true", he meant just that. He did not mean that a "proposition which is partially false may nevertheless also be true". Accepting this meaning of the word "true", it is obvious that neither absolute presupposition enables one to say unequivocally: "This

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

is true." Every judgment begins with this conditional clause: "If the assumptions upon which our criterion of truth is based are valid, then, presumably, this judgment is true."

By way of exemplification, we may return for a moment to the God-concept of the late Shailer Mathews. He defined God, in part, as the "personality-producing" factor in the universe. This appears to be a rather modest proposition which few educated persons would be inclined to question. Man is; he either appeared spontaneously or is a resultant in some causal nexus; the most obvious causal nexus is the cosmos, or some phase of it. But even this partial analysis of Mathews' judgment concerning God bristles with presuppositions: (i) every entity must have some cause; (ii) man is an entity and is, therefore, caught up in some causal nexus; (iii) the specific causal nexus within which man is caught up is the cosmos; and (iv) the cosmos is capable of producing life. Many persons find these presuppositions congenial and follow step by step with little or no hesitancy. If, however, one were asked: What is the basis for acceptance of (i) or (iv), the answer would have to be in terms of some other presupposition or assumption.

We are now in position to understand the reason for Collingwood's distinction between relative and absolute presuppositions. He seeks some way whereby he can break the circle of presuppositions by assuming the unquestioned and unquestionable validity of some presuppositions in whose terms all other presuppositions may be evaluated. He freely admits that an absolute presupposition is actually a presupposition "to end all pressuppositions". As soon, however, as a given presupposition is questioned by the culture which has previously adopted it as absolute, it must give way to some other. Thus Newton questioned the pre-Copernican presuppositions because he had already adopted another.

Collingwood's conception of "absolute presuppositions", therefore, needs restatement. Presuppositions, both relative and absolute, are in fact regulative principles or structural ideas used as frames of reference for specific systems of cognition. The presupposition of the Orderliness of Nature is such a structural idea used in the investigation of nature. Every scientific experiment is at once an attempt to solve some specific problem and at the same time an attempt to determine whether or not, and to what extent, nature is in fact orderly. As Eddington points out, there are at least three types of natural laws: Identical, Statistical, and Transcendental. The first type consists of laws such as the Law of Conservation of Energy or Mass. These, as he notes, are mathematical in character and are based upon the observation of behaviors. The second describe the behavior of crowds. Crowds may consist of atoms or of men. And, as he observes, "much of the apparent uniformity of Nature is a uniformity of averages".11 The third, or Transcendental Laws, are not clearly defined by Eddington. The distinction between the first two types and this third appears to be that between epistemological and ontological. Identical

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and methodical laws are, in the wise, epistemological. They are used in the attempt to formulate our conceptions of the universe and bear the marks of our interests and selectivity. The Transcendental Laws, on the other hand, refer to the actual movements of the world as such--the ontological realm--which may or may not conform to our conceptions of them. This interpretation finds some support in his statement which follows: "It may be that the laws of atomicity, like the laws of conservation, arise only in the presentation of the world to us and can be recognized as identities by some extensions of the argument we have followed. But it is perhaps as likely that after we have cleared away all the superadded laws which arise solely in our mode of apprehension of the world about us, there will be left an external world developing under genuine laws of control."12 This means, if we interpret him correctly, that the Uniformity of Nature may mean (i) the actual behavior of the ontol realm as it is in itself, and (ii) our approximate statements of this behavior conditioned by our limited observations and limited concepts with which we formulate our partial knowledge.

The significance of these considerations for Collingwood's conception of absolute presuppositions may now be restated. It is undoubtedly true that presuppositions can be classified in terms of their position in the cognitional structure. Some of them are presupposed by others, and these in turn may be presupposed by still others. Some may, accordingly, be classed as primary and others as secondary or tertiary. But none of them are by this process excluded from critical evaluation. DesCartes' dictum: "I think, hence I am," would appear to be basic for thinking as such. Nevertheless, it has been subject to serious modification. Presuppositions or assumptions, then, are epistemological devices invented for the purpose of furthering man's quest for knowledge. Their validity and significance lies in their capacity to further this quest, and any given presupposition will continue to be used only so long as it is epistemologically useful. When its usefulness is exhausted, or when more efficient ones are discovered, the old will be discarded and the better one adopted.

It should be evident that the presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment has outlived whatever usefulness it may have had. The field of medicine achieves its significant results not by canonizing either Hippocrates or Galen, but by continuous and piece-meal investigations at the frontiers of its knowledge and by continued inventiveness in the development of its methods. Humanity in the Occident has moved from an economy of scarcity to one of abundance not by demanding Absolute Fulfillment of its economic interests, but by careful and continuous application of the principle of predictable possibility. Conquest of plant-disease resulted from the development of disease-resistant plants; the loss of top-soil has been checked by contour plowing; food has been increased by the development of new types of fertilizers;

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[illegible]

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by increasing the range from which food could be brought to the centers of population. These have all resulted from the application of the principle of predictable possibility to specific problems in human life.

It would appear to be time for men to adopt this logic in their approach to religious problems. The long history of mistaken quests in religion, dominated by the presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment, is too well known and too well-documented to require further comment. Religious thinking must adopt the "new mentality" or fall still farther behind in the long struggle against ignorance and superstition.13

1. Collingwood, R. G., An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940, Chapter V.
2. Ibid., p 44
3. Cf Ayer, A. J., Language Truth and Logic, London: Victor Gollancz, Letc., 1946 Capter I, for an exceedingly vigorous rejection of Absolute Fulfillment The emphasis of men like Mathews and Wieman upon "tentativity" in religion is another instance of this same vigorous rejection of the Presupposition of Absolute Fulfillment, and evidence for their adoption of Predictable Possibility as their absolute presupposition.
4. Niebuhr, R., Faith and History, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949 pp1952 ff. This is developed more fully inmy review of this work in The Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol XVII, No. 4, October 1949, pp 251f.
5. Essay on Metaphysics chapter VI, "Metaphysics an Historical Science."
6. Mead, Mind, Self land Society, (ed) C. W. Morris, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934, p 162.
7. Mannheim, K. Diagnosis of Our Tiem, New York: The Oxford University Press, 1944. Bibliographies covering this probelm may be found in Mannheim Ideology and Utopia., New York, 1936: mandelbaum. M., The Problem of Historical Knowledge, New York: Liveright Pub., Corp., 1938; Merton R. K., "The Sociology of Knowledge," in Twentiety Century Sociology, ed by G. Gurvich and W. E. Moore, New York: Philosophical Library, 1945, pp 366-405.
8. Otto, Max C., Things and Ideals, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924, p 289f
9. The Meaning of Human History, La Salle: The Open Court Publ. Co. 1947 p 130.
10. In Contemporary British Philosophy 2nd series, ed J. H. Muirhead, New York the Macmillan Co., 1925, p 197
11. Eddington, A. S., the Nature of the Physical World, New York: the Macmillan Co., 1929, p 244.
12. Ibid., p 245
13. Bosley, H. A., The Quest for Religious Certainty, Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Co., 1939, is well worth reading in this connection.

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1. Collingwood, R. G., An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940, Chapter V.
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4. Nicholas, M., Truth and History, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947, pp120 ff. This is developed more fully in my review of this work in the Journal of Public and Religion, Vol XVII, No. 4, October 1949, pp 338.
5. Theory on dialectical chapter VI, "Metaphysics as Historical Science."
6. Hegel, Sept. Hegel Lectures, (ed) G. W. Marxis, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934, p 182.
7. Hamilton, E. Dialogue of Our Time. New York: The Oxford University Press, 1944. Philosophic covering this problem may be found in Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, New York, 1936; Hamilton, M., The Problem of Historical Knowledge, New York: Liveright Pub., Corp., 1938; Merton R. K. "The Sociology of Knowledge," in Twentieth Century Sociology, ed by G. Gurvich and W. E. Moore, New York: Philosophical Library, 1945, pp 366-408.
8. Otto, Max C., Things and Ideals, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924, p 227
9. The Meaning of Human History, La Salle: The Open Court Publ. Co. 1947 p 130.
10. In Contemporary British Philosophy 2nd series, ed J. H. Muirhead, New York: Macmillan Co., 1925, p 197
11. Eddington, A. S., The Nature of the Physical World, New York: the Macmillan Co., 1929, p 244.
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13. Hooley, H. A., The Quest for Religious Certainty, Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Co., 1939, is well worth reading in this connection.

VII. Approximation *

Readers who have followed the series of articles in this journal analysing contemporary forms of religious thinking will have noted that there appears to be a continental divide which determines the direction in which such thinking moves. One side of this divide may be "Finalism." The presupposition which governs such thinking was stated as follows: "Human needs must find absolute fulfillment either here or here-after." ("The Pre-supposition of Absolute Demand", 'The Iliff Review', Spring, 1950, p. 74). This insistence upon the final realization of man's religious and moral interests has a long and honored history. It found early expression in the writings of Plato. It came to agonizing expression in the rather involved writings of Kierkegaard, and now governs the thinking of the Neo-Orthodoxy dominant in contemporary Protestantism.

The other side of the divide may be named Approximation. It found expression in Protestantism in the late nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth. The presupposition which governs its thinking may be stated in this manner: Man's religious and moral interests are subject to proximate rather than final satisfaction or fulfillment. We propose to call this the Presupposition of Approximation. It constitutes the framework and justification of the logic of Absolute Immanence. ("The Logic of Absolute Immanence", 'The Iliff Review', Spring 1949, pp. 88 ff).

Both types of thinking begin with a common interest, the religious and moral experiences of persons. The Finalists are convinced that there is no middle ground between absolute satisfaction and no satisfaction of man's expectation of fulfillment. Consequently, they seek for absolute assurance wherever they believe it may be found. Authority is placed in Scripture, the Living Word, an infallible Pope, or in the rejection of reason and the absolutizing of specific subjective experiences called "existential". To the interested observer who does not share their concern with finalism, they appear to be seeking certainty by violent assertions supported by all types of circumlocution. Those who accept approximate realization have learned to live in terms of probabilities. They believe it to be a waste of time seeking for absolute truth and final assurances. The probabilities which guide their thought and action are based upon evidence which is available or discoverable, open to scrutiny by any thinker who comes to investigate, and logical methods appropriate to the problem and relevant data. Such data is normally observable, although introspective data compared with similar experiences of others are not necessarily excluded.

I

The theories of knowledge based upon the Presupposition of Approximation are many. They rely, in the main, upon two operations. The first is clarification, the name applied to the several steps preliminary to the actual testing of hypotheses. It includes the determination of (i) the nature of the problem under consideration; (ii) the meaning or meanings of the terms presumably relevant to its analysis and solution; (iii) the development of hypotheses which may be proposed as possible solutions; and (iv) the conditions which must obtain if the hypothesis is to be verified. This indicates the rather complex character of the operations prerequisite to the actual process of observation or gathering of data.

* Iliff Review, Vo. XIII, No. 2, Spring, 1956

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* Iliff Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Spring, 1966

It may be noted, in passing, that observation is a term with technical meaning. To observe does not mean engaging in aimless inspection or introspection. It consists in seeking out the conditions which will either verify or disprove a given hypothesis. Perhaps a brief analysis of the procedures followed by physicians in diagnosis will illustrate the clarificatory operations. AA patient is before a physician with some discomfort or disability. Examination consists in checking his blood-pressure, his pulse rate, temperature and other routine items. All of this is done to determine the nature of the problem, (i) above. In this process, certain meanings or symptoms will occupy the attention of the examiner. His training and previous experience will have provided him with definitions of such symptoms (ii) above. Also, in this process, certain hypotheses will have occurred to the diagnostician (iii) above. These several hypotheses will then be considered in turn. If the case be one of poliomyelitis, moreor less specific symptoms or reactions must be observed or observable. By this time, the diagnostician has reached (iv) above. He is now prepared to engage in the second operation, that of determining whether in fact the patient has poliomyelitis. Thus far he has been engaged with the clarificatory process including preliminary observation or the search for the conditions which will enable him to conclude his diagnosis. The diagnostician does not merely "look at" the patient; he looks for predetermined items such as pulse-rate and temperature.

The second operation in the logics of Approximation may be called verification proper. There are two levels involved. The first we have called "behavioral verification" for the reason that some human action is required by it. It may be called "experimentalism" when one is concerned with the physical and social sciences. It may take the form of pragmatism, instrumentalism or voluntarism which are developments of Charles S. Pierce's principle that one should "consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." ("How to make our ideas Clear" (1878), in PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA, ed. by P.R.Anderson and M.H. Fisch, New York: D. Appelton-Century Co., 1939, p. 461). More recently, it has been called "Operationalism" in the attempt to arrive at specific definitions of concepts. Operationalism defines the meaning or meanings of given concepts in terms of the operations requires to express them precisely. The meaning of "yard" as a unit of measurement consists in the number of operations with a smaller measure, a foot-rule for example, required to cover its length. The term is extended by some, as for example, W.P.Bridgman, THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS, (1927) to include 'mental' operations required to determine some meaning. The inclusion of such mental operations precludes the use of "behavioral verification" if taken seriously.

In order to attempt to standardize this situation, I shall speak of Observational or Operational verification as denotative or designative of the primary level of verification proper. Observation appears to be the constant factor in each of the views presented in the preceding paragraph. It is the process by which data (facts) are derived and the method by which one determines whether or not the conditions required to establish an hypothesis are, or are not present. In other words an hypothesis may be considered established or verified if the results obtained from experiments or operations are congruent with what was required for such verification.

[illegible] Let us suppose that [illegible] undergoing in medicine [illegible] laboratory. It consists in seeking out the conditions which [illegible] another or discovers a given hypothesis. Perhaps a brief [illegible] of the procedures followed by physicians in diagnosis will illustrate the elementary operations. A patient is before a physician with some discomfort or disability. Examination consists in checking his blood-pressure, his pulse rate, temperature and other routine items. All of this is done to determine the nature of the problem, (i) above. In this process, certain meanings or symptoms will occupy the attention of the examiner. His training and previous experience will have provided him with definitions of such symptoms (ii) above. Also, in this process, certain hypotheses will have occurred to the diagnostician (iii) above. These several hypotheses will then be considered in [illegible] If the case be one of poliomyelitis, moreover less specific symptoms or reactions must be observed or observable. By this time, the diagnostician has reached (iv) above. He is now prepared to engage in the second operation, that of discriminating whether in fact the patient is poliomyelitic. Thus far he has been engaged with the identification process including preliminary observation or the search for the conditions which enable him to conclude his diagnosis. The diagnostician does not merely "look at" the patient; he looks for [illegible] terminal items such as pulse-rate and temperature.

The second operation in the logic of approximation may be called verification proper. There are two levels involved. The first we have called "behavioral verification" for the reason that some human action is required by it. It may be called "experimentalism" when one is concerned with the physical and social sciences. It may take the form of [illegible] preparation, instrumentation or volunteerism which are developments of Charles S. Pierce's principle that one should "consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." ("How to make our ideas clear" (1878), in PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA, ed. by P.H.Anderson and M.H. Fisch, New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939, p. 461). More recently, it has been called "Operationalism" in the attempt to arrive at specific definitions of concepts. Operationalism defines the meaning or meanings of given concepts in terms of the operations required to express them precisely. The meaning of "yard" as a unit of measurement consists in the number of operations with a smaller measure, a foot-rule for example, required to cover its length. The term is extended by some, as for example, W.P.Bridgman, THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS (1927) to include 'mental' operations required to determine some meaning. The inclusion of such mental operations precludes the use of "behavioral verification" if taken seriously.

In order to attempt to steer clear this distinction, I shall speak of Observational or Operational verification as descriptive or designative of the primary level of verification proper. Observation appears to be the constant factor in each of the views presented in the preceding paragraph. It is the process by which data (facts) are derived and the method by which one determines whether or not the conditions required to establish an hypothesis are, or are not present. In other words, an hypothesis may be considered established or verified if the results obtained from experiment or observations are congruent with those required for such verification.

A digression may be in order at this point. The discussion of observation and verification has proceeded to this point as though all observation consists in inspection. Inspection means the observance by an observer of something other than himself. The results of the use of Salk vaccine were observed by those who administered the vaccine, and their conclusions, were based upon such introspection. What shall we say about 'introspection?' It has been defined in a preliminary manner "as the knowledge by a subject of his own states and processes and of the self considered as the unity of its several states." (Ledger Wood, 'The Analysis of Knowledge', London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1940, p. 88). Introspection as a metohs of investigation, 'in limited areas', must be given some consideration. If one wishes to determine whether or not there is such a thing as "imageless thought", his only recourse is to engage in introspection. He may have key words spoken to him while he turns his attention inwardly to discover whether or not images are evoked in response. But this poses a question. By what process does the subject "know" whether or not an image has been invoked?

The Wuertzburg Group, under the inspiration of Oswald Kuelpe (1862-1915), who were pioneers in the attempt to investigate the nature of thought experimentally, used 'Bewusstheit' to designate the process. This term has been translated, perhaps inexactly, as "awareness". But to say that in introspection we are aware of what happens within the subject does not appear to add very mu h to our understand of the process. C. E. M. Joad used "awareness" as the constant factor in his epistemology. He defined is as directional activity on the part of man accompanied by immediate certainty. At one level, awareness was defined as perception, since attention was directed toward matter; at another level it was defined as cognition, the awareness of concepts; at a third level, it became mysticism, the awareness of value. (Matter, Life, and Value, 1929).

One could use intuition to designate this activity, as Bergson and others have done. But as pointed out by K. W. Wild, there are at least thirty-one different descriptions of intuition in the literature of western thought alone. (Cf. 'Intuition', 1938, Part III). The conclusion reached by Wild is that there is such a thing as "immediate knowing" which deserves further investigation. Perhaps the most which can be said at this moment is that man can direct his attention either toward external objects or toward his own subjective states. The former objects are "public" in that several different observers may perceive them at the same time. This fact of multiple observation constitutes their "objective" character. The so-called "subjective" objects of interest, such as the proverbial toothache, the thoughts passing through one's mind, or some feelings he may be enjoying, are also knowable in some sense. They are, however, private in that they are not subject to multiple observation. From personal experience, I am inclined to say that such "subjective" give rise to the same certainty or uncertainty that the objective experiences do. One may have a vague pain or feeling of discomfort. But this does not appear to differ in any significant manner from his observation of objective realities. He may catch a vague glimpse of something or he may perceive it clearly and sharply.

We may end this digression by stating that whatever knowledge we have concerning subjective factors has to be obtained by means of introspection. It must be recognized, however, that such knowledge has no greater claim to finality than has our knowledge of objective factors. In both instances, some interpretation is involved. Those who investigated imageless thought had first to clarify their problem and to specify the conditions whose presence would verify their hypotheses. And a judgment had to be rendered as to whether or not the results obtained were congruent with the predetermined conditions. The only "immediate knowledge" which may be asserted must be restricted to our conviction that we were undergoing some experience. Beyond that, one faces interpretation.

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functions. [illegible] to multiple observation. This [illegible] Wolfstein, that it is [illegible] to subject to some multiple observation. [illegible] intervals at least. I can conceal from others what I am thinking and feeling and even planning or willing. To this limited extent, then, introspection may be a useful intellectual tool. So far as our basic problem is concerned, namely, the cognitive quest for God, introspection is of very limited usefulness. It can provide information concerning one factor in the Existential Medium, namely, the specific individual who is undergoing introspective analysis. He may extend this, by analogy, to all other persons, but he must recognize that he is using analogical inference by so doing. This may be stated as follows: Two things are alike in some respects; we conclude they are alike in all respects. But this logical method has been subject to considerable question. Its cogency depends upon the number and extent of the similarities in the two objects under comparison. It serves quite well with relatively simple objects provided the comparison is extensive enough. But it does not appear to be valid in the case of such complex entities as persons. One may consult studies such as that of F. V. Smith, The Explanation of Human Behavior (1951) for an analysis of some six systems more or less current, in which the difficulties involved in explaining more or less normal behavior are indicated; or he may read Clara Thompson, Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development (1950) for a simplified statement of the difficulties faced in the theoretical structuring of one of the "depth" psychologoes. Such studies will indicate the problems confronting the individual who would rely upon introspection for anything more than the relatively simple reports of his own experience.

After recognizing the difficulties involved, let us acknowledge the method of introspection as a possible approach to the understanding of one phase of our Existential Medium, namely the subjective experiences of an individual observer himself. The **question** then arises: Is it legitimate to speak of such introspection as "observation"? We noted above that observation is a technical term denoting or designating the search for the conditions which will verify or disprove an hypothesis. To "observe" means to direct attention to the objective referent or referents to determine whether or not they are congruent--more or less--or non-congruent, again, more or less, with the requirements specified as "the conditions which will verify the hypothesis." But "direction of attention to or towards" is precisely what occurs in introspection as well as in inspection. If to observe means to attend to something, then the directional activity employed in the effort to discover whether or not "imagelessthought" occurs may be considered a form of observation.

The question as to the nature of the directional activity employed in introspection is another matter. Perhaps it may be described as "awareness" as the Wurtzburg Group indicated. Or it may be awareness as defined by Joad (p 13 above). Again, one may attempt to state the process in neurological terms in which ideas are implicit neurological processes gradually formed in the process of living. Correlations of such processes with words or symbols constitute the "growth of reason." (Frank Lorimer, The Growth of Reason, 1929) Whatever language one may use, the fact involved is man's ability to direct attention either toward the objective, or public realm, or toward the subjective, the private realm.

Perhaps this is sufficient justification for the use of "Observational verification" to designate the primary mode of verification. Until more adequate terminology becomes available, we shall use this.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

The second level of verification is called Implicative Verification. This may be defined as that form of verification which consists of support drawn from other and presumably earlier theories verified in terms of Observational verification. This could be called "corroborative" verification if one wished to do so. Stephen C. Pepper used the term in the case of what we have named Observational verification. He distinguished two types: that of man with man and of fact with fact. He called the first "multiplicative corroboration" and the second "structural corroboration." In the case of testing the capacity of a chair to fulfill its expected functions, he himself could sit upon it. If it proved sturdy enough to sustain his weight, he had some evidence to support the view that it was adequate. He could corroborate his findings by asking some of his friends to try it. In this way, he would multiply his corroborations until satisfied as to the sturdiness of the chair. Or, he could use another form of corroboration. He could examine the wood, the way in which it was constructed, and similar tests. This would consist in what he called structural corroboration (Pepper, World Hypotheses, 1942, pp 47 ff). It should be observed that in both cases, he is concerned with observational verification. His structural corroboration relies in part upon what we are calling Implicative verification. But still includes actual observation by the thinker concerned of the object under investigation. It would appear, then, he is concerned with the first level of verification. I am prepared, however, to accept structural corroboration as a form of Implicative verification with the provision that it does not exhause the meanings which Implicative verification has.

Another term which is allied to Implicative verification is coherence. One of the fine statements of the Coherence theory was presented by H. H. Joachim in 1906 in The Nature of Truth (Oxford University Press). Building upon the monistic philosophy of Spinoza, he denied the existence of self-contained, independent intities. Positively stated, he asserted that there was nothing independent of mind. Reality consisted in a "significant whole" which he identified with Truth. He conceived this whole to be defined most adequately as a self-fulfilling Ideal Experience described in terms of categories derived from conscious experience. Knowledge represents our partial comprehension of this Living, coherent systematic Whole.

In defense of this view, he argued that every judgment is but a particular expression of some systematic whole. Thus "two plus two equals four" may be a simple judgment which a third-grader can "understand" as an isolated statement. But its significance lies in the system of mathematics developed through the ages; and the meanings and questions which may occur to one who reads it will differ in terms of the more or less complete comprehension different people may have of the system as a whole. (Chapter III). From this he moves, by extrapolation, to the theory that Reality itself consists in the systematic whole or which the several limited systems constitute particular or partial statements. And as a consequence, every particular judgment, or for that matter, every humanly formulated system is no more than an approximation to the Truth. This can only be known by an Absolute knower. But the degree of truth which any given judgment has will be determined by the extent to which it is coherent with the shole defined as a self-fulfilling Ideal Experience.

The use of the term Approximation in the preceding paragraph may suggest that the Idealistic epistemology of Joachim belongs within the same classification as those we are considering in this chapter. In Joachim's thought, truth

[illegible] may be defined as that form of [illegible] verification which [illegible] from other and presumably [illegible] verification to terms of observational verification. Popper would be called the "[illegible] verification" if one wished to do so. Popper uses the term in the case of what we have named Observational verification. He distinguished two types: that of mere [illegible] and of fact which fact. He called the first "multiplicative corroboration" and the second "structural corroboration." In the case of testing the regularity of a chair to fulfill its expected functions, he himself could sit upon it. If it proved sturdy enough to sustain his weight, he had some evidence to support the view that it was adequate. He could corroborate his findings by asking one of his friends to try it. In this way, he would multiply his corroborations until satisfied as to the sturdiness of the chair. Or, he could use another form of corroboration. He could examine the wood, the way in which it was constructed and similar tests. This would consist in what he called structural corroboration (Popper, Would Hypotheses, 1962, pp 47 ff). It should be observed that in both cases, he is concerned with observational verification. He structural corroboration relies in part upon what we are calling Implicative verification. But still includes actual observation by the thinker concerned of the object under investigation. It would appear, then, he is concerned with the fact of verification. I am prepared, however, to accept structural corroborations as a form of Implicative verification with the provision that it does not include the meaning which Implicative verification has.

Another term which is allied to Implicative verification is coherence. One of the fine exponents of the Coherence theory was presented by H. H. Joachim in 1906 in The Nature of Truth (Oxford University Press). Notwithstanding the monistic philosophy of Spinoza, he doubted the existence of self-evident, independent intuition. Positivity stated, he presented that there was nothing "[illegible] of mind." Reality consisted in a "significant whole," which he illustrated with a [illegible]. He conceived this whole to be defined most adequately as a self-fulfilling ideal. Experience described in terms of undergoing derived from conscious experience. Knowledge represents our partial comprehension of this living, coherent systematic Whole.

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[illegible] the logic of Absolute Immanence. [illegible] equivalent to the Existential Medium, is a dynamic process in which novelty, creativity and differentiation are constant or continuous factors. To this extent, one could never say that everything would be timelessly present in some Infinite Knower. Truth, for Absolute Immanentalists, is the [illegible] applied to all of the [illegible] theories concerning this realm of novelty and creativity. It denotes achievements on the part of thinkers rather than the nature or character of the whole. In a world-view in which novelty and creativity are factors, one must agree with William James who said somewhere that we must always add "and" to every judgment which we make.

To return to the problem before us, we may distinguish Implicative verification from the Coherence theory by noting that various theories concerning the Existential Medium may be related to one another. By way of exemplification we may recall L.Shailer Mathews' conception of God as the personality-producing and personally-responsive Factor in our cosmos. (The Hiff Review, Spring, 1949, pp 85f.) His argument for this conception may be formulated quite simply. Man is. He appeared on this planet perhaps a million years ago in some primitive form. He has, during the intervening time, undergone a long process of development. Part of this was due to his own intelligent direction of his affairs; part was due to environmental factors in process of change. Part of it was due to his own inherent nature, or to his primary "subjective aim" or aims, stated in Whitehead's language. Perhaps more of it was due to the fact that he is a social creature, and that social existence has a determinative effect upon individual development and growth.

What is the evidence which supports this set of affirmations or judgments? Some of it was drawn from geology and anthropology. Evidence accumulated through the years as a result of research finally led to the "theory" that man has been here, in some form or other, for the length of time indicated. This was verified or confirmed by data gathered by means of patient research. In itself, it does not verify the view that God "exists", but it does point to some form or other, for the created process. ~~Secodly Mathewsbelieved~~

Secondly, Mathews believed that humanity individually or collectively, cannot be given credit for all of this. The conditions which made possible the appearance of man could not have been arranged by man himself. His appearence presupposes them. Thus there is evidence, if not of some conscious purposiveness or teleology, at least of a process which made human life possible. And if man is a creature of this cosmic process, then it must be interpreted as capable of producing and nurturing him until in due course of time he could assume conscious direction of his own affairs. And this could be carried into the field of organic evolution, cultural development and personality studies.

There is, the n, a group of interrelated theories, verified more or less fully, which have positive implications in support of Mathews' conception of God as personality-producing Factor operative in the Existential Medium. TLhe Evidence for God as personally-responsive is more speculative and less convincing. When these several interrelated theories are related in Mathews conception of God as the personality-producing factor in reality, they tend to confirm or corroborate it. It is this process of relating theories together in ways which tend to support hypotheses which we define as "Implicative verification."

Each of these theories whose implications may be used in corroborative roles must itself have ben subjected to observational or operational verification. There is little cogency value in implicatory verification drawn from theories unsupported by operational verification. The significance of this may be indi-

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[illegible] the theory of [illegible] of reality must stand or fall in [illegible] verification. The more inclusive theories which derive their support from these limited theories may contribute insights or suggest further studies with reference to any of the supportive theories. In other words, their relationship to the latter is one of clarification rather than verification. These may be noted in connection with the theory of organic evolution itself. Once it had been established, it suggested to thinkers in other areas that the same process may have been responsible for cultural or political evolution, or even cosmic. But this possibility was only a possibility. Before anything positive could be said, the slow and patient verification process had to be applied to the hypotheses suggested. Such persistent investigation gradually compelled men in anthropology, to take one instance, to reject the evolutionary hypothesis as applied to their field. The establishment of organic evolution suggested the possibility of social and cultural evolution, but these had to be investigated in terms of observational verification before any conclusions could be drawn.

The God-concept then, as, interpreted here, is subject to implicative verification primarily. It is true that some adherents of Absolute Immanence believe God concepts may be verified in terms of operational verification. Attention was called to Wieman's attempt to subject his conception of God as Creative Event to such operational verification. But the cogency value of this attempt must be questioned inasmuch as similar results may be obtained with different hypotheses concerning the nature of God. (cf. my "Verifiable and Non--Verifiable God-Concepts," The Iliff Review, Fall 1955, pp 8 ff).

III

We are now ina position to consider seriously the proposal that the Logic of Absolute Immanence is in fact governed by the Secondary Presupposition of Approximation. If the conceptions of God developed or adopted by Absolute Immenentalists find their primary support in implications drawn from operationally verified theories of more limited fields, the certainty of their truth can be no greater than that of the theories whose implications support them. If, as Absolute Immanentalists believe, God is the religious name of some phase structure, factor or characteristic of the Existential Medium in whole or in part, then both the existence and nature of God must be verified as indicated above. This means that the theories used in implicative verification must have been verified operationally or impirically, yet every impirically verified theory must be held as probable. Bertrand Russell stated this rather well when he wrote that "the supposed absolute concept 'knowledge' should be replaced by the concept 'knowledge with degree of certainty p,' where p will measured by mathematical probability when this can be ascertained." (Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948, p 498) It is always possible in the case of operationally verified hypotheses to find facts which may compel revision of the hypotheses in whole or in part. And the long history of mankind's attempts to understand themselves and their Existential Medium would appear to document this rather thoroughly.

This fact is recognized by those who follow modern Existentialism. Kierkegaard repudiated in detail the "approximation-process" and sought security with the confines of his own soul. Edmund Husserl and the Phenominological school sought to arrive at "presuppositionless" philosophy by setting aside (braketing) the world studied by operational verification and confining themselves to the analysis of "pure consciousness." (E. Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson, 1931). But such analysis is a form of introspection subject to the same approximation process as inspection. (Cf. pp. 13 ff., above). The attempt to arrive at absolute knowledge

of verification [illegible]

The more immediate direction with which [illegible] theories may contribute insights or suggest further studies with relevance to any of the supporting theories. In other words, their relationship to the latter is one of clarification rather than verification. These may be noted in connection with the theory of organic evolution itself. Once it had been established, it suggested to thinkers in other areas that the same process may have been responsible for cultural or political evolution, or even cosmic. But this possibility was only a possibility. Before anything positive could be said, the slow and patient verificatory process had to be applied to the hypotheses suggested. Such persistent and painstaking practicality characterizes anthropology, to take one instance, to reject the merely theoretic hypotheses applied to their field. The establishment of organic evolution suggested the possibility of social and cultural evolution, but these had to be investigated in terms of observational verification before any conclusions could be drawn.

The God-concept then, as interpreted here, is subject to implicative verification primarily. It is true that some adherents of Absolute Immanence believe God concepts may be verified in terms of operational verification. Attention was called to Tillman's attempt to subject his conception of God as Creative Event to such operational verification. But the cogency value of this attempt must be questioned inasmuch as similar results may be obtained with different hypotheses concerning the nature of God. (cf. my "Verifiable and Non-Verifiable God-Concepts," The TRM Review, Fall 1957, pp 2 ff.

III

We are now in position to consider seriously the proposal that the Logic of Absolute Immanence in fact governed by the Economy of Approximation. If the conceptions of God developed as adapted by Absolute Immanentalists find their primary support in implications drawn from empirically verified theories of more limited fields, the reality of God may be no greater than that of the theories upon implicative support they. If, as Absolute Immanentalists believe, God is the religious name of being structure, insofar as characteristic of the Universal Life Plan in whole or in part, then both the existence and nature of God must be verified as indicated above. This means that the theories used in implicative verification must have been verified operationally or implicatively, yet even implicatively theory must be held as probable. Bertrand Russell stated this matter well when he wrote that "the supposed absolute concept 'knowledge' could be replaced by the concept 'knowledge with degree of certainty p,' and so on." [illegible] measured by mathematical probability when this can be [illegible] (Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954) It is always possible in the case of operationally verifiable hypotheses that facts which may compel revision of the hypotheses in whole or in part. And the long history of mankind's attempts to understand themselves and their Ultimate Medium would appear to document this rather thoroughly.

This fact is recognized by those who follow modern Existentialism. Kierkegaard repudiated in detail the "approximation-process" and sought certainty with the confidence of his own soul. Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological School sought to arrive at "presuppositionless" philosophy by setting aside (bracketing) the world studied by operational verification and confining themselves to the analysis of "pure consciousness." (E. Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson, 1931). But such analysis is a form of introspection subject to the same approximation process as any other. (Cf. pp. 13 ff., above). The attempt to arrive at ideal or transcendental

knowledge uncontaminated by presuppositions on the one hand or perception on the other has a long history unmarked by success in any field related to the understanding of man and his several environments. Certainty or finality may be possible in pure mathematics or symbolic logic. In such fields the "objects" studies are pure meanings rather than existential actualities, if we may use this redundant formulation. We are finite beings, and limited both in our intelligence and energy. We may achieve workable knowledge with reference to more immediate situations, and probable theories concerning more inclusive realities, including God.

It is granted that some persons, and one cannot estimate their proportion of the human population at any given time, seek for the security which they believe may be found in absolute knowlege. There are others, and again one is in no position to number them, who have learned to live satisfactorily in terms of the approximation process. Absolute Immanence may not satisfy the desires of the first group. It has been developed by those to whom verified probabilities are more important and significant than unverified certainties. They believe that in terms of verified probabilities they are in touch with realities, and they have courage enough to follow this route in their religious living. For others, the satisfaction derived from unverified certainties is preferable to that derived from venturesome living and thinking. Perhaps these two types of people will never appreciate one another. It is for each man to decide where his loyalties lie. For better or worse, the adherents of Absolute Immanence have taken their stand on verifiable probabilities. Only time can tell which approach has "the" future.

IV

In the analysis of the logics of Absolute Transcendence, we concluded that these logics were based upon an ontological presupposition which we called "The Presupposition of Absolute Demand." (The Iliff Review, Spring 1950, pp 74ff). In terms of the language used in the present discussion, we may rename this "The Secondary Presupposition of Finalism." Certain presuppositions concerning man and his Existential Medium were accepted as the basis of their thinking. One was the "truth" that God and the "cosmos" were essentially dissimilar realities. It was assumed that there was an endless and "qualitative difference" between them. It was also assumed that this endless qualitative difference obtained in the caseof human reason and "knowledge" of God. Furthermore, it was assumed that human destiny must be fully realized, not here in history but in some transhistorical realm. Taken individually or together, they constitute assumptions concerning man and that in which "he lives, moves and has his being," his existential medium. Involved in each of these separate assumptions is the principle of Discontinuity or Dissimilarity.

The Secondary Presupposition of Approximation is also an ontological presupposition. It was formulated (p. 11 above) in these terms: Man's religious and moral interests are subject to proximate rather than final satisfaction or fulfillment. When one examines this somewhat critically, he discovers that it consists in positive assumptions concerning both man and his Existential Medium. The first of these places man's religious needs in the same category as his other needs, such as the need for food, water, companionship and the entire list of currently identifiable human needs. This is a denial of the view that religious needs are of endless "qualitative difference" from all other human

knowledge unconditioned by presuppositions on the one hand or perception on the other has a long history unmatched by success in any field related to the understanding of man and his several environments. Certainty or finality may be possible in pure mathematics or symbolic logic. In such fields the "objects" of studies are pure meanings rather than existential actualities, if we may use this redundant formulation. We are finite beings, and limited both in our intelligence and energy. We may achieve workable knowledge with reference to more immediate situations, and probable theories concerning more inclusive realities, including God.

It is granted that some persons, and one cannot estimate their proportion of the human population at any given time, seek for the security which they believe may be found in absolute knowledge. There are others, and again one is in no position to number them, who have learned to live satisfactorily in terms of the approximation process. Absolute Immanence may not satisfy the desires of the first group. It has been developed by those to whom verified probabilities are more important and significant than unverified certainties. They believe that in terms of verified probabilities they are in touch with realities, and they have courage enough to follow this route in their religious living. For others, the satisfaction derived from unverified certainties is preferable to that derived from venturesome living and thinking. Perhaps these two types of people will never appreciate one another. It is for each man to decide where his loyalties lie. For better or worse, the adherents of Absolute Immanence have taken their stand on verifiable probabilities. Only time can tell which approach has "the" future.

IV

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The Secondary Presupposition of Approximation is also an ontological presupposition. It was formulated (p. 11 above) in three terms: Man's religious and moral interests are subject to postulate rather than final satisfaction or fulfillment. When one examines this complex critically, he discovers that it consists of positive assumptions concerning both man and his Existential Medium. The first of these places man's religious needs in the same category as his other needs, such as the need for food, water, companionship and the entire list of currently identifiable human needs. This is a denial of the view that religious needs are of endless "qualitative difference" from all other human

needs. Religious needs differ from other needs, but the difference is not such as to provide for complete discontinuity. The second positive assumption is the acceptance of the "new mentality" as more or less adequate (i) for an understanding of these needs, and (ii) for the determination of the conditions whereby they may find partial or proximate satisfaction. The third assumption governs one's view of the nature or character of God as the objective pole in the experiences acknowledged to be religious. If, as indicated in the discussion of "The Logic of Absolute Immanence" (The Iliff Review, Spring 1949, p 88) "human needs, including the religious, are natural needs, whose satisfaction is a result of the adjustment and readjustment of the relations between man and his Existential Medium, then God as the dominant factor in the satisfaction of religious needs, belongs within the Existential Medium as such. Thus the necessity for God as supernatural is denied.

Whether these assumptions are in fact true is not the question before us. We are concerned with the nature of these several assumptions gathered together as the Secondary Presupposition of Approximation. The conclusion would appear to be that they are all affirmations, assumptions or presuppositions as to the nature or character of realities, human and divine. Perhaps we may state this in terms of a proposition: If man's religious needs are human needs, and if human thinking is more or less adequate as an instrument for analysing them and for the determination of the conditions which provide for their satisfaction and if finally their satisfaction results from some relation or relations with God as defined in Absolute Immanence, then the logic which governs Absolute Immanence is valid. In other words, three assumptions concerning man and his Existential Medium provide the justification of his thinking. Yet these three assumptions are all ontological in character, i.e., affirmations concerning whatever is viewed as real.

Ontological assumptions, as indicated in a previous paper (Iliff Review, Winter 1955 p 3ff) may not be used in testing other antological assumptions. They are determinants of cogency, and as such are not testable by other determinants of cogency at the same presuppositional level. If any set of such assumptions is true, then the logics which they support, are presumable valid logics. But the "truth" of any given presupposition, such as the one considered in this paper, cannot be determined so long as one remains at the ontological level.

needs. Religion needs differ from other needs, but the difference is not such as to provide for complete dissociability. The second possible assumption is the acceptance of the "new mentality" as more or less adequate (i) for an understanding of these needs, and (ii) for the determination of the conditions whereby they may find partial or provisional satisfaction. The third assumption governs man's view of the nature or character of God as the objective pole in the experience acknowledged to be religious. It, as indicated in the discussion of "The Logic of Absolute Immanence" (The Hill Review, Spring 1955, p 88) "human needs, including the religious, are natural needs, whose satisfaction is a result of the adjustment and realignment of the relations between man and his Intellectual Medium, when that is the dominant factor in the realization of reality comes out, belongs within the Dialectical Medium as such. Here the necessity for God as supernatural is lost."

Whether these assumptions are in fact true is not the question before us. We are concerned with the nature of these several assumptions gathered together as the Secondary Presupposition of Approximation. The conclusion would appear to be that they are all affirmations, assumptions or presuppositions as to the nature or character of realities, human and divine. Perhaps one may state this in terms of a proposition: If man's religious needs are human needs, and if human thinking is more or less adequate as an instrument for satisfying them and for the determination of the conditions which provide for their satisfaction and if finally their satisfaction results from some relation or relations with God as defined in Absolute Immanence, then the logic which governs Absolute Immanence is valid. In other words, these assumptions concerning man and his Intellectual Medium provide the justification of his thinking. Yet these three assumptions are all ontological in character, i.e., affirmations concerning whatever is viewed as real.

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VIII The Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency *

In a series of articles published in "The Iliff Review" during the past several years, I have summarized the results of my investigation of the assumptions or presuppositions underlying various contemporary theologies. The first of these appeared in the Spring 1946 issue, under the title of "The Logic of Contemporary Humanism." This was followed by three short treatises under the general title of "The Logic of Recent Theism," which appeared in 1947 and 1948. Then, in 1949, the third of the contemporary systems was subjected to presuppositional analysis under the title of "The Logic of Absolute Immanence," and in 1950, the same analysis was applied to contemporary Neo-Orthodoxy in terms of "The Logic of Absolute Transcendence."

Later, it was noted that the assumptions basic to the four positions could be classified in terms of two more inclusive sets of presuppositions: (i) The Presupposition of Absolute Demand or Final Realization,* and (ii) The Presupposition of Proximate or Partial Realization. At this point, another problem emerged. It is to this problem that the investigations summarized in this paper are directed.

The analysis of the several logics basic to Absolute Transcendence, Partial Immanence, Absolute Immanence and Religious Humanism, and the two Secondary Presuppositions to which these four may be reduced, i.e., The Presupposition of Final or Ultimate Realization and that of Proximate or Partial Realization, makes one fact quite clear. It is that each of these several assumptions and presuppositions is ontological in character. They make certain claims concerning the nature of the Existential Medium as such. Those who maintain the Presupposition of Final Realization assume that man's religious and moral needs are such, and the nature of "Reality" is such, that these needs must be finally satisfied and their goals fully realized. The exponents of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization assume that Man's needs are such, and the "Real" is such that these needs will probably find only proximate satisfaction. The first group accepts Discontinuity as basic, and limits man's intelligence to efficient functioning only at the lower level. For "knowledge" of God and the ultimate destiny of the soul, one must use more-than-rational means of achieving knowledge, or preferably, certainty. The second group, relying upon the principle of Continuity, deny the validity of such extra-natural knowledge, and build their systems upon methods such as behavioral and implicative vertification. Both groups make certain presuppositions which are ontological in character, i.e., refer to the "nature of the Existential Medium as such." It is these presuppositions which serve as the basis of the cognitional systems developed by both.

I.

The situation is analogous to that of a man who would weigh all of his possessions. Among these possessions, he has a scale which he uses to weigh the other items. When he comes to weighing the scale, he finds himself at a loss. It is possible for him to work out a balance on one end of which he places the scale, and on the other, various items which he has already weighed. In this way, he may determine the weight of the scale. In the meantime, he has assumed that the scale is correct. Even though he can weigh the scale by indirection, his weights all assume the accuracy of the scale itself. Another man, using a different type of scale, performs the same operation upon these goods. He, too, finds himself assuming the accuracy of his own scale. When these men compare their respective weights, they may find themselves with different sets of figures in hand. Now comes the sixty-four-dollar question: "Which set of figures is correct?" So long as they have but the two scales, and these differ, there is no way whereby the correctness of either set of figures can be determined.

*Iliff Review, Vo. XII, No. 1, Winter, 1955

[illegible] Presuppositions Underlying Contemporary Philosophy *

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This, I suggest, is a crude analogy of the situation now facing theologians and philosophers of religion. The several systems examined are based upon two "scales" which determine the conclusions which they have accepted. According to the Presupposition of Final Realization, reality is obligated to provide "justive" for every living person. That is what Kant believed, and he found it unthinkable to believe other wise. 1 This was, for him, one of Collingwood's Absolute Presuppositions. As such, it was "nonsense" to attempt either to challenge or to justify it. Yet the exponents of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization find it equally "unthinkable" to assume that man's needs can legislate what "must" be true of the Existential Medium as such. Their logic is based upon the assumption that all human needs may find some satisfaction, but that the precise degree of satisfaction must be determined by examination of behavioral and implicative evidence, and not by what "ought" to be true. Both presuppositions determine the thinking of large groups of philosophers, theologians and ethicists. "Facts" have cogency value because of these presuppositions, and not because of any inherent qualities they may possess. Is there, then, any way whereby we may "weigh" these secondary presuppositions to determine which is perferable to the other?

It is evident that the bulk of empirical evidence supports the contentions of the adherents of Proximate Realization. Mankind has made some progress, very real in given areas, progress which can be charted and measured, in terms of the logics based upon the Presupposition of Proximate Realization. But having said this, it must be remembered that the adherents of Final Realization do not deny that progress has been made in these areas in the ways suggested. But they are not primarily concerned with this type of advance. With Immanuel Kant and others, they are concerned with "ultimate goals," "eternal ends," and "absolute values." These represent, for them, another level of Being, a level beyond the spatio-temporal, qualitative relm investigated by means of the methods based upon the Presupposition of Proximate Realization. All attempts to sweep aside their criticisms of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization have been made in terms of the presumed validity of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization itself, and are thus circular or question-begging. This means that despite the preponderance of empirical evedence, the Presupposition of Proximate Realization cannot be used by its exponents as an argument against the adherents of Final Realization "without" first assuming the truth of their own presupposition.

We have, apparently, reached the point where it is impossible to discredit either of the two secondary presuppositions without first assuming the truth of the other. This means that so long as we remain at the ontological level in our analysis of presuppositions, we face either dogmatism or scepticism. One may give up the attempt to decide between them. If we do this, we have accepted scepticism since we have denied the possible truth value of the systems based upon both of them. One may decide to accept one of them "on faith" since both obviously cannot be true. This means dogmatism, namely, assuming the truth of a given presupposition in default of adequate grounds for so doing.2 This was the solution proposed by R. G. Collingwood in his significant "Essay on Metaphysics" (1940). And this was precisely the position in which I found myself about the time he published this essay. The most I found it possible to assert, then, was this: If the Presupposition of Final Realization, with its ontological implications, is true of reality, then the systems based upon it are presumably true. And by the same logic, the systems based upon the ontological foundations of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization are presumably untrue. If, on the other hand, the ontology presupposed by the Presupposition of Proximate Realization is sound, then the systems based upon it are presumably ture, and those based upon Final Realization are presumably untrue.

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In this state of affairs, either dogmatism or scepticism appears inevitable. With the shoemaker in one of Larsen's stories, one gives up the quest. The shoemaker became interested in manufacturing a perpetual motion machine. Repeated attempts always left him with the conviction that another wheel would solve his problem. But this "one more wheel" multiplied until he filled his whole house with machinery without making any appreciable progress toward his goal. In desperation, he threw the whole thing out and returned to what he could "know" and "do", namely, cobble shoes. This is, of course, a parable illustrative of the sceptic approach to knowledge. Such sceptics insist that man must deny the relevance of theological or metaphysical research, and confine himself to immediate and practical tasks.

Historically, one may observe this in the development of scepticism as outlined by Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 A.D.). In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, he noted, repeatedly, that no affirmation could be made without qualification. Thus food may be palatable under certain circumstances, and unpalatable under others. Changes in one's physiological condition or mental state may change the taste of the food without at the same time having any effect upon the food itself. This inability to state in final or perfect form the nature of the experiences and the experiences led the ancient sceptics to a denial of thepossibility of saying anything about either. 3. It is this demand for finality in matters religious which appears fundamental to the proetical scepticism of the adherents to Absolute Transcendence. "The demon of the absolute" dogs their steps whenever they seek for assurance intellectually. As a result, they tend to absolutize certain past experiences transmitted through sacred scriptures in the hope that they may thus escape ultimate scepticism. But the actural result is little better, namely, dogmatism.

Religious sceptics who do not deny the relevance of Religion as such tend to become dogmatic. The dogmatist affirms the truth of a given system without adequate evidential support. The adherents of Final Realization assert that mankind's religious experience is, in some real sense, absolute. If man needs God, defined as either the Absolute Transcendance school or the Partial Immanence school defines the concept, then this need must be viewed as an absolute. If, for some reason, human persons must be immortal, then this demand of man for personal immortality is also considered an absolute. In default of positive evidence to verify the two hypothesis, the dogmatist asserts the final validity of certain experiences, transmitted through sacred writings, and upon these writings and experiences, bases his belief in God as transcendent and the soul as immortal. The question of the possibility of the truth of these two hypotheses is not before us; we are concerned with the dogmatic approach to them. Whenever one affirms the truth or validity of any hypothesis without adequate support, he [illegible] s the camp of the dogmatist to the extent that he places assertion above verification.

If the outcome of cognition based upon ontological presuppositions is either scepticism or dogmatism, it appears to be necessary to investigate some other approach to the problem. The school of Analytical Philosophers attempt to do this by confirming themselves to the analysis of language, variously defined. E. W. Hall, in a recent work, investigates the nature of value. He limits himself not to so-called "value-experiences" at the ontological level, but to an analysis of value-languages. 4 Without entering into the question of the possible significance of this approach, lit us examine what may be involved here. These man are saying that there are at least two levels of cognitional research, namely, the ontological and the linguistic. In other words, one's interest may be focused upon the symbols one uses or upon that which is symbolized.

The distinction on which the analytical philosophers have drawn attention may be accepted as valid. It may be used in our attempt to find a way out of the dead end situation in which cognition based upon ontological presuppositions finds itself. To consider this more fully, let us refer to the knowledge situation as such. We note that any given knowledge situation is analyzable into three terms: (i) the Object-as-such, or OAS; (ii) the Object-as-known, or OAK; and (iii) the Subject-as-knowing, or SAK. If we define the ontological realm, provisionally, as "the object as it really exists", 5 then all three phases of the knowledge situation as just analyzed are ontological. The OAS (the object-as-such) is abviously ontological; the OAK (the object-as-known) is also an existential situration, and is thus ontological; even the SAK (the subject-as-known) is part of the ontological aspects of the sutuation. Accepting then, the knowledge situation as ontological, we may distinguish it, for purposes of analysis from the means or methods employed by the subject-as-knowing in it cognizing of itself and its objects. From this point of view we may define epistemology as the critical analysis of the cognitive instruments employed by cognizers in understanding themselves and their Existential Medium. As an activity engaged in by the subject-as-knowing, epistemology is part of the ontological situation broadly defined. At the same time, while engaged in thinking, a thinker will make assumptions of two kinds: (i) those which refer to the situation in existential or situational terms; and (ii) those which control the methods employed or his attitude toward these methods.

By (i) we refer to the list of assumptions and presuppositions named and described under the Logic of Absolute Transcendence, the Logic of Partial Immanence, the Logic of Religious Humanism, and the Logic of Absolute Immanence, and to the Seconary Presupposition of Final Realization and the Presupposition of Proximate Realization. These we have called "ontological" presuppositions. By (ii) we mean, not the situation, but the intellectual tools employed in the examination process. Epistemological presuppositions, then, are not directed to the ontological (existent situation as such) realm, including man as Existent and the Existential Medium. They are, instead, presuppositions governing the way he approaches the cognitive sutuation, or perhaps, the type of cognitive instruments he shall use. I shall admit that "approaches to" the cognitive situation as well as the "methods" employed, are presumable included within the ontological situation. At the same time, they represent a different level. They are procedual rather than situational. If these terms appear preferable, one may use them. All we are concerned with here is the distinction between situation and methods of approaching it. And I suggest that there is an epistemological or procedural presupposition which will serve to evaluate the two ontological (situational) presuppositions under consideration.

III

It has long been recognized in fields of serious study that a good hypothesis has at least two marks or characteristics. The first is fruitfulness. Given two hypotheses, one of which holds out the promise of extending knowledge to a considerable degree, and perhaps opening up new vistas for investigation, whereas the other promises little if anything cognitively fruitful, the common-sense attitude adopted by the creative thinker has been to take the more fruitful and reject the less. Take for a moment the debate which raged for years between those who accept organic evolution and those who accepted special creation. According to the second hypothesis, God created Adam and Eve out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into them the breath of life. That was an interesting story now generally regarded as myth. The first hypothesis, organic evolution, has proved to be a fruitful approach to the study of man and many of his institutions. It opened new vistas of research, enabled competent students to predict what would occur, and generally added to the

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

sum total of human knowledge. Thus "fruitfulness" is a basic mark of a good hypothesis.

A second characteristic already suggested is its capacity to predict. With the special creation story of man's origin, there was little predictive value. With the organic evolutionary hypothesis, there were many predictive possibilities, such as the several lines of evidence now generally presented to support the hypothesis. All these lines were the result of implications drawn from the hypothesis which in time were discovered to be fully or partially true. Thus fruitfulness and predictive value are characteristics of good hypotheses, as the history of human thought indicates.[6] Several other desirable characteristics of hypotheses are considered by contemporary logicians. The two mentioned are presented in order to clarify somewhat the meaning of the epistemological (procedural) presupposition which we offer as a possible escape from either scepticism or dogmatism.

Collingwood's assertion that it is "nonsense" or "pseudo-metaphysics" to question Absolute or Final Presuppositions is conceivable true if such presuppositions are are necessarily ontological in character. We have indicated some of the reasons for the impossibility of deciding among such ontologies stated in presuppositional form. But there appears to be no necessary reason for assuming that presuppositions as such must be ontological. There are no apriori reasons why they may not be epistemological as well.

We would propose, then, the adoption of a presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency, at the epistemological level, as a possible instrument by means of which we may escape from the circle of ontological presuppositions. If hypotheses may be tested prior to entrance into the verificatory phase of thinking, by their fruitfulness and predictive value, why cannot onthological presuppositions be tested the same way? Again, there appears to be no a priori reasons why they may not. Accordingly we propose to test secondary presuppositions in terms of increasing cognitional efficiency. Those ontological presuppositions which appear to have greater promise of increasing the efficiency of human thinking are to be preferred to those with lesser promise of cognitional efficiency. This means that the test of the Secondary Presuppositions of Final Realization and Proximate Realization will be found at the epistemological level, more specifically, in terms of their respective possibilities of increasing the efficiency of human thinking.

This, I suggest, is not "nonsence," but "common-sense" in so far as ultimate human problems are concerned. If metaphysics is so defined that its only outcome is either scepticism or dogmatism, then in truth it should be called "pseudo-metaphisics" and the sooner it is abandoned the better it will be for the human race. But this is not necessarily the case. Granted that scepticism and dogmatism appear to be the only possible outcomes so long as one remains at the ontological level, as soon as one transfers his basis of operations to the epistemological level, there would appear to be available a basis for common-sense evaluation. In other words, the alternatives to scepticism and/or dogmatism would appear to be common-sense.

IV

What is the common-sense approach to the problem of ontological presuppositions? Common-sense is not currently covered with much emotional appeal. Some identify it with "naive" realism, and then condemn it as thoroughly as it should be condemned. But we have in mind what George E. Moore meant when he spoke of "common-sense". Basic to his philosophy of Common-sense are certain truisms, each of which he knew, with certainty to be true: "There exists at present a human body, which is my body.

[illegible]

A second theoretical [illegible] already suggested is the [illegible] special creation story of man's origin. [illegible] the organic evolutionary hypothesis. [illegible] the several lines of evidence are generally presented as supporting [illegible] All these lines were the result of inferences drawn from the [illegible] in time were discovered to be fully or partially true. [illegible] directive value are characteristics of good hypotheses, in the history of [illegible] thought indicates. Several other desirable characteristics of hypotheses [illegible] adhered by [illegible] logicians. The two mentioned are presented in order [illegible] clarify somewhat the meaning of the epistemological (methodological) [illegible] which we offer as a possible escape from either dogmatism or dogmatism.

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IV

That is the common-sense approach to the problem of ontological presuppositions. Common-sense is not easily swayed when such metaphysical [illegible] "naive" realism, and then crumbles it as it should be [illegible] we have in mind metaphysics [illegible] of "[illegible] [illegible]

This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes; it was for instance, much smaller when it was born, and for some time afterwards, than it is now." 7 This with a series of related facts, Moore accepted as definitely true and known by him to be true. When he faced the questionas to how to formulate these "facts" in proposal form he found it difficult to reach an analysis of his knowledge of which he could be equally certain. 8 But this inability to arrive at equal certainty concerning the analysis of what he knew does not contradict the fact of his knowledge. That is to say, the heart of Common-Sense philosophy is the acceptance of such certainties as are implied in normal experience and are presupposed in normal thinking. It is certain that one would not concern himself with the problem of how one preceives a human hand if there were no experiences of objects, which by common consent, we call "human hands." How the "hand" exists or subsists is a secondary question which presupposed that, no matter how defined, a hand is. Thus, the problem of perception presupposed the perceptual object perceived. Then and only then, do the questions of how this object is believed to exist, and how we are aware of it, become relevant. 9

When we return to our problem, the common-sense approach to the evaluation of Secondary Presuppositions, we suggest that we know that it is better to utilize presuppositions which tend to further the cognitive quest than to employ those which tend to hinder that quest. Knowledge, in other words, is preferable to ignorance. Even the knowledge that one does not know, provided this is true, is better than ignorance of the fact that we are ignorant. This observation, made by Socrates, we submit is something which underlies in some degree, the cognitive activities of every person whose thinking we have analyzed. This is what we mean by the Primary Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency here proposed as the presently known test of Tertiary and Secondary Presuppositions. 10 If it is possible to show that one presupposition hinders, and the other presuppositions further the cognitive quest for God, then it is only common sense, and we suggest, good sense, to reject the former and adopt the latter.

V

If we are to establish the hypothesis that thinking is more efficient under the control of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization, it will be necessary to show (i) that this is actually, in given areas, the case, and (ii) that what is true in these "given" areas may also be true in the areas designated by the cognitive quest for God. We believe it can be demonstrated, with little difficulty, that the growth of knowledge in the western world is a direct result of the denial of absolute claims, and the adoption of the search for proximate goals. The second problem, that of "proving" that this approach may be made to the problems before us, is more techinical, but the evidence is, we believe, sufficiently cogent to compel acceptance of the conclusion suggested. We shall consider the two matters in the order suggested above.

In the first place, the knowledge which we possess of existent realities is relative knowledge. Whitehead noted in discussing the attempts on the part of scientists to formulate the basic concepts in their fields of study; "Success is never absolute, and progress in the right direction is the result of a slow, gradual process of continual comparison of ideas and facts". 11 We are finite creatures, possessed of finite minds, facing what is as yet beyond our complete comprehension. Whether we like it or not, we must live in terms of probabilities. The evidence for this is voluminous, and we shall merely suggest it in terms of one field, namely, medicine.

Life is only one phase or a certain time in the past, and has undergone continuously every change. Though the without undergoing changes; it was for instance, much easier to be happy, and for some time otherwise, then it is now." ? This with a certain of [illegible] Hours enough as definitely true and known by him to be true. Then he knows but questions to how to formulate these "facts" in propositional form so found it difficult to reach an analysis of his knowledge of which he could be equally certain. ? But while inability to arrive at equal certainty concerning the analysis of what he knew does not contradict the fact of his knowledge. That is to say, the form of Common-Sense philosophy is the acceptance of such certainties as are limited in normal experience and are presupposed in normal thinking. It is certain that one works not concern himself with the problem of how one perceives a house but if there are no experiences of objects, which by common consent, we call "houses indeed." How the "real" exists or subsists is a secondary question which presupposes that, no matter how defined, a house is. Then, the problem of perception presupposes the perceptual object perceived. Then and only then, do the questions of how this object is believed to exist, and how we are aware of it, become relevant. ?

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In the first place, the knowledge which we possess of material realities is relative [illegible]. Without resort to discussing the accuracy on the part of [illegible] to formulate the basic concepts in their fields of study, "Success is never absolute, and progress in the right direction is the result of a slow, gradual process of continual commission of those sin. Faults." We are finite creatures, possessed of finite minds, feeling that we are yet beyond our complete comprehension. Believe we life it or not, we must live in terms of probabilities. The evidence for this be [illegible], can we shall merely suggest it in terms of our [illegible] [illegible] methods.

If one will examine the history of medicine, he will discover that from the time of Hippocrates (born ca. 460 B.C.) to the early part of the nineteenth century, very little progress was made in extending the life-expectancy of mankind. In Rome and the Mediterranean world during the Augustan Age, the life-expectancy of any given individual was approximately twenty-five years.[12] In 1825, for western culture, it had risen to about thirty-five years; by 1925, it had risen to fifty-five years.[13] Since then it has risen to approximately seventy. This means that the life-expectancy of western man has allmost trebled during the twenty centuries of the Christian era. Disregarding the negative factors for the moment, let us note the positive factors believed responsible for the great increase during the past century and a quarter. Acording to Sir William Osler, Canadian born authority in this field, three such factors may be identified. The first consisted in the increase in "creative comforts," that is , ia advances in the standard of living. The second consisted in developments in sanitation and hygiene. This factor reduced infant mortality rates by as much as ninety percent in given areas. The third factor was the great increase in the range and efficiency of surgery. These three factors can be correlated definitely with the decrease in mortality and the increase in life-expectancy. Other developments which have occurred since Sir William wrote this (1924) in such areas as endocrinology, psychopathology and pharmacology would now be added to the list.[14]

Why did these changes occur so late? Why did the life-expedancy of western man increase only an estimated ten years during the first 1800 years of this era, and then rise so rapidly during the past one hundred and twenty-five years? Perhaps an analysis of one disease, malaria, will suggest the answer. References to this disease in the Hippocratic Collection (ca 400 B.C.) and in the writings of Claudius Galen (ca 130-200 A.D.) indicate that it was of sufficient importance to engage the attention of serious students of medicine. Despite the fact that both collections of medical writings contain accurate descriptions of this disease in its several forms, neither body of writings offers evidence that either the cause of the disease or of adequate methods of treating it were known.[15] It was believed that stagnant water had some thing to do with it, or that foul air may have been etiologal factor. When large numbers of persons were infected, the air and all that floated in it were suspects. But no ancient authority ever connected mosquitoes, and especially the genus Anopheles, with malaria infection. Some of them approximated this conclusion, unwittingly, when they stated that such infection occurred indamp areas, and from this drew the logical inference that the plants, insects and animals which inhabited these are as were dangerous. Some of their practices too, were apparently effective. They burned piles of wood to keep the pestilence away. The smoke undoubtedly drove the mosquites away, and thus probably prevented some infection.[16]

It was not unil the latter half of the nineteenth century that the nature of malaria infection was determined and the specific mosquito responsible for transmitting the parasite identified. It is not surprising, therefore, that the physicians of the first century and prior to that were baffled by this debilitating disease. They studied it, and left descriptions which contemporary authorities believe to be quite accurate. They made ingenious guesses concerning the areas where the danger of infection was greatest, but they did not understand it nor could they combat it effectively. Even Pliny the Elder (23--79 A. D.) one of the learned men of his day, admitted that medicine was helpless so far as quartan malaria was concerned. It required years of patient research and experimentation to determine the etiology of malaria, and then to devise methods, often piece--meal, for its prevention and cure. And even today, questions still arise with regard to possible revisions of the theories now held.[17]

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This disease is attributed to the presence of a minute parasite which inhabits the red blood corpuscles. These parasites where discovered by Alphonse Laveran (1845-1922), of Paris, who described them fully. Sir Ronald Ross (1857-1932) located the mosquito responsible for transmitting it, the Anopheles, about 1895. The approved method of combatting the disease is that of controlling the breeding-places of the parasite-carrying mosquito. This method has made possible the elimination of the disease in some regions, and may result in its complete elimination. Studies in the United States for 1938 indicate that the mortality rate for Malaria, was then the lowest of record.18

This brief sketch of one specific problem is indicative of the way in which human knowledge grows. It occurs when men become interested in specific situations, and then spend themselves in observing, recording, and testing their result by experimentation, then rechecking whenever any new light or suggestion emerges. Malaria could not have been controlled without developments in such fields as microscopy, which enabled men to discover germ and microscopic life; to developments in drainage and flood control; to the discovery and invention of new drugs and anti-bodies. In brief knowledge in this area resulted from the careful and continuous application of behavioral and implicative verificatory methods to specific problems.

The answer to the first question seems clear. What knowledge we have garnered throughout human history has been the result of patient observation, and careful reflection upon the results of such observation. The history of science tells the story from one angle: the attempt of the part of patient men to learn as much as possible about selected areas of interest. The basic interest does not appear to be "perfect" knowledge, but reliable information; information which serves as a basis for prediction and which is accepted or rejected in terms of its capacity to predict not only events yet to occur, but also records of events which have occurred. This statement from the pen of Warren T. Vaughan concerning developments in the field of endocrinology indicates the interrelatedness of information as well as the significance of predictability in the search for reliable information. "True progress, had perforce, to await success in the isolation or separation of the secreted substances in pure form, uncontaminated by other tissue extracts; the determination of its chemical constituents or formula; and, when possible, its preparation synthetically in the laboratory in a form identical with that made within the tissues of the body. When this has been done then we are in a position to study the substance experimentally, just as we study any other drug such as digitalis, morphine, atropin or cascara, by observing the response of animals to its administration and the response of persons who have been shown to be deficient in some one of the internal secretions, to its use as a curative drug." The medical research student subjects himself to severe standards before he will claim that he "knows". He not only isolates the substance under investigation; determines its chemical constituents; but he also insists that he must be able to produce it synthetically in his laboratory before he is prepared to test its effect upon experimental animals, and finally upon human beings. It is this process of knowing it so well that he can produce it synthetically which is the heart of the matter. This means he can predict what will occur if he adds the proper elements under specified conditions. It is patient, tireless work which prepares the way for growth in knowledge in highly important fields such as medicine and surgery. Students in these fields have adopted the "new mentality"; in fact, they have been instrumental in producing it. They are not guided in their thinking by the Presupposition of Final Realization, but by that of Proximate Realization. "Success is never absolute, and progress in the right direction is the result of a slow, gradual process of continual comparison of idea with facts." This statement by Whitehead, in actual fact, summarizes the process we have so inadequately sketched.

Dr. B's problem

This much, then, we may accept as true; Knowledge in the field of medicine has advanced steadily, with resulting benefits to long-suffering humanity since research students and practicing physicians adopted the new mentality; since they learned to rely on the methods of behavioral and implicatory verification in the investigation of the causes and cures of diseases a s well as the conditions of health. The same methods were employed in agriculture and food production so that today it is possible to provide not only more food but more adequate food for a good portion of the human race. The long story of the advances made in adding to human welfare in terms of behavioral and implicatiory verification may be found in any history of the several fields as well as in histories of science.[20] A new chapter is in process of unfoldment when and nuclear fission may be utilized more fully to serve the peaceful rather than the aggressive tendencies of humanity. But this new age, as the preceding, will make most rapid strides in terms of the new mentality applied to specific problems for proximate goals. The evidence for this may be found in any handbook describing the discovery of nuclear fission, and its application thus far.

VI

It was stated above,[21] that in order to establish the truth of the hypothesis that thinking is more efficient under the control of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization than under that of Final or Absolute Realization, it was necessary to present evedence that (i) such efficiency has in actual fact occurred in specific areas, and (ii) that the same approach may be made to the areas designated by the "cognitive quest for God." We turn now to this second fact which must be established.

It does not appear possible to attack this problem directly. The reason is that "all of the exponents of the Presupposition of Final Realization presuppose that God is in whole or in part of such nature that behavioral and implicatory verification methods cannot be applied to the investigation either of His nature or existence. This apparently makes impossible any reasonable discussion of the problem. The response is always ready: "But God is not such a reality as can be so investigated." This assertion can be met and denied, but in order to do so it would be necessary to do the following; (i) define the nature of religion, and establish the definition in cogent terms; (ii) examine in detail the character of the several divine realities which were factors in the experiences of religious behavior studies. The problems involved in this cannot be dealt with simply or briefly.

However, there may be another way of meeting this problem. If the exponents of Final Realization assert that behavioral and implicatory methods of verification are not applicable to the investigation of the problems related to God, we may ask what methods they propose to use. If these methods prove to be unsatisfactory, and there is at least presumptive grounds for accepting methods which have proven to be efficient in other areas.

The exponents of Final Realization, i.e., those who accept the logic of Absolute Transcendence, as a whole and the adherents to the Logic of Partial Immanence, in part, depend normally upon revelation as the source of their information concerning God. It will be granted by many of them that some information concerning God may be obtained by means of behavioral and implicative reasoning, but it is primarily negative. That is to say, evidence is presented to show that human efforts to achieve either truth or goodness are ineffective. It is also denied that the normal cognitive processes can be used to arrive at satisfactory knowledge of God.[22] As an alternative they turn to revelation.

Revelation or mystical [illegible] tionality. The history of religion is replete with instances of attempts to achieve absolute knowledge. This is particularly true when critical situations are confronted. Thus savage people use metanoesis for diagnostic purposes in case of serious illness. The Old and New Testaments, as well as the religious literature of all ancient people likewise contain such metanoesis.24 The literature available is filled with details concerning metanoetic devices designed to promote diagnosis. In the case of morbidity it was used to derive information from the extranatural and supernatural sources concerning both the possibilities of restoration to health, and the methods to be employed to achieve that end. At certain cultural levels in the Occident today such methods are still employed, even though western culture long since has passed through this phase in man's intellectual growth.

This situation does not differ greatly at another cultural level. The Romans of the Augustan Age (ca. 44 B. C.-A.D. 68) faced a health situation almost as mysterious and precarious as do the Melanesain peoples. Medical science, if we may use that term, was certainly not far advanced. Archagathus, a Greek physician, established his practice in Rome about 218 B.C. He proved to be too fond of his knife and cautery to win many patients. As a result, Greek medicine received a bad name among the Romans. About the year 90 B.C. Asclepiades, a Bithynian physician, established himself in the Italian capital, and began a successful practice. From this time, Greek medicine found welcome in Rome. We have indicated, above, the relatively inefficient state of Roman medicine in that the life-expectancy of the period way an estimated twenty-five years. This does not mean that many persons did not live to be quite old. In fact, Diogenes Laertius, in his "Lives of Eminent Philosophers" (produced about the beginning of the third century A.D.) apparently assumed one could not be a philosopher if he had not lived to be seventy! At the same time, medical historians estimate that infant mortality was very high, and this brought down the level to twenty-five years.

Confronting such a situation where they faced diseases and injuries with little information and practically no pharmacology, the Romans of this period turned to magic and religion for help. Gods and demons were generally credited with responsibility for both health and disease. The Romans had at least seventy-three gods who functioned at one time or other throughout their history in matters of health.25 With little actual diagnostic information, they used almost every metanoetic device known to priest, magician and holy man. Incubation, i.e., sleeping in the temple of the healing God where in dreams the proper information might be received, was a favorite method. Prayer and fasting were also used.26 Oracles were consulted in times of epidemics and the advise received was accepted as both authoritative and supernatural. The Sibylline Oracles advised bringing Asklepios, the Greek God of healing, to Rome in 293 or 292 B.C. to stem a severe pestilence.

Divination, augury, and astrology were all used in the attempt to tap extranatural sources of information in serious matters. Battles were fought or were avoided according as the divine prognosis was favorable or unfavorable. Metanoesis was an essential factor in the behavior of early and ancient civilization as much as scientific method is in ours. With inadequate means of arriveng at reliable knowledge, and facing situations where knowledge was desperatly needed, savage and ancient people had recourse to metanoetic devices of many types.

Let us grant that metanoesis provided for both savage and ancient peoples some rationalization of mysterious situations. A mysterious event was placed within a magical or religious context, and to that extent became meaningful. Let us grant, also, that some of the ideas presumably derived from metanoesis served a socially integrative

purpose. If a given disease is the result of the displeasure of the god Febris, for instance, and there are prescribed ways of removing this displeasure, then the group will be integrated about this process for the time being. Both removal of the mysterious and the resulting socially-cohesive activities must be considered valuable. At the same time, the question of fact must eventually arise. Did any of the metanoetic devices provide reliable knowledge concerning (i) the nature of malarial infection, (ii) the etiological factors responsible for it; or (iii) the ways whereby the disease may be controlled? And the answers to these several questions must be in the negative. Reliable knowledge was not obtaindd in that fashion, and everyone today will admit it. Furthermore, what about the status of the reality of the goddess Febris, a personification of fervers, especially malarial fevers? She not only [illegible] the disease, but cured it when certain condidions were met.27 Again, it is generally agreed among contemporary Occidentals that such an individuation of a disease and its accompanying etiology and prognosis cannot be given serious consideration. The whole complex of ideas does not belong within the context of reaiable knowledge.

The conclusion to which the facts apparently drive one is that the use of metanoesis in the past did little if anything to further mankind's attempts to understand either himself or his environment. There are those who believe that metanoesis actually hindered the quest for knowledge and this may well be the case. It is unnecessary for us to pass judgment upon that matter. We are concerned with a broader one: "Did this approach further mankind's quest for knowledge; did it increase the cognitional efficiency of human minds or not?" And the answer must be either in the negative or neutral. It is evident that this was not the way to learn more about malaria; the attempt to find its etiology in a given God was undoubtedly a misguided quest. Knowledge of such entities or events comes by means of slow, persistent and patient observation of conditions and comparison with the demands of a given hypothesis, namely, in terms of behavioral and implicative verification. But the other question still remains: "What about knowledge of devine realities?"

What happened in the case of savage and ancient peoples? Did the metanoesis of the Trobriand Islanders, for instance, further their quest for knowledge of God? They attributed diseases to sprites, demons and other supernatural beings. Among them was "tokway," a wood-sprite which lived in trees and rocks. It was believed to steal food from the fields and yam-houses, and to inflict slight ailments upon persons. A second group consisted in "mulukqausi" or flying-witches, believed responsible for all rapid and violent diseases. The third of the supernatural or extranatural realities accepted as responsible for diseases was the "Tauva'u", whose activities resulted in epidemics.28 It is difficult to see what, if any, contribution to the growth of knowledge such hypothetical entities made. Obviously, they do not represent actualities as they are conceived by the Trobrianders. That diseases occurred is factual; that such diseases may now be diagnosed and in most cases cured is also factual. But the process from mystery to understanding does not appear to have been the read through metanoesis; it was instead the result of research and investigation by men trained in the new mentality.

The same conclusion must be accepted in the case of the Romans of the Augustan Age. The belief on Dea Febris does not appear to have furthered our quest for knowledge of God today. This goddess would not be listed among the sources of our present God-concepts. That she may now be considered an early attempt to relate the healing factor in our existential Medium with God as now understood by many people may be true. But so far as furthering our present theological knowledge is concerned, we see little if any value in this conception. She may possibly have furthered our information of the disease of which she was an individuation, but medical authorities would find this difficult to believe.

It be granted that ancient metanoesis made some contribution to the growth of contemporary knowledge concerning God, what can be said about the methods proposed under the Presupposition of Final Realization? Such God-concepts are by definition based upon some form or forms of metanoesis. This is the only conclusion possible in the face of their assertion that God is reality not subject to investigation by the normal behavioral and empirical verificatory methods. In so far as God is transcendent, that is the relations between God and the cosmos are governed by the principle of discontinuity and qualitative difference, methods other than behavioral and implicative must be used in the attempt to determine either the nature or existence of God or God.

However, the exponents of God as Absolutely Transcendent are unwilling to rest in ultimate inexplicability. They therefore proceed to tell us a great deal about God. The source of their information is revelation. Revelation is by definition a modern form of metanoesis if revelation is defined as a method or means whereby information is made available to man in other than natural or normal ways. Perhaps a brief analysis of H. Richard Niebuhr's discussion of revelation will help to make this point clear. He begins with the view of historical relativism which asserts there is no way of thinking about God except from the standpoint of some historical community. "The historical limitations of all thought about God demand that theology begin consciously with and in an historical community. Its limitation as an inquiry into the [illegible] of the object of faith require it to begin in faith and therefore in a particular faith, since there is noother. Because God and faith belong together the standpoint of the Christian theologian must be in the faith of the Christian community directed toward the God of Jesus Christ. Otherwise his standpoint will be that of some other community and another God. There is no neutral standpoint and no faithless situation from which approach can be made to that which is inseparable from faith."[29] From this standpoint, Niebuhr can define revelation to mean "that something has happened to us in our history which conditions all our thinking and that through this happening we are enabled to apprehend what we are, what we are suffering and doing, and what our potentialities are. What is otherwise arbitrary and dumb fact become related intelligible and eloquent fact through the revelatory event. To the extent that revelation furnishes the practical reason with an adequate starting point it may be said to be validated."[30]

Thus far, revelation would appear to mean (i) the adoption of historical relativism as presumably true, and (ii) the discovery within the tradition of the western world of some event which serves to organize and illuminate the problem of human destiny. Historical relativism does not appear to serve very well the demands for absolute certainty, and we shall soon see that Niebuhr recognized this fact. The second suggestion, the use of an occurrence to organize and illuminatelarge bodies of interpreted experience, is, of course, what Miss Dorothy Emmet described as the use of analogy in metaphysical thinking. A given analogy is useful, and serves, to the extent that it can organize fruitfully large bodies of data.[31] But Niebuhr attempted to draw much larger meaning from his analysis. He asserted that the event which occurred was a "self-disclosing of that eternal knower" who knows is in not knowing of ourselves.[32] "Revelation is the moment in which we find our [illegible] selves to be judged not by ourselves or our neighbors but by one who knows the final secrets of the heart; revelation means the self-disclosure of the

judge."[33] This "Thing" is revealed to us only through the faith which is a personal act of commitment, of confidence and trust, not a belief about the nature of things."[34] Perhaps a summary of his argument from this vantage point will clarify the position before us.

Niebuhr accepts the view of historical relativism, and upon this basis arrives at an ultimate commitment. He believes one can only understand or judge in terms of the values of his tradition. Accordingly, by an act of faith or commitment, he accepts what is central to this tradition as final in both valuational and epistemological matters. For him as a member of the Christian church, the decisive event in Christian history was the advent of Jesus Christ. This, then, becomes the norm in whose terms all important matters are decided. The Christian's experience of God must be interpreted in terms of the Biblical concepts, as these are illuminated by the life and teachings of Jesus. Niebuhr is careful to dissociate himself from the Ritschlian Christology in which Jesus is given the value of God. For him it is the self--disclosure of God interpreted in terms of the life and teachings of Jesus chiwh consitutes the final certainty for the Christian.

If this analysis of Niebuhr's theory of revelation is fair, then revelation may bedefined as the absolutizing of a given historical tradition, and especially of certain specific events within it. And it must be remembered that this absolutizing is based upon the acceptance of historical relativism, which presumably, denies the possibility of any such absolutizing. If one will consider Barth's statement in the opening paragraphs of his contribution to a symposium on the same subject, i.e., revelation, he will see that Barth has specifically accepted the Christian tradition, especially its Biblical phases, as such an absolute. It is something which the Christian possesses and unless one is a member of the "possessing" community, he has no right to speak or judge.[35] Reinhold Niebuhr, in his study of competing conceptions of history, accepts "the Christian view" as final, and devotes more than half of a book in this area to the development of the relevance of this view to the final understanding of human life.[36]

The question before us is not whether in actual fact the specific events in Christian history constitute the central truth about reality. It is this: What effects does the absolutizingof a phase of human history have upon the problems of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency? Let us note, first, that this absolutizing of the Chrstian tradition constitutes another statement of the ontological presupposition of Final Realization. As such, it is not subject to validation or verification, since, as we noted in the early sections of this article, ontological presuppositions cannot be verified or disproved. They constitute assertions concerning the nature of reality which determine the nature of data. They are, therefore, determinants of cogency, and as such are not properly transformable into propositions.

Another problem emerges in this attempt to build an absolute system upon the grounds of historical relativism. Is is that H. Richard Niebuhr has not analysed historical relativism adequately. According to historical relativists, the historicalsituation has the following effects upon cognition.

[illegible]

[illegible] or judge in terms of the values of the predictions. Economically, in terms of life or economically, he guesses what is correct to this [illegible] final in both national and sociomorphological matters. [illegible] ber of the Christian church, the decisive event in Christendom [illegible] the advent of Jesus Christ. This event, therefore, determines the [illegible] become all important matters are decided. The Christian's [illegible] God must be interpreted in terms of the Biblical message, and [illegible] illuminated by the life and teachings of Jesus. Reality is [illegible] modern historian from the Scientific Cosmology in which [illegible] the value of God. For him it is the self-disclosure of God [illegible] terms of the life and teachings of Jesus which consecrates the [illegible] reality for the Christian.

If this analysis of Niebuhr's theory of revelation is fair, then [illegible] may be defined as the absolutely of a given historical [illegible] reality of certain aspects which [illegible]. And [illegible] absolutizing in behalf upon the perspective of [illegible] particularly, denying the possibility of any such absolute [illegible] Barth's statement in the opening paragraphs [illegible] a presupposition on the same authority [illegible], revelation, he will [illegible] two questions: assuming the Christian reality, [illegible] phrase, as a high-sounding [illegible]. If the authority which the Christ [illegible] also [illegible] one is a premiser or is a presupposition, [illegible] right to speak on behalf of Barthian Neo-Orthodoxy, [illegible] presuppositions of Karl Barth, assuming this Christian [illegible] more than half of a book in this [illegible] to the development of the [illegible] of this view to the total understanding of human life.[illegible]

The question before us is not whether in actual fact the specific [illegible] Christian history constitute the central truth about reality. [illegible] effects were [illegible] a place of a [illegible] history from [illegible] those of [illegible] Christian [illegible]? Let us note, [illegible] absolutizing of the [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] methodological presupposition of Barth's Dialectic. [illegible] to validation or verification, since, as we found in the early [illegible] analysis, religious presuppositions cannot be verified or disproved. [illegible] consists in [illegible] the reality of reality [illegible] [illegible] of God. [illegible] determine [illegible] are not [illegible] verifiable [illegible].

A great problem confronting the attempt to build an [illegible] the [illegible] religious [illegible] Barth's [illegible] [illegible] verification [illegible] verifiability. [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]

On the other place, the absolute scientific concepts of the [illegible] appear universal and impersonal. This we should grant. Secondly, the concepts which are used in the attempt to resolve these questions are also produced by the culture and the tradition within which the questions arise. This we are prepared to grant, in part. But it must be remembered that traditional concepts do not serve adequately, new concepts as well as new methods are invented. So important is this that some sociologists would make invention a key-concept in interpreting cultures. As one sociologist stated it: "The essence of culture is invention."[37] Unless one is prepared to assert that cultures are static, he must accept invention of concepts as well as of instruments as a factor in cultures and the traditions which develop within them. If this is accepted, the basis for the absolutizing of given events within a tradition becomes questionable. Finally, and perhaps most important, is the fact that some problems must be solved in the same terms in every culture. By way of an example, one may consider the discovery of nuclear fission and the development of the atom bomb. It will be granted that the discovery of nuclear fission could not have occurred as it did in any other culture than that of the west. It was an outgrowth of the development of modern physical science, and no culture other than the western had reached the stage where this was possible. Furthermore, the fact that its first application was in terms of an atom bomb was determined by the conditions in the western world. If there had been no world war II, it is highly doubtful that an atom bomb would have been developed. But the exigencies of the situation facing both Germany and the Allies determined that the first use of nuclear fission was for destructive purposes. This time is free of historical relativism, in this specific instance. But when one asks the question: Did western culture determine the nature of atomic fission and the specific condition under which an atom bomb was developed, the situation is different. Let us answer the second part of the question first. It is probably true that the state of western technology determined the type of atom bomb developed. Given a different form of technological society, it is possible that a different type of bomb would have been invented. My information is too meagre at this point to make any judgment here. It is merely pointed out that the type of bomb actually made was probably determined by cultural conditions. But when one asks whether or not the nature of uranium is due to cultural conditioning, the answer appears to be definitely negative. Atoms have presumably existed from the first formation of matter, and their constitution has apparently remained unchanged since. If nuclear fission is to occur, the conditions for such action will be the same whether atoms are secured in China, Russia or the United States, or for that matter, whether they come from a half million years ago, or in some still unknown tomorrow. Historical relativism is true in certain phases of history or culture, particularly where man's responses to specific situations are important. Historical relativism ceases to be relevant, to any significant degree, when the factors investigated are non-psychological in character.

If this summary be true, then historical relativism may be considered a determinant of God--concepts to the extent that (i) society determines what concepts are believed to be most satisfactory, and (ii) those which are to be subjected to critical investigation. If, however, God is more than a satisfactory idea utilized within a given religious tradition, factors other than historical relativism may become important. In fact, even the "satisfactory" God-concept may become satisfactory on grounds other than historical conditioning.[38]

A third question concerning the possibility of building an absolute metaphysical presupposition upon historical relativism emerges from the absolute that the competing traditions may [illegible]

Catholic Neo-Scholasticism and the Crisis theology flourished on the European continent, even though they have their centers in different cities. They both belong within the Christian tradition in which H. Richard Niebuhr believes it possible to find an absolute. If Neo-Scholasticism accepts the Aquinian--Aristotelainism as its absolute, and the Crisis theologians find their absolute within the New Testament seen through Reformation eyes, we apparently have two absolutes validated by the same tradition. This would appear to be quite embarrassing since the first commandment of Absolutism is: Thou shalt have no other Absolutes before me.

There are, then, grounds for serious questioning of the attempt to base absolute ontological presuppositions upon historical relativism. Neither Karl Barth nor Reinhold Niebuhr would appear willing to accept H. Richard Niebuhr's proposal. Reinhold Niebuhr seeks to justify his adoption of the Christian tradition as absolute upon pragmatic grounds: It offers the only possible resolution of the predicament faced by western man.[39] Karl Barth apparently attempts no other justification than strong assertion.[40] But our preimary interest here is not which, if any, of these attempts to vindicate the Presupposition of Final or Absolute Realization is valid. We have indicated our belief that it is impossible to do this. Our question lies elsewhere: What effect upon increasing cognitional efficiency does the adoption of the Presupposition of Final Realization have? If this question is faced squarely there would appear to be but one conslusion, namely, that any attempt to impose finality upon human thinking has a detrimental effect upon the thinking of those concerned.

Charles Guignebert, commenting on the Catholic Reform which followed the Protestant Reformation as follows: "Nevertheless a terrible imprudence affecting all the future, had ben committed at Trent under the influence of the Jesuits, who were immutably persuaded that they possessed absolute truth. Not only had Tradition been declared equal to Scripture (which definitely cut short any attempt at reform of the Church teaching in the Protestant direction) but the Council had also defined and formulated everything contained in the faith from this traditional point of view, and had ranked the work done under the authority of the Holy Spirit."[41] He concluded his judgment of this action by noting that "for this reason we may maintain that if the efforts of the Council and the Jesuits saved the Catholic Church in the great crisis of the Reformation, they prepared her decadence and overthrow in the future by deliberately depriving her of the indispensable faculty of readjustment to the changes going on around her, by means of which she hitherto insured her survival."[42]

The quoting of authorities to the effect that the Catholic Reformation meant the stifling of research except under Church guidance or within the intellectual framework adopted by the Church, is not in itself the kind of proof we seek. One may find many instances of attempted repression of freedom, and the actual realization of such aims in the history of the Roman Church in Guignebert's final chapters, and of course in a study of the apologetic attitude of the Church itself in the face of this changing world. The history of Protestantism is not without its own pages describing the suppression of freedom of thought and in some instances of the destruction of those who dared to oppose repression. Indicative as results as these instances may be, the cognitional basis for this lies in the adoption as final of a given intellectual framework or system.

A brief exposure of one point may be in order. On August 4, 1879, Pope Leo XIII published his early (first) on "The Restoration of Christian Philosophy, according to the Mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor." Leo XIII stated the case for an adequate philosophy not only to keep people from error, but also "guard with religious care all truths that come to us by Divine tradition, and resist those who dare attack them."[44] He then asserted the Scholastic philosophers, and St. Thomas as the acknowledged master of them all. In fact, he wrote at the Council of Trent, the Summa of St. Thomas "lay open on the altar, with the Holy Scriptures and the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, that from it might be sought counsel and reasons and answers."[45] He concludes his letter by recommending strongly that all the leadership of the Catholic Church should apply themselves to the consideration of the wisdom of St. Thomas, "and to spread it as far as you can, for the safety and glory of the Catholic Faith, for the good of society, and for the increase of all the sciences."[46] And the teachers whom they were to oversee should be charged with the same responsibility. This means, in effect, that the Thomastic philosophy received the highest commendation and support which required that it be given serious attention wherever the Roman Catholic Church extends its sway.

In his discussion of Absolute Presuppositions, Collingwood formulated three which have, historically, determined the course of modern science, and the course which has, in return, been developed by the same science. The first is the Newtonian formulation: "Some events have causes." The second is the Kantian, "that all events have causes," and the third is the Einsteinian that "no events have causes."[47] m The question, then, which should be raised is this: Where in these several presupposition, does the basic philosophy of science of Thomas Aquinas belong? The answer to this question may be determined by observing that the Thomastic system was thoroughly teleological in character, and that the end toward which all things moved was God. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, he asserts that "all things are directed to one good as their last end."[48] Even evil is placed within the context of universal teleology. This is done by asserting that evil is found within some good, and the good is always a cause of something.[49] Furthermore, God is not only the end toward which all moves, but by His providence He "governs and rules all things." (Ch LXIV). The conclusion, then, is that given the period in which he lived, Thomas Aquinas would assent with Kant that "all events have causes," and God is the Final End or Cause.

If this analysis of Aquinas is sound, then the acceptance of St. Thomas as the philosopher whose system is to govern men in their scientific thinking means the continuance of universal causality as final. But, as Collingwood pointed out, the Absolute Presupposition that every event has a cause is no longer operative in much modern scientific thinking. Such thinking is governed by the Einsteinian presupposition thatno events have causes. In other words the element of necessity presuppsed by Kant no longer obtains. The distinction between cause and law is important. In the case of cause, events occur because it is necessary for them to do so. They are within a teleological, causal nexus, and are thus determined. In the case of modern physics, for example, events are observed to occur in specific ways. They act according to "law" and not as a result of cause.[50] The absolutizing of

Aristotle's Physics and Book XII of his Metaphysics meant that the continued progress made possible by modern physics would appear to be seriously hampered, if not prevented entirely. The Aquinas-Kantian metaphysics would mean additional complications in an already complicated situation. It is this which presumably prompted a recent historian of science to say: "More important for us is the fact that the whole of the scheme of Aquinas was framed in accordance with Aristotle's logic and science. His logic known already through compendiums, acquired a wider influence when a synthesis of knowledge was attempted. Based on the syllogism, it proved to give rigorous proof from perfectly certain premises. It led naturally to the idea of Knowledge derived from intuitive axioms on the one side, and authority--that of the Catholic Church--on the other. It was singularly ill adapted to lead men to or guide them in the exploratory investigation of nature."[51] This historian of science is stating what should be evident to all serious students, namely, that within every system as in every age and culture there are strains which develop and for which some type of adjustment must be provided. The ideal of perfect knowledge, with the assumption that finality could be achieved, would mean the end of the type of approach which has made modern science and its practical application in technology possible.

The story of the detrimental effects of the absorbtizing of Aristotle upon the development of experimental science is too well known to require retelling. Perhaps the earliest of these was that in which Galileo demonstrated experimentally that the weights of given bodies does not determine the velocity with which they fall. "Bodies were thought to be intrinsically heavy or light and to fall or rise with velocity proportional to their heaviness or lightness because they sought their natural places with varying power. In 1591, Galileo, repeating an experiment of Stevinus, dropped a ten--pound weight and a one--pound weight together from the top of the leaning Tower of Pisa and showed the incredulous onlookers that, heavy or light, they struck the ground simultaneously."[52] The story of the attack of the church of his day upon Galileo, and the Protestants sharing with the Roman Catholics in the attack, is still depressing reading. It is a sad commentary upon the intolerance which too often springs from the attempt to make any system absolute. Are one cannot say that the world has outgrown such attempts. The attack upon the teaching of organic evolution in various states in the United States during the third decadeof this century; the swpression of thought in Italy under Fascism; in Germany under the national Socialists, and the present suppression of thought in Russia under the doctrine of the absolutness of the Communist ideology, are examples in the so-called enlightened parts of th e earth whenever the adherents of Finality becmme associated with political or economic powers now available to mnn. The fact would remain established that the Presupposition of Final Realization constitutes a danger to the growth of knowledge so essential to the welfare of the human race.

It may be objected at this point, that the Presupposition of Proximate Realization has its own absolutes. It is assumed, by Collingwood, that certain presuppositions are treated as absolute by contemporary scientific thinkers. Today, the Einsteinian presupposition that "no events have causes," is accepted presumably, as such. However, as we noted above, such presuppositions are accepted and utilized precisely because they are the best available which appear to further the cognitive quest of the men concerned. This was stated precisely in Einstein and Infeld's discussion of the growth

as physical science. "The aim of every theory is to guide us to fruitful suggest new experiments and lead to the discovery of new phenomena and laws."[54] And to this could have been added, "new sets of presuppositions." The aim of scientific and critical thinking is thus two-fold: (i) the proper mination as precisely as possible for the nature of the objects under con- sideration; and (ii) the development of more efficient methods of so doing. It is not that of arriving at finality. It is believed, by such men, that [illegible] presupposes what they do not discover, namely, a static universe. If the evidence collected pointed toward such an existential medium, then pre- they would accept the conclusion and utilize it as fully as possible. The evidence does not point in that direction. Consequently, many efforts ex- pended to prove this would be considered thoroughly detrimental to the [illegible] of providing much needed knowledge to help man in his attempts to arrive at a more satisfactory existence.

VIII

A second device adopted by the adherents of the Presupposition[illegible] Realization to escape from the dogmatic consequences which threat[illegible] is their recourse to myth. According to Paul Tillich, a myth is a history of the gods. This, according to his analysis, is a minimal definition but one which must be included in such definitions.[55] A recent interpreter of Bultmann states the latter's position as to the nature of mythological think- ing as "one in which the divine appears as human and the other-worldly as this-worldly."[56] Christian mythology, then appears to be a form of thinking in which some story, situation or event is believed to suggest more than is told, and which must not be interpreted literally. It is a truth, not a fact.[57]

It is obvious that this is a specialized use of a concept which has long been used in anthropological research. Its meaning in such studies is more general. Myths consist in stories told for various purposes, per- haps some of them are tales told merely for the enjoyment of the narrator and his audiences. In many instances they have value in placing the present situation in some context which, for the culture, is meaningful. A study of the myths of the Trobriand Islanders,[58] and those gathered by Paul Radin from his studies of the American Indians,[59] will suggest that whereas there is normally a reference to the extraordinary, it is not true that the extra-normal is necessarily divine. Magical powers are often referred to in these stories. Sociologists tend to view myths as forms of social con- trol. Stories are told which employ emotions to further the socially-inte- grative and socially-useful institutions and to develop loyalty and devotion to the social group itself.[60] As one sociological text states it, "Every social order is held together by a system of myths, a term we use to designate the value-impregnated beliefs and notions that men hold, that they live by and live for. No society can maintain a degree of stability unless the myth upon which it rests--the myth of law, or power, of freedom and so on--remain as fundamental values for man."[61] These sociologists widen the definition to include the basic beliefs of a society which would be quite difficult to justify if one studied primitive groups. There is a distinc- tion between myth as Malinowski and Radin consider the matter, and the common-sense beliefs which govern some, at least, of the activities essen-

tial to social cohesion among the Tsohonoid (Iroquois) and the American Indians.
At the same time, the definition presented shows the interest in social control in this area characteristic of many sociologists.

If one examines the writings of Christian theologians who seek to utilize myths in the formulation of Christian doctrine, one will discover that whereas the potential truth contained within a given myth is emphasized its functional value soon comes to the fore. Reinhold Niebuhr believes the solution of our present deplorable situation depends upon the re-statement of the Christian view of history.[62] Roger L. Shinn adopts the same point of view, and is prepared to use the word "myth" in preference to "saga" or "drama".[63] But his interest, like that of Niebuhr, is personal and social, not cognitive. Or perhaps one should say that his primary interest is placed upon the soteriological rather than the epistemological values found in the Christian tradition. From a somewhat different theological standpoint, Bernard E. Meland adopts "myth" as an indispensable instrument in his attempts to provide a framework within which Christianity may recover some of its pristine power.[64]

With this attempt to recover whatever socially-cohesive and personality-integrative power Christianity has had at any of its creative periods, one must express profound sympathy. Previously we have noted that religion has at least three phases or aspects. The first is function: the contributions which religions have made to individual and social existence. The second is interpretation or reinterpretation: the attempt to understand as fully as possible the nature of the individual person, the culture of which he is a part, and the nature and existence of God or divine beings. The third consists in techniques or overt behaviors designed to further man's quest for the values believed available in religion in terms of the accepted conceptions. Myth, as defined by the persons mentioned above, belong to the technique phase of religion. As such, it is pragmatically useful device designed to further the religious quest. But any attempt to make myth cognitively determinative of the truth of the concepts which it may contain is subject to the criticisms leveled against the adherents of Partial Immanence. The argument from myth is pragmatic. Its value lies in what it can do to transform theories into functional beliefs. Any attempt to deduce the nature of God from what is pragmatically useful faces the devastating fact that different cultures find pragmatic value in conceptions of the nature of God which are diametrically opposed to one another. At another level, the "myth" of Capitalistic Democracy is confronted by the "myth" of Communist ideology, and one appears to be as functional as the other. Yet, each contains elements which deny important elements in the other. Both cannot be true reports of the realities considered. There would appear to be little if any cognitive value in myths, no matter how important a social or personal function they may have in different cultures. A myth becomes relevant only after the primary cognitional task has been performed. Otherwise, it may, as Whitehead points out, become an obstacle in the way of intellectual progress.[65] There does not appear to be any way whereby we can escape the necessity for (i) clarification of our hypotheses concerning God, even those embedded in myths, nor for (ii) the verificatory activities required

[illegible]

at the same time, [illegible]

If one examines the writings of Christian theologians who [illegible] myths in the formulation of Christian doctrine, one will discover that whereas the potential truth contained within a given myth is [illegible] its functional value soon comes to the fore. Reinhold Niebuhr believes the solution of our present deplorable situation depends upon the re-statement of the Christian view of history.[62] Roger L. Shinn adopts the same point of view, and is prepared to use the word "myth" in preference to "saga" or "drama".[63] But his interest, like that of Niebuhr, is personal and social, not cognitive. Or perhaps one should say that the primary interest is placed upon the soteriological rather than the [illegible] values found in the Christian tradition. From a somewhat different theological standpoint, Bernard E. Meland adopts "myth" as an indispensable instrument in his attempts to provide a framework within which Christianity may recover some of its pristine power.[64]

With this attempt to recover whatever socially-cohesive and [illegible] integrative power Christianity has had at any of its creative [illegible] one must express profound sympathy. Previously we have noted that [illegible] has at least three phases or aspects. The first had to do with the [illegible] demands which religions have made to individual and social [illegible]. The second is interpretation or [illegible] the attempt to [illegible] fully as possible the nature of the individual person, the nature of [illegible] as a whole, and the nature and existence of God or divine beings. The third consists in a complex of overt behavior designed to further man's quest for the values believed available in religion in terms of [illegible] consequences. Myth, as defined by the previous discussion, [illegible] the technique of [illegible] religion. As such, it is pragmatically useful device designed to further the religious quest. But the attempt to make myth cognitively determinative of the truth of the concepts which it conveys [illegible] subject it to the criticisms leveled against the adherents of [illegible]. The argument from myth is pragmatic; the value lies in what it does [illegible] transform the stories into functional beliefs. This attempt to deduce the truth of God from what is pragmatically useful raises the devastating fact that different cultures find pragmatic value in conceptions of the nature of God which are diametrically opposed to one another. At another level, the myth of Capitalistic Democracy is confronted by the "myth" of Communism, and one appears to be as functional as the other. Yet, each contains elements which deny important elements in the other. Both cannot be true reports of the realities involved. There would appear to be little or no cognitive value in myths, no matter how important a social or personal use there may be in different cultures. A myth becomes [illegible] only after the primary cognitional task has been performed. Otherwise, it may, as Whitehead points out, become an obstacle in the way of intellectual progress.[65] There does not appear to be any way whereby we can escape the necessity for (1) the verification of our hypotheses concerning God and man, once embodied as myths, and for (2) the [illegible]

to prove or disprove the truth of the hypotheses clarified. If the advocates of the Presupposition of Final Realization ever faced critically the implications of their various proposals, they would see that they are using a rather simple type of pragmatism to justify the beliefs which they claim are essential to the salvation of man and culture.

The presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency, then, would seem to require a rather careful consideration by those who seek to serve the cause of religion today. If we must rely upon myth or fiction in order to maintain our religious behavior, then the religious situation is indeed serious. Man can live by fictions. This was true of early man. But we can hardly hope to arrive at true and more adequate conceptions of God and he resolves to use his intelligence as fully and freely as it is possible to do. There are now too many economic and political factors threatening freedom of thought and experimentation for serious minded defenders of religion to add to them by seeking absolute truth in a dynamic, changing world.

IX

A misunderstanding may easily occur at this point. We have argued for the adoption of the Primary Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency as the criterion in whose terms we could decide between the Secondary Presuppositions of Final Realization and Proximate Realization. The use of the words "increasing cognitional efficiency" in this connection may lead some readers to consider this but another statement of pragmatism, defined as the logic of efficiency. Perhaps we can here arrange Presuppositions in their proper order as conceived thus far, the better to consider this criticism.

We began this analysis with an investigation of four contemporary cognitive approaches to the understanding of the Objective factor in the religious complex, namely, God. The four: The Logic of Absolute Transcendence; The Logic of Partial Immanence; The Logic of Absolute Immanence; and The Logic of Religious Humanism, may be considered in terms of the nature of that which makes evidence cogent, that is, intellectually compelling. Facts as indicated many times previously, become data when organized in a cognitive quest. The cogency of a fact is determined by the basic assumptions held by the thinkers who use it. We discovered, upon further analysis, that these four basic assumptions, which we propose to call Tertiary Presuppositions, could be organized into two Secondary Presuppositions, namely, the Presupposition of Final Realization and that of Proximate Realization. By this time, it had become evident that we were dealing with ontological presuppositions, i.e., assumptions concerning the nature of reality as such. But it also became evident that so long as one remained at the level of ontological presuppositions, it was impossible to use either to discredit the other. This was true since some ontological presupposition is required to make any fact cogent.

Let us re-examine this for a moment to indicate what we mean. If one accepts the view that Reality must be such as to satisfy fully man's presumably legitimate religious interests, as Horton did in arguing for God as transcendent, then every fact which suggests the inadequacy of the Existential Medium, as known and knowable by rational means, to satisfy fully these interests, becomes a datum which supports the supernaturalist's claims. If, on the other hand, one accepts the view that human needs are

protean, that many of them will find only partial or areas of [illegible] at best, then all such facts indicate areas in which further investigation must be made to determine precisely how fully such interests may be met and, if the evidence available indicates only partial satisfaction, to seek the fullest possible value available under the conditions which exist.

This means, that so long as one remained at the level of ontological presuppositions, the intellectual outcome had to be either dogmatism or scepticism, in some form or other. This led to the proposal that we leave the ontological level and seek for a possible criterion at the epistemological level. The Primary Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency was then proposed, at the epistemological level, as a way out of the unacceptable choice of either dogmatism or scepticism. That ontological presupposition which offers the most fruitful and [illegible] road to man's intellectual quest for God should be selected, and the other rejected. The question, then, is this: Is this pragmatism, or the logic of efficiency, as criticizedd when utilized by the adherents of Partial Immanence?

Upon analysis of several "pragmatic" systems, as used in Partial Immanence we discover that the basic assumptions or Tertiary Presuppositions consisted in the claim that man's needs are determinative of reality. By this we mean that in default of positive evidence to the contrary, whatever man needed must be assumed to exist. If man needed, or so he believed, the existence of God as wholly or partially transcendent, and if evidence to the contrary was lacking, it was considered legitimate to accept the [illegible] of needs as evidence for the existence of God so defined. This presupposition is ontological, making certain claims concerning the nature of man, the world and God. Furthermore, it was justified by its moral and religious effects. If Protestants believe God must be personal, both transcendent and immanent, in order to live as they believe they should, then--in default of positive evidence to the contrary--belief in God so defined was considered justifiable.[66] Using the same Tertiary Presupposition, the Bahaists can claim that their conception of God is also justifiable, and presumably, Mayahana Buddhists can do the same. The logic of efficiency as defined in the Tertiary Presupposition of Partial Immanence is the logic of efficiency in living, not necessarily in thinking. In fact, it was common to say that "Life is deeper than Logic." The presupposition then places primary emphasis upon efficiency in living as defined by given groups.

The Primary Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency, as utilized here, finds its justification in the efficiency of thinking. The question of efficiency in living is deferred until this has been determined. The difference between pragmatism as the logic of efficiency and this Presupposition lies at this point: The Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency presupposes that efficiency in living depends, in the long run, upon reliable, that is, accurate information concerning the realities upon which life depends, and upon the nature of life itself. Where efficiency in living is made primary, and reliable knowledge secondary, efficiency in living suffers. The so-called "imaginary environment" of the savages, peopled with ghosts, witches and magical entities, may have served the immediate needs of the folk who believed in it. But this orientation to fictional realities turned their attention away from the actualities upon which their existence depended. This was true also of the healing gods of ancient civilizations. Belief in these healing gods may have assuaged the anxieties of persons in immediate situations, and to that extent served their needs. At the same

At the same time, such belief diverted attention from the [illegible] upon which health depended. This prevented them from achieving [illegible] over pathological factors which today enable mature men to live [illegible] times as long as they did. Values, in the long run, depend upon [illegible] man's knowledge of himself and his Existential Medium. Such knowledge must be the first charge against his time and efforts. In the course of [illegible] the knowledge gained will result in the increase of his values; if not [illegible] the particular individuals concerned, then of their children and their [illegible]ants. This is not pragmatism, in the narrower sense of efficiency [illegible] living. It is the intelligent quest for human values viewed in the perspective of the centuries, as conditioned by more adequate and reliable knowledge [illegible] realities.

The Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency is thus oriented toward the verifiability and the verification of the congruence of concepts with the realities they symbolize, designate, or denote. As such, it is located at the level of the efficiency of human thinking rather than that of immediate practicality. It is a type of "practicality," which characterizes pure science, critical philosophy, and reasonable religion. As such, it should become part of the intellectual arsenal of religious thinkers who would first understand what God is before they ask what values God may have for them. The question of divine values is certainly legitimate, but it does not appear that it can be raised until we know what God is.

The task remains to show positively that the use of the Presupposition of Proximate Realization and the methods subsumed under it can bring us closer to reliable knowledge of God. It is evident that the Presupposition of Final or Absolute Realization, demanding as it does both absolute knowledge and complete fulfilment of man's religious interests, has not produced the type of reliable knowledge acceptable to modern man. For him, God concepts must be verifiable and verified, in so far as this is now possible, if he is to find religious values in them. For better or worse, he must have reliable knowledge if he is to find the values which religious institutions presumably provide for him.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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21. Page 9
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23. "Metanoeo is formed of meta, which means 'beyond' and noeo, a Greek derivative meaning 'to perceive, think'. We use the word to mean all attempts to arrive at knowledge by other than the natural or rational means." Cf. B. Berchelder, "Reason in Religion", op. cit., p 133.
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IX Verifiable and Non-Verifiable Theo[illegible]

The application of the Primary Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency, discussed in the Winter issue of The Iliff Review, 1955, suggests that those God-concepts which refer to immanent or partially immanent objective referents are to be preferred to those which are wholly or absolutely transcendent. It appears to be possible to investigate the existence and nature of the former, whereas it does not with the latter. And, insofar as some verification of specific concepts can be achieved, we shall be able to add to our reliable knowledge in this field. The task of this article, then, is to examine the several conceptions to determine which are in fact theoretically verifiable, and which are not.

I

We have assumed that the object of our quest is a reality in some sense other than the cognitional subject. In Ledger Wood's language, God has some form of "referential transcendence", which means that God is in some real sense other than human thinking or human thought.1 We are not concerned with God as an ideal accepted for its religious value but with no objective referent. Wood's suggestion contains a distinction which we need to consider. It is the distinction between "epistemological" and "ontological" object. The epistemological object is the conceptualization of the ontological object to which the former refers. Our analysis of the foundations of religious knowledge is confined to the epistemological object as such. In this analysis we hope to determine the conditions under which the ontological object may be investigated fruitfully. But such fruitful investigation cannot be undertaken until the problems at the epistemological level have been resolved.

Contemporary Christian theology contains references to God as epistemological object at three levels. An analysis of these three levels should permit us to answer the question before us, namely, precisely which God-concepts are theoretically verifiable?

The first form of epistemological object may be designated the perceptual. The meaning of "perceptual" object depends, of course, upon the definition of "perceptual". The perceptive process contains or includes the following elements: (i) The presence in the perceiving organism of receptors, i.e., structures subject to sensory stimulation; (ii) some form of stimulus capable of exciting the various receptors; and (iii) some interpretation of the stimulus. Perception is possible only under conditions which provide for excitation of receptors. Since receptors are located both within the organism and at the surface, the source of stimulation may be either within or without. In either case, perception can occur only upon the excitation of some of these receptors.

There may be some question concerning the excitation of receptors by memory images, but this is not a matter of primary

The application of the [illegible] Principle of Increasing Complexity, discussed in the [illegible] issue of the Third Review, 1959, suggests that these Gestalt-concepts are not to be in immediate or partially immediate objective relations are to be preferred to those which are wholly or absolutely transcendent. It appears to be possible to investigate the existence and nature of the former, whereas it does not with the latter. And, insofar as some verification of specific concepts can be achieved, we shall be able to add to our reliable knowledge in this field. The task of this article, then, is to examine the several conditions to determine which are in fact theoretically verifiable and which are not.

I

We have assumed that the object of our quest is a reality in some sense other than the cognitional subject. In Lonergan's language, God has some form of "referential transcendence", which means that God is in some real sense other than human thinking or human knowing. We are not concerned with God as an ideal presupposed for the religious value but with an objective referent. Wood's suggestion contains a distinction which we need to consider. It is the distinction between "epistemological" and "ontological" object. The epistemological object is the conceptualization of the ontological object to which the former refers. Our analysis of the foundations of religious knowledge is confined to the epistemological object as such. In this analysis we are to determine the conditions under which the ontological object may be hypothesized validly. But such faithful investigation cannot be undertaken until the problems at the epistemological level have been resolved.

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concern at this point [illegible] of near excitation of receptors. This means that the final source of stimulation was the excitation of interoceptors or exteroceptors. A similar problem emerges from the effects of the secretions of the ductless glands upon the several receptors. In this case, the excitation is due to some chemical process which can serve as a stimulus in the same manner that light excites the optic nerve. In any event, the necessity of some form of stimulus to excite the receptors appears to be a constant factor in the perceptive process.

From this point of view, we may define a perceptual object as any object or event capable of exciting receptors. God, then as perceptual object must be such that some of the receptors are capable of being stimulated by this "object" under given conditions. Some theologians define God as precisely such an object. Several years ago, A. C. Knudson stated that God may be a perceptual object. Experience of God, however, depended upon the presence within man of certain mental structures which make such perception possible. He identified the experience of God with "the feeling of absolute dependence", with "instinctive faith in the reality of the ideal, a religious a priori".2 Disregarding in this connection the questionable character of the Kantian analysis of mind basic to Knudson's proposal, it should be observed that neither "the feeling of absolute dependence", nor "the instinctive faith in the reality of the ideal", constitutes an object capable of exciting any receptors of which I have knowledge. As perceptual events, they would appear to be quite indefinite and leave one with little if any specific information concerning God as an objective factor. I once climbed Long's Peak in northern Colorado, and from the top looked down its east face. Looking down some two thousand feet of the perpendicular wall of rock, I felt something akin to Schleiermacher's "sense of absolute dependence". But I did not thereby immediately rise to the sense of the absolute otherness of God presumably accompanying this experience. After a while, and under the influence of my religious training, something similar this idea occurred to me. But this was an inference from what was to me a compelling and significant experience rather than a direct or even indirect perception of God. I perceived a vast empty space ending in jumbled rocks at the bottom, and bounded on the near side by sheer walls of rock. From this perception, I "felt" something akin to awe. Also from this experience, I may have inferred something about the greatness and majesty of God. "Faith in the reality of the ideal" may be an inference from some or many experiences, some of them undoubtedly perceptual But faith as such is an attitude of the person rather than an object of perceptual experience.

H. N. Wieman has also insisted that God is a perceptual object. In an early book, he asserted that "either God is an object of sensuous experience, or else He is purely a system of concepts and nothing more".3 At the same time, he recognized the obvious fact that God is not an object such as we normally

[illegible] in the perceptive process.

Those who, like [illegible], hold that God is a perceptual object [illegible] as an object capable of exciting receptive [illegible] as perceptual object must be such that some of its [illegible] are capable of being [illegible] by the object [illegible] [illegible] theology during [illegible] of an object [illegible] years ago, A. C. Macintosh insisted that [illegible] be [illegible] the importance of God, however, [illegible] upon the [illegible] of certain [illegible] [illegible] such perception possible. He identified [illegible] of God with the feeling of absolute dependence, [illegible] into faith in the reality of the ideal [illegible] religious [illegible] interpreting [illegible] in this connection the questionable [illegible] [illegible] analysis of mind [illegible] Macintosh's proposal [illegible] be observed [illegible] neither "the feeling of absolute [illegible]" nor "the instinctive faith in the reality of the ideal" [illegible] rather an object capable of exciting any reception of which [illegible] have knowledge. As perceptual states, they [illegible] quite indefinite and leave one with little if any [illegible] something concerning God as an objective factor. [illegible] in northern Colorado, and [illegible] [illegible] looking down across the [illegible] particular wall of rock, I felt something akin to Schleiermacher's "sense of absolute dependence". But I did not directly immediately rise to the sense of the absolute otherness of God presumably accompanying this experience. After a while, and under the influence of my religious training, something similar this idea occurred to me. But this was an inference from what was to me a compelling and significant experience rather than a direct or even indirect perception of God. I perceived a vast empty space ending in jumbled rocks at the bottom, and bounded on the near side by sheer walls of rock. From this perception I "felt" something akin to awe. Also from this experience, I may have inferred something about the greatness and majesty of God. "Faith in the reality of the ideal" may be an inference from some or many experiences, some of them undoubtedly perceptual. But faith as such is an attitude of the person rather than an object of perceptual experience.

H. N. Wieman has also insisted that God is a perceptual object. In an early book, he asserted that "either God is an object of sensuous experience, or else He is purely a system of concepts and nothing more".5 At the same time, he recognized the obvious fact that God is not an object such as we normally

perceive. To meet this objection, he stated that God was a reality of such nature that he cannot be perceived in terms of our normal perceptual selectivity. So God could only be perceived when we broke through the habitual selectivity and became aware not of any segment of stimuli, but of all. The state which he described would appear to approach that of meaninglessness, since to be sensitive to every stimulus at the same time would apparently mean specific awareness of none. I doubt very much that such an experience could be called perceptual since one of the essential factors in perception is integration of the meaning of a specific experience with preceding experiences. And a meaningless experience hardly permits this to occur.

Wieman soon became aware of this, and redefined his conception of perceptual event. He then defined it as "a structure of interrelated events some of which must be perceptual events".[4] According to this definition, every event which contains some perceptual events must be called a perceptual event. By the same logic, every event which contains some inferential meanings must also be called an inferential event. Thus the criterion of perceptual event proposed by Wieman lacks precision; The same object may be called either or both perceptual and inferential event or object. And, if one wishes to include other factors normally involved in such experiences, any given object or event may be called "physical", "physiological", or even "social". If such an inclusive definition of perceptual object is accepted, it is doubtful that there are any objects or events which may be called non-perceptual.[5]

In the light of this discussion, perhaps we can clarify more fully the meaning of perceptual object or event. Let us examine two objects or events. The first consists of the vestigial remains found in a human body; the second, that which is called organic evolution. It is evident that the vestigial remains within a human body are each capable, under specific conditions, of stimulating various exteroceptors. We see, feel, or even smell given organs, such as the vermiform appendix. It fulfills the conditions required for perception under the normal meaning of that term. It is a concrete object embedded in the body, subject to sensory experience, and to interpretation as a more or less functional organ.

What about organic evolution? It is by definition an attempt to interpret not only given vestigial remains, but also a large number of perceptual objects and events, some present and some known only through writings, archeological remains, and other types of data. We do not sense organic evolution; we sense objects which when related meaningfully to other experiences leads to the inference that a process of perhaps a million years in duration may be called organic evolution. Organic evolution is thus an inference drawn from perceptual experiences for the purpose of placing these experiences within a meaningful context. I suggest that the vermiform appendix, on the one hand, and organic evolution on the other, constitute sufficiently different

perceive. To meet this objection, he claimed that God was a reality of such nature that he cannot be perceived in terms of our normal perceptual selectivity. So God could only be perceived when we broke through our habitual selectivity and became aware not of any segment of eternity, but of all. The state which he described would appear to approach that of mystic enlightenment, since to be sensitive to every eternal as the same time would apparently mean specific awareness of none. I doubt very much that such an experience could be called perceptual since one of the essential factors in perception is interpretation of the meaning of a specific experience with preceding experiences and a meaningless experience hardly permits this to occur.

Wittman soon became aware of this, and redefined his conception of perceptual event. He then defined it as "a structure of interrelated events some of which must be perceptual events". According to this definition, every event which contains some perceptual events must be called a perceptual event. By the same logic, every event which contains some inferential events must also be called an inferential event. Thus the existence of perceptual events proposed by Wittman leads paradoxically: the same object may be called either or both perceptual and inferential events or objects. And, if one wishes to include other factors normally involved in such experiences, any given object or event may be called "physical", "physiological", or even "useful". If we use an inclusive definition of perceptual object, it seems clear, it is doubtful that there are any objects or events which may be called non-perceptual.

In the light of this discussion, perhaps we can clarify more fully the meaning of perceptual object or event. Let us examine two objects or events. The first consists of the vestigial remains found in a human body; the second, that which is called organic evolution. It is evident that the vestigial remains within a human body are each capable, under specific conditions, of stimulating various exteroceptors. We see, feel, or even smell given organs, such as the vermiform appendix. It fulfills the conditions required for perception under the normal meaning of that term. It is a concrete object embedded in the body, subject to memory experience, and to interpretation as a more or less functional organ.

What about organic evolution? It is by definition an attempt to interpret not only given vestigial remains, but also a large number of perceptual objects and events, some present and some known only through written records, archeological remains, and other types of data. We do not name organic evolution to mean objects which when related meaningfully to other experiences lead to the inference that a process of perhaps a million years in duration may be called organic evolution. Organic evolution is thus an inference drawn from perceptual experiences for the purpose of placing those experiences within a meaningful context. I suggest that the relations existing, on the one hand, and organic evolution on the other, constitute sufficiently different

epistemological objects to warrant giving them different names in the interest of clarity of thinking.

God does not belong within the category of perceptual objects as just described. Among the objects sensed and perceived, there is none which is given the name "God" by any serious observer. Many are prepared to say that event X refers to God, but not that this is God. This means we must pursue this analysis further if we are to arrive at a tenable theory of God as apistemological object.

II

The distinction between organic evolution as an inference from observed facts and the specific facts observed suggests a second type of epistemological object which we shall call inferential or heteroscopic. A microscopic object is so small that it cannot be seen by the human eye without instrumental aid, specifically one which magnifies the minute object to observable proportions. A macroscopic object is, on the other hand, of such size that it can be observed directly by the unaided eyes of man, even though some such objects are so far away that help is required to bring them within range of observation. In both cases, microscopic and macroscopic objects are observable by means of instruments now available. But there are other "objects" which are not observable by any presently known instruments. They are sometimes called "scientific" objects to denote the more ultimate constituents of the microscopic and macroscopic objects.6 I am not certain that they are precisely what I mean by heteroscopic object. Further analysis may reveal the connections between "scientific" and "heteroscopic" objects.

We may approach this matter quite readily by noting several God-concepts which have been developed historically. According to Aristotle, God was the Prime Mover who was real but not observable. The perceivable consisted of the world of men and events considered as "moveables". Such moveables were not considered to be selfsufficient. Every moved presupposed a mover. The final or ultimate Mover was, of course, the Unmoved Mover of the Physics.7 It is evident that this Unmoved Mover was not a constituent of either the microscopic or macroscopic world since both were in process of movement and change. The Unmoved may be said to have been operationally present within these two worlds inasmuch as he was the ultimate cause of all movement in both. But in either case, whether as Unmoved Mover as such, or as operationally immanent within the moveables, God was not an observable or perceptual object. He was an inference believed to be necessary since Aristotle assumed that every moving object must have been moved by something other than itself. Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is thus an example of God as heteroscopic object.

C. Lloyd Morgan, in his first series of Gifford Lectures, stressed the fact of emergence, the appearance of the new or novel. "Emergence" was his name for the process responsible for the appearance of different levels within the Existential Medium.

[illegible]

[illegible] belong within the category of "observed objects" [illegible]. Among the objects recited [illegible] "observed", there is one which is given the name "God" by any numbers observer. Many are required to say that every X relates to God, but not that God is God. This means we must pursue this analysis further if we are to arrive at a tenable theory of God as epistemological object.

II

The distinction between organic evolution as an inference from observed facts and the specific facts observed suggests a second type of epistemological object which we shall call intra entital or microscopic. A microscopic object is so small that it cannot be seen by the human eye without instrumental aid, especially one which magnifies the minute objects to observable proportions. A macroscopic object is, on the other hand, so much larger that it can be observed directly by the unaided eye. Even though some such objects are so far away that they must be inferred to bring them within range of observation. In both cases, microscopic and macroscopic objects are observable by means of instruments not available. But there are other objects which are not observable by any presently known instruments. They are sometimes called "ultimate" objects to denote the same distinction overall between of the microscopic and macroscopic objects. I am not certain that they are precisely what I mean by intraentital objects. Further analysis may reveal the same [illegible] between "ultimate" and "intraentital" objects.

We may approach this matter quite nearly by noting several God-concepts which have been developed historically. According to Aristotle, God was the Prime Mover who was real, but not observable. The personalities comprised of the world of men and events considered as "movables". Such movables were not considered to be sufficient. Every moved presupposed a mover. The final or ultimate Mover was, of course, the Unmoved Mover of the Physics. It is evident that this Unmoved Mover was not a constituent of either the microscopic or macroscopic worlds since both were in process of movement and change. The Unmoved may be said to have been operationally present within these two worlds inasmuch as he was the ultimate cause of all movement in both. But in either case, whether as Unmoved Mover as such, or as operationally immanent within the movables, God was not an observable or perceptual object. He was an inference believed to be necessary since intuitively assumed that every moving object must have been moved by something other than itself. Intuitively Unmoved Mover is thus an example of God as intraentital object.

C. Lloyd Morgan, in his Emergent Evolution, distinguishes the idea of emergence, the appearance of the new or novel. "Emergent" was the name for the process responsible for the appearance of "novel" [illegible] the Unmoved Mover.

He stated his basic conviction in these words: "For better or worse, I acknowledge God as the Nisus through whose Activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed."8 Upon analysis, one discovers that God as Nisus is an interpretation of many facts and interrelated theories. First is the observed fact that there are differentiable levels in reality beginning with matter, then rising to life and mind. It is the "fact" that these three levels are more or less discernible, and that the evidence points to the temporal priority of matter with more ultimate constituents, followed in time by life, and finally, by mind, which gave rise to Morgan's theory of emergence. But the fact of emergence was not considered by him to be ultimate. He believed that there must be that in the nature of reality which is responsible for the emergence of emergents; and that "Nisus" or "striving" was his name for this ultimate factor.

It is evident that "God as Nisus through whose Activity emergents emerge" is not an observable or perceptual object. What is observable is the phenomenon of levels: matter, life, and mind. Even life and mind are hardly observable in any gross sense of perception. At the same time, they are in part determinable by instruments available today. They constitute the perceptual objects to be explained. With these perceptual objects before him, Morgan inferred the "existence" of God as Nisus responsible for their emergence. That this Nisus is not observable or perceptual would appear to be confirmed by the fact that other students of nature explain the three levels of phenomena in other terms. The Nisus is thus an heteroscopic object, an object of such nature that it is not subject to perception as are microscopic or macroscopic objects. Whereas it is never observable, its existence is inferred from that which is observable. Thus heteroscopic objects are presumably actual and existent non-perceptual realities whose presence is inferred from an analysis of perceptual data.

From this vantage-point, we may ask whether or not God as heteroscopic object is a "scientific" object as defined by Ritchie and Broad. They define scientific objects as the ultimate constituents of microscopic and macroscopic objects. Protons and electrons could be so defined when they wrote as such ultimate constituents. If the Existential Medium as a whole may be considered a macroscopic object characterized by the emergence of emergents, then perhaps God as Nisus could be considered a scientific object. At the same time, it is doubtful that Morgan would consider God a fourth level: Matter, Life, Mind and then God. God was rather that Activity responsible for the emergence of the three extant levels. It would appear preferable, if one is interested in precision of definition, not to extend the meaning of "scientific object" to include what we here designate as heteroscopic.

God, as epistemological object, may be viewed as an heteroscopic object. As such, God could be considered to be real, existent, determinative, yet of such dimensions quantitatively

[illegible]

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From this vantage-point, we may ask whether or not God as heterocosmic object is a "scientific" object as defined by Bitchell and Broad. They define scientific objects as the ultimate constituents of microcosmic and macrocosmic objects. Protons and electrons could be so defined when they write as such ultimate constituents. If the Ultimental Medium as a whole may be considered a macrocosmic object characterized by the emergence of emergents, then perhaps God as Mind could be considered a scientific object. At the same time, it is doubtful that Morgan would consider God a fourth level: Matter, Life, Mind and then God. God was rather that Activity responsible for the emergence of the three earlier levels. It would appear preferable, if one is interested in precision of definition, not to extend the meaning of "scientific object" to include what we have designate as heterocosmic.

God, as cybernetological object, may be viewed as an heterocosmic object. In truth, God could be considered to be truly ultimental, determinative, yet of such dimensions (quantitatively

and qualitatively that he cannot be observed and/or perceived by any currently known instruments or procedures. As heteroscopic object, God is an inferred reality, an inference based upon and considered necessary by perceived objects or events. If, in some far-future, we are able to transform and perfect our methods and instruments, God as heteroscopic object may become a perceptual object. Before this can occur, however, I predict we shall have to develop a qualitatively new approach to the whole subject. At any rate, we are in a position today where the most we can say is that it may be possible to find evidence to support the claim that God as heteroscopic object exists.

III

A third type of epistemological object is more difficult to define. In our examination of the God-concepts in the class called "Absolute Transcendence",9 we noted that the exponents of such concepts asserted that there was no way whereby God could be known by any form of observation or inferred from any such observation. They reasoned in this manner because they believed that God as absolutely transcendent belonged to another order of reality than that of the human or the material. God so defined is both more-than and other-than man and the cosmic process. As an epistemological object, God is discontinuous with other forms of epistemological objects.

Man's "knowledge" of God so defined comes through revelation, or what we have called metanoesis. We may have knowledge in the usual sense of the historic figure within whom God presumably incarnated himself; we may have similar knowledge of the documents within which we find information concerning Jesus Christ; and we may have such knowledge concerning the presumed effects of faith in God so defined in the life of the church and of Christian persons. But we must rely upon faith in revelation for both the nature and existence of God as absolutely transcendent.

It is somewhat difficult to find a term which would characterize this type of epistemological object. It may be possible to use "faith object" to designate this category, but this would lead to confusion since object-of-faith may refer to goals of life or to certain documents which contain the theology called by one church at least "The Faith". For what it may be worth, I shall propose another term, metascopic, to designate such epistemological objects as refer to objective referents which are other than either perceptual or heteroscopic objects. God as metascopic object would thus be an objective referent whose nature is not continuous with perceptual or heteroscopic objects, and is therefore not subject to the same type of behavioral and implicative verification.

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Man's "knowledge" of God is defined some through revelation or what we have called mysticism. We may have knowledge in a usual sense of the historic figure within God personally incarnated himself; we may have similar knowledge of his commands within which we find information concerning Justice Charity and we may have such knowledge concerning the presumed effects of faith in God as defined in the life of the church and of Christian persons. But we must rely upon faith in revelation for both the nature and existence of God as absolutely transcendent.

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There are some similarities between heteroscopic and metascopic objects. Both are beyond observation by any currently available instruments of observation and research. We defined the heteroscopic object as one whose dimensions and qualities are such that they cannot be perceived by our normal perceptive processes nor by any extension of them instrumentally. At the same time, heteroscopic objects are continuous with perceptual objects. Metascopic objects, on the other hand, are impercible and non-interable from any perception and by definition will be forever so. In other words, there are no theoretical possibilities that they will ever be either perceptual or heteroscopic objects. God as metascopic object is known only as He reveals himself to man. The knowledge-process is from God to man, and not from man to God.

We then have three epistemological objects: the perceptual, the heteroscopic, and the metascopic. The problem before us is that of determining which of these several epistemological objects is subject to verification, and to what degree. In an earlier paper we outlined the verificatory process as we define it in this connection. Verification consists in two broadly different operations. The first is clarification, or the analysis of the problem and the determination of the conditions required for its solution. The second is verification proper. Clarification includes at least four steps: (i) the determination of the nature of the problem at hand; (ii) definition of the terms relevant to the understanding of the problem and its possible solution; (iii) discovery and explication of hypotheses and (iv) determination of the conditions which must be fulfilled if a specific hypothesis is to be considered verified.

The second phase of the verificatory process is verification proper. By this we mean the activities or processes incolved in (iv) above. A simple illustration may serve to clarify our meaning. If a safe has been robbed, police normally seek to determine the method of operation involved. Robbers specialize in specific methods of opening safes, or otherwise pursuing their trade. The argument then is as follows. A given method of operation presumably means that burglar X committed this crime. Verification consists in part in examining the scene of the crime to determine what method was used. If it coincides with that nromally employed by some known criminal the police can then hunt for him, and gather further evidence required to convict him.

Verification proper consists in two possible forms which may be used together or independently.

The first is behavioural verification which consists in activities, observational in character, to compare the requirements for establishing the hypothesis with the actualities in the relevant stiuations. The second, or implicatory verification, consists in comparint the results of other instances of behavioral verification with those obtained in the present case.

In the case of the safe robbery, part of the verification consists or depends upon the psychology of habit. A given safe robber develops the habit of robbing saves in a given way. Accordingly, we may expect him to continue to use this method. At the same time, it is doubtful that any other person would develop precisely the same habitual method. These conclusions have resulted from investigations in the area of the psychology of habit, and have implications in police work and also in the philosophy of religion.

There are some scientists who are behaviourists, and mechanistic objectivists. Both are beyond observation by any currently available instruments of observation and measurement. We defined the behaviorist object as one whose characteristics and qualities are such that they cannot be perceived by our normal perceptions, processes, nor by any extension of them instrumentally. At the same time, behavioristic objects are concerned with perceptual objects. Metaphysical objects, on the other hand, are immaterial and non-measurable from any perception and by definition will be forever so. In other words, there are no theoretical possibilities that they will ever be either perceptual or behavioristic objects. God as metaphysical object is known only as He reveals himself to man. The knowledge-process is from God to man, and not from man to God.

We, then, have three epistemological objects: the perceptual, the metaphysical and the metaobjects. The problem before us is that of determining which of the several epistemological objects is subject to verification, and in what degree. In an earlier paper we outlined the verificatory process as we define it in this association. Verification consists in two broadly different operations. The first is qualification, or the analysis of the problem and the determination of the conditions required for its solution. The second is verification proper. Qualification includes at least four steps: (i) the determination of the nature of the problem at hand; definition of the terms relevant to the understanding of the problem and its solution; (iii) discovery and application of hypotheses and (iv) determination of conditions which must be fulfilled if a specific hypothesis is to be considered verified.

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Verification proper consists in two possible forms which may be used together or independently.

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In the case of the safe robbery, part of the verification consists of determining the psychology of robbing. A given safe robber develops the habit of robbing safes in a given way. Accordingly, we may expect him to continue to use this method. At the same time, it is doubtful that any other person would develop precisely the same behavioral method. These considerations are resulted from investigations in the area of the psychology of habit, and have implications in police work and also in the practice of religion.

The necessity for insisting upon verification of God-concepts has been presented in previous papers.[10] So long as one remains at the level of ontological presuppositions, there is no escape from either scepticism or dogmatism. Unwilling to accept either alternative, we examined the possibility of finding a test for ontological presuppositions at the epistemological level. From this analysis there emerged the Final Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficience. It was adopted on the grounds that (i) it provided a possible means of escaping scepticism and dogmatism, and (ii) places religious thinking in a position where growth in reliable religious knowledge may occur comparable to that in other areas. But the adoption of this presupposition commits one to the adoption of the secondary Presupposition of Proximate Realization in preference to that of Final Realization. The latter tends to have a stultifying effect upon research, whereas the former has demonstrably added to the efficiency and fruitfulness of human thinking. This means, then, that the test of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency commits us to the task of verifying positively any God-concept we may expect to adopt. With this summary of the argument, we turn to an examination of the possibility of verifying some or all of the epistemological objects considered above.

The first of these epistemological objects was the perceptual. Rather than discuss its possible verifiability in a vacuum, we shall analyze Henry Wieman's conception of God as Creative Event as an exemplification of this category. Though I am not convinced that he has made good his case that God as defined is a perceptual object, we shall waive this point and investigate his concept in his own terms.

It is possible with Wieman's conception of God to engage in experimental behavior to determine whether or not the results predictable from the concept are realizable. One may engage with other persons in an attempt to increase his sensitivity to social and other situations; he may integrate his new insights derived in this manner with those he previously had; he may then approach anew the world of men and events to determine whether or not they have been transformed as a result of the sharing of insights with others. When he has made these attempts, honestly and over a sufficiently long period of time to permit determinable results to occur, he can reach his conclusions on the basis of this form of behavioral verification.

It should be observed that the creative experience which Wieman describes in chapter Three of The Source of Human Good, (1946), maynot give rise to perceptual experiences such as are denoted by "blue" or "sharp". At the same time it may result in what Hocking calls "negative mental after-images." By these Hocking means that a given experience may leave one with the general conviction that the experience was either satisfactory or unsatisfactory.[11] We may presume that those followed by a positive mental after-image would be considered creative experiences whereas those which leave negative after-images would not be so considered. I doubt that these experiences could be called "perceptual." They are undoubtedly experiences involving human behavior at some levels, and to that extent can be considered as forms of behavioral verification. In any case, the experience of God as Creative Event contains as a minimum, (i) some perceptual events, and (ii) some determinate and presumably determinable modifications in personality. In so far as both factors are present, God as Creative Event constitutes an hypothesis subject to behavioral investigation.

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Results such as these constitute evidence of the capacity of God. There are many different hypotheses which could include both perceptual events and determinable modifications of behavior to reach definite conclusions that God is precisely the Creative Event described by Wieman. Madame Blavatsky could have justified her rather [illegible] God-concept in much the same way. At the same time, it should be noted that the Creative Event, sketched by Wieman, is probably a religious name for that which sociologists call "the social process." As described by Max Lerner and Talcott Parsons, the social process is, in the main, equivalent to the Creative Event.[12] Granted that Wieman has utilized a sociological concept and from it developed an alternative religious conception, the important matter is that his view of God finds support in current sociological theory which Madame Blavatsky's conceptions do not. There is support for his theory from other fields which makes it necessary to accord it some degree of truth-value. God as Creative Event is thus subject to both behavioral and implicatory verification.

Turning now to the next type of epistemological object, we may select the late Shailer Mathews' view of God as personality-producing and personally-responsive factor in the cosmos as a low level heteroscopic object. By low level heteroscopic object we mean one with limited extensionality, i.e., its coverage is quite limited in terms of the total Existential Medium. Wieman limits the extension of his concept primarily to this planet and its human population. Mathews extends the meaning of his concept to include all that Wieman means by the Creative Event as well as the total evolutionary process and those phases of the Existential Medium more or less directly contributory to it. This increase in extensionality places Mathews' God-concept within the class of heteroscopic objects. At the same time, his view of the heteroscop object is much less inclusive than is true of views such as C. Lloyd Morgan's.

It is obvious that God as personality-producing and personality-nurturing factor is subject to behavioral and implicatory verification. There are large bodies of solid data and numerous verified theories to support the hypothesis that human personality emerged and was nurtured to its present stage by various vectors involved in the Existential Medium. Among them may be listed the theories concerning the origin and formation of the earth; the emergence of life and the theory of organic evolution ; and the various theories concerning the nature and development of personality. All of these may be cited as implicative support for Mathews' view of God. Thus God as heteroscopic object at this level is subject theoretically, to behavioral and implicative verification.

V

The next level of expanding inclusiveness of God as heteroscopic epistemological object is emplified in various recently formulated God-concepts. The late Jan C. Smuts used the term "holism" to designate the basic characteristic of the Existential Medium as a whole. He defined holism as "a process of creative synthesis, the resulting wholes (being) not static but dynamic, evolutionary, creative."[13] This creative process functioned at all known and presumably knowable levels of the cosmic process. The conditions required for the verification of this hypothesis are all natural processes. As such, they are presumably subject to behavioral and implicatory verification. If the evidence available supports this view, then Smut's hypothesis must be given serious consideration along with other similar views concerning the basic structure of reality which we may call God. If the evidence does not, then this attempted interpretation must be discarded and further hypotheses developed and investigated. Whether or not he proved his point is not before us now. What is important is that he presented an hypothesis whose truth or falsity can be determined by behavioral and implicative methods of verification or disproof.

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This conception of God as the Holistic factor operative at all levels in the Existential Medium includes what Wieman describes as the Creative Event, primarily at the individual-social level, and, by Mathews at the socio-cosmic levels. This then is a third level of extensionality which includes the two preceding. And it is a conception of God which brings religious thought into creative congruence with other forms of contemporary thinking.

There are many formulations of this approach to the God-concept in contemporary philosophies of religion. Basic to most of them is the conviction that God is "The Determiner of Destiny," in Pratt's interesting language. God is thus the dependable Factor or the Dynamic Determinant operative in the Creative Event at one level, in the creative and differentiative process whereby the earth and its inhabitants came into existence and continue to change and to stabilize; and presumably, in the farthest reaches of the microscopic and macroscopic phases of the Existential Medium.

Perhaps a moment's consideration should be given to the suggestion that God is differentiative as well as integrative. It was noted some years ago by Hugh Hartshorne that every type of creativity included both differentiation and integration. This is so obvious that it should have been noted and accepted without question.[14] But the destructive phase of creative activity is usually overlooked or underemphasized. Hartshorne noted that every form of reconstitution presupposed some elements of disintegration or loss of individuality on the part of the elements which together comprise the new emergent or whole.

Human life depends upon a constant supply of food. But food is, in the main, organic. This means that cattle die to provide meat; plants die to provide vegetable matter, and so the process continues. Even personality growth makes its demands upon others. The words attributed to John the Baptist concerning Jesus that "He must increase, but I must decrease," (John 3:30) may be said concerning all who take seriously their social responsibilties. There are tools which are exacted from all who "serve" mankind. It may be true that there are compensations, but it must be recognized that they are "compensations" namely, that which provides in some measure for loss or privation. It is quite significant that the symbol of Christianity is a Cross, reminiscent that one died for many. This means that God as Dynamic Determinant at all levels in reality must be defined in differentiative as well as integrative terms.

These several definitions of God as heteroscopic object all have their objective referent in the Existential Medium in whole or in part. Since this is the case, concepts such as these are subject to behavioral and implicative verification. The conditions for such proof or disproof are here, and every philosopher or religion who accepts one of these views must accept with it the responsibility for engaging in the verificatory activity indicated if his view is to be more than an hypothesis or guess. And to the extent that this responsibility is taken seriously, such conceptions of God may become solid foundations for religious living.

VI

The third type of epistemological object which emerged from the analysis of contemporary God-concepts was the metascopic. We noted that metascopic objects are not subject to verification by any established methods of verification, since by definition they are objects at a different level of reality than perceptual or heteroscopic. God as matascopic object is not continuous with the rest of the Existential Medium. Accordingly, the methods appropriate to the investigation

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[illegible] There is a third level of an analogy which [illegible] is in a consciousness of God which brings religious life [illegible] with other forms of [illegible] thinking.

[illegible] Dynamic Nature of God appeared to the [illegible] primary philosophers of religion. Really so most effective as the [illegible] God as "The Ground of Being." In Tillich's interesting language, God is the dependable Ground or the Dynamic Determinant operative in the [illegible] Even at one level, in the creative and differentiative process which [illegible] and its individuals come into existence and continue to change and to [illegible] presumably, in the farthest reaches of the microcosmic and macrocosmic [illegible] of the Ultimate Mystery.

Perhaps a moment's consideration should be given to the suggestion that God is differentiative as well as integrative. It was noted some years ago by [illegible] Hartshorne that every type of creativity included both differentiation and integration. It is so obvious that it should have been noted and accepted without question. But the distinctive phase of creativity is usually overlooked or underemphasized. Hartshorne noted that every form of reconstruction presupposes some elements of disintegration or loss of individuality on the part of the elements which together comprise the new emergent or whole.

Humanity depends upon a constant supply of food. But food is, in the [illegible] organic. It is course that earth life is to provide meat plants die to provide [illegible] table matter, and so the process continues. Universally grown [illegible] demands upon others. The words attributed to John the Baptist concerning [illegible] that "He must increase, but I must decrease." (John 3:30) may be said [illegible] morally all who take seriously their social responsibilities. They are those [illegible] which are absorbed from all who "serve" mankind. It may be true that there are compensations, but it must be recognized that they are "compensations" [illegible] that which provides in some measure for loss or privation. It is quite right [illegible] that the symbol of Christianity is a Cross, reminiscent that one died for many. This means that God as Dynamic Determinant at all levels in reality must be defined in differentiative as well as integrative terms.

These several definitions of God as heterocosmic object all have their objective referent in the Existential Medium in whole or in part. Since this is the case, concepts such as these are subject to behavioral and empirical verification. The conditions for such proof or disproof are here, and every philosopher or religion who accepts one of these views must change with it the responsibility for engaging in the verificatory activity indicated if his view is to be more than an hypothesis or guess. And to the extent that this responsibility is taken seriously, such conceptions of God may become solid foundations for religious living.

V

The third type of metamorphological clue which emerged from the analysis of contemporary Chalcedonian was the immanent. It is found that metaphysical [illegible] are subject to verification by any relational method of verification [illegible] by definition they are objects of relational level or reality [illegible] or metaphysics. God as immanent is not in such metaphysical [illegible] Ultimate Mystery. Accordingly, the [illegible] approaches to the verification

of the Existential Medium do not apply to God. Perhaps we should restate this by saying that no positive verification is possible under the conditions specified by the exponents of Absolute Transcendence. They will admit the use of the clarificatory phase of verification, but deny the possibility of positive behavioral or implicative verification. At the same time, some of them sought to avoid remaining at the level of pure assertion or affirmation, and engaged in negative behavioral and implicatory verification. Niebuhr has noted that the evils of the world supported his view that God must be other-than the world of men and events. If man's religious needs must be finally and fully satisfied as the exponents of the Secondary Presupposition of Final Realization assert, then all the evidence cited by Niebuhr must be accepted as verifying his conception of God. If, on the other hand, the oltological presupposition basic to his work is rejected, as we found it necessary to do when tested by the Primary Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency, then his evidence may be cited as substantiating the view that God is both differentiative and creative. The evils may be evidence of the differentiative phase of God's work. Others who belong to Niebuhr's general group, such as Karl Barth, reject even Niebuhr's tentative efforts at verification. They insist that God is wholly metascopic and thus ultimately beyond all verification or disproof. God must be accepted on faith; belief in God is a matter of will rather than rationality. It is purely a matter of saying "Yes" to the revelation or confrontation of God. This surely means that God as metascopic object is not subject to verificatory methods. To this extent, then, the late Douglass Clyde Macintosh was correct when he spoke of such theology as "reactionary irrationalism."[15]

VII

The theoretical verifiability or non-verifiability of perceptual, heteroscopic and metascopic objects would appear to be relatively clear. The first two are subject to verificatory investigation; the third is not. But the issue is not so clear-cut when one considers the God-concepts presented in the class known as Partial Immanence. According to their general philosophical positions, they would consider God as epistemological object to be heteroscopic. Bowne all but said that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural was no longer tenable. The question, for him, had moved from the ontological to the causal level. His primary distinction was between primary and secondary causation.[16] W. M. Horton approached the metascopic level when he asserted that God must be conceived of as "surveying and controlling the cosmic process from a point of restlying above and beyond it."[17] At the same time, he recognized the direction in which his thought was moving, and sought to return to the heteroscopic level by insisting that there was, by inference, an environment beyond the cosmic whose activities were responsible for the changes which occurred here.[18] In so far as Bowne and Horton may be considered representatives of the general position of Partial Immanence, God as epistemological object must be classified as heteroscopic for this school of thought.

At the same time, there appears to be an element of radical dualism in the thinking of some, if not all, of these theologicans and philosophers of religion. The following rather lengthy quotation from Bowne will indicate this trend:

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"1. Can the mental life be deduced from the physical? [illegible] All that takes place in the organism can be reduced to some form of movements and grouping of the physical elements; and on reflection on such grouping and movement will ever reveal thought and feeling as an analytical consequence. Moreover, all physical causation consists in producing new movements and groupings of the elements. Antecedent movements and groups are the effect. Hence thought, which is not a physical movement or grouping, lies outside of physical causation."

"2. Can the mental life be understood without admitting a real something the self or soul, which cannot be identified with the physical elements, which is the abiding subject of thought and feeling? Again, no. Capital facts and the most cogent kind of reasoning unite in enforcing this answer. However, mysterious and inscrutable the physical elements may be, the mental life cannot be viewed as a resultant of their inter--action. It is, rather, demonstrably impossible without the one and abiding self."

This question and answer procedure was continued much farther. The two questions and answers cited indicate the argument as he presented it in his book on metaphysics. He believed there was an absolute incommensurability between the physical, including the organic, and the mental, the mind or self. At the sametime, he sought to avoid this by denying that such "incommensurability" meant a radical dualism. It was rather a method of approach. If one began with thephysical, he could never hope to arrive at the mental as a consequence. However, if he began with the mental, it was possible to arrive at the physical. The distinction between the mentaland the physical was then asymmetric rather than completely discontinuous. One may begin with the mental and find some continuity with the physical in that the categories of the former may include the latter. He could not begin with the physical, and using its categories as primary find place within them for the mental. Despite the seeming dependence upon the metascopic, it appears that the God-concept of the Partial Immanentalists belongs at the leveloi heteroscopic objects. As such, it is subject to behavioral and implicative verification. The difficulty with their present verificatory methods, lies in the excessive cognitive weight they attribute to man's mental life. Despite the present inadequacy of their methods, there are no a priori reasons why the hypotheses presented in Partial Immanence may not be investigated fruitfully by more adequate verificatory methods.

These types of epistemological objects are now before us. The first two perceptual and heteroscopic, are definitely subject to behavioral and implicative verification. The third, the metascopic, is not subject to such verification or disproof. In terms of the Primary Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency, common-sense demands that we adopt assumptions and procedures which offer increase in realiable knowledge rather than those which tend to stultify thinking. This means that the perceptual and heteroscopic levels are preferable to the metascopic. It would appear to represent a step backward to rely upon assertion when verification is possible, unless, of course, one considers truth unimportant in religious living. With Santayana, he will then assert that religion is poetic in nature. "Religion remains an imaginative achievement, a symbolic representation of moral reality which may have a most important function in vitalizing the mind and in transmitting, by way of parables, the lessons of experience. But it becomes at the same time a continuous incidental dectption; and this deception, in proportion as it is strenuously denied to be such can work indefinite harm in the world and in the conscience."[20] Santayana would consider God to be an imaginary object whose sole justification was its

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pragmatic value in dramatizing some of the basic issues of life. But if God as God was considered to be an object, perceptual or heteroscopic in nature the results would be harmful to the believer. Whereas Santayana does not consider God to be a metascopic object, his attitude toward verification would be much the same as those who do. In neither case does verification appear important or significant.

If religion is one of the serious concerns of life, then it does not appear to be feasible to treat it as poetry or "imaginative achievement." There is a reality to life which makes necessary the discovery of the actual for its sustenance and maintenance. Reliance upon metascopic objects would aappear to be unwise, tosay the least. If God matters, that is, if God's existence or character makes a difference, then the conceptions of God which we accept for our religious living should be those whose truth has been investigated as fully and critically as possible. Imagination may point the way to fruitful investigation. It is no substitute for hard work at the verificatory problem.

1. Langer Wood, "Philosophy of Nonsense," London: George Allen and Unwin 1940, p 9.
2. A. C. Knudson, "The Apologetic Value of Religious Experience," The Journal of Religion, vol XV, Oct 1935, p 457
3. H. N. Wieman, Religious Experience and Scientific Method, (1926) p 10
4. H. N. Wieman, "Perception and Cognition," The Journal of Philosophy, (Feb. 4, 1943), p 74.
5. Cf. W. H. Berhhardt, "The Cognitive Quest for God," The Journal of Religion (April, 1943) pp 94ff., for further criticism of this review.
6. Cf. A. D. Ritchie, Scientific Method, (1923) pp 40ff., and C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought, (1922), pp 331 ff.
7. Aristotle, The Physics 258b, 10ff.
8. C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1923, p 36.
9. Cf. W. H. Berhhardt, "The Logic of Absolute Transcendence," the Iliff Review, (Winter, 1950)
10. Cf. W. H. Bernhardt, "The Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency," The Iliff Review, (Winter, 1955) for a more complete discussion of this phase of the argument.
11. W. E. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, New Haven: The Yale University Press, 1923, pp 184 ff.
12. Cf. Max Lerner, "The Social Process," The Encyclppedia of all Social Sciences, New York: The Macmillan Co., vol XIV, 1934 pp 149ff., and Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1939 pp 46ff.
13. Mr. Wieman's comments on this view of his God-concept may be found in "Religious Significance of Creative Interchange," The Iliff Review, Spring 1955, pp 19ff.
13. Jan C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927 pp 86ff.
14. H. Hartshorne, "An Empirical Approach to a Theory of Character," in Religious Realism, (ed D. C. Macintosh), New York: The Macmillan Co 1931, pp 133ff.
15. C. D. Macintosh, The Problem of Religious Knowledge, ch XIX.
16. B. P. Bowne, Personalism, Chapter III. "The Phenomenality of the Physical World."
17. W. H. Morton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p 161.
18. Ibid., pp 163f
19. B. P. Bowne, Metaphysics (Revised ed.) New York: Harper and Brothers 1898 pp 344.
20. The Philospphy of Santayana, (Ed Irwin Edman), New York: Random House 1942, p 151.

3. [illegible] "Analogy [illegible] Transport [illegible] Journal of [illegible], vol IV, [illegible] p 437.
4. [illegible] Werner, Julio [illegible] Propertes [illegible] Sensual [illegible] [illegible] p [illegible]
5. [illegible] M. Werner, "Form [illegible] and Curvature," The [illegible] Psychology, [illegible] (1944) p 22.
6. [illegible] W. [illegible] Gibson, "The Gradient Over [illegible] and [illegible] Relation (April 1944) pp [illegible] for further [illegible] of the [illegible]
7. [illegible] A. [illegible] Rubin, Synsetiske Mønster, (1927) pp [illegible] [illegible] Psyk. Studier [illegible] (1927) pp [illegible]
7. Aristotle, The Physics 208b [illegible]
8. C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, [illegible] (1923) p 56.
9. C. W. H. Mossbacher, "The Logic of Absolute Presupposition," [illegible] Review, (Winter, 1950)
10. C. W. H. Mossbacher, "The Presupposition of Increasing Complexity," [illegible] Review, (Winter, 1951) for a more complete discussion of this phase of the argument.
11. W. E. Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, New Haven [illegible] University Press, 1923, pp 168 ff.
12. C. Max Lerner, "The Social Process," The Development of [illegible] Science, New York The Macmillan Co., vol XIV, 1934 pp 1[illegible] Patrick Geddes, Essays in Dialectical Sociology, Chicago, The [illegible] Press, 1927 pp 444.
13. Mr. Wisdom's comments on this view of his Gestalt-[illegible] R. Hybrid Dynamics or Creative Interchange," The Spirit [illegible] 1933, pp 197.
14. Ian C. Smith, Hybrid and Evolution, New York The Macmillan Co. [illegible] pp 555.
15. H. Hazelborne, "An Empirical Approach to a Theory of Consciousness," [illegible] Hybrid Realism, (ed D. C. Macintosh), New York, The Macmillan Co. 1931, pp 1337.
16. C. D. Macintosh, The Problem of Religious Knowledge, cl XIX.
17. B. P. Bowne, Personalism, Chapter III, "The Phenomenality of the Physical World."
18. W. H. Moore, Pragmatism and the Modern Mind, p 161.
19. Ibid., pp 1031
20. B. P. Bowne, Metaphysics (Revised ed.) New York: Harper and Brothers 1898 pp 344.
21. The Philosophy of Santayana, (Ed Irwin Edman), New York Random House 1942, p 151.

The last issue of The Iliff Review which was devoted to an analysis and review of my work in The Iliff School of Theology during the past twenty-five years, offers me the opportunity to glance back at the problems which have been of primary interest to me. The invitation of the editor, Dr. Harvey H. Potthoff, adds incentive to opportunity.

I.

Three subjects have had the major part of my attention. The first was the theory of the nature of religion. I had been taught many theories during my rather lengthy period of graduate study, and had read many more. In actual fact, the question as such never rose to the level of the problematic at any point prior to my election to the chair of Christian Theology in 1929. As I began to prepare my courses, a question emerged which should have come to attention long before: On what grounds can I justify the adoption of any one or more of the many definitions in use? Most of them were either interesting or appealing, but neither "interest" nor "appeal" appeared to me to be adequate grounds for acceptance of one and rejection of others. There was the question of fact which had eventually to be faced: What has been the nature of religion throughout the many centuries during which mankind has been religious, or what has been acknowledged to be religious?

These questions led me into many areas of research beginning with an analysis of the problem of possible verification of definitions. Dr. Charles S. Milligan, in his presentation of my definition of religion in the last issue of this journal, has sketched the direction and conclusions of my work in this area. Let me say that he has understood very clearly precisely the problem which I faced, my approach to it, and the method and data employed. I can think of no finer statement of the position than he has presented. Furthermore, he has himself engaged in research in the same area. The results were published in The Iliff Review under the title: "Navaho Religion--Values Sought and Values Received."1

To those who are fortunate enough to have copies of those two issues, let me recommend the rereading of these two articles. They will indicate his research capabilities and also provide additional support to the theory of religion presented. His analysis of my position combined penetrating understanding and sympathetic interest. It is not often that this combination is used in the evaluation of another man's work.

Dr. Henry Nelson Wieman's article covers the same general problem, namely, the analysis of religion and its specific application. He has selected one "non-manipulable" and subjected it to clear and precise analysis.

* The Iliff Review, Vol. XI, no. 2, Spring, 1954

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[illegible] "transformation [illegible] compassionate [illegible] can [illegible] and feel and [illegible] and [illegible] imagined before."2 Mr. Wieman classifies God [illegible] of this process as the supreme non-manipulable, and [illegible] we place ourselves within the power of this transforming process to do its will and further its goals.

If I understand Mr. Wieman correctly at this point, the Creative Event or Creative Interaction is functionally equivalent to what is known as the Social Process, the process of interactional [illegible] human level in whose terms the values sought by Mr. Wieman are achievable, under favorable conditions. But the social process is not nonmanipulable. One of our present problems grows out of the fact that some people control the processes of interaction in pursuit of their own, and often selfish ends. Thus, the Iron Curtain serves not only to keep Americans from free and [illegible] with Iron Curtain countries. It also keeps the people in those countries from possibly creative interaction with us. In our own country, certain interests would say we are concerned to [illegible] similar restraints upon what we read, see, or hear. The liquor industry, to take an example from a very different field, is determined to prevent one from viewing certain athletic events via television without at the same time being subjected to what I consider objectionable advertising. Sociologists would agree, in the main, that communication is something which by its very nature will be controlled, but that it should be controlled in the interests of democratically determined ends. It will be controlled for the reason that everything cannot be printed, telecast or spoken, and that every person can not talk with every other person. This imposes the necessity for selection, and selection is one form of control. The principle which determines what is to be selected likewise determines what is to be neglected; it is thus a form of control of the processes of communication on the human level.

While I cannot accept the suggestion that Creative Interaction is in actual fact a non-manipulable, I believe Mr. Wieman has made a suggestion whose value must be investigated. He is saying, in essence, that there may be processes or realities which can be controlled, but which should be treated as though they were uncontrollable. In other words, he is saying that we should include within the category of the non-manipulable not only what we cannot control, but also what we should **not** control. This would seem that there are processes, such as Creative Interaction, which when controlled can result in great harm, but left uncontrolled can result in great good. I have not had time to give this suggestion the consideration which it merits, but I am grateful to Mr. Wieman for this insight and shall give it the attention which it demands.

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[illegible] Mises correctly at this point, the great [illegible] or creative Intervention is indispensably equivalent to what is known as the social process, the process of interpersonal human level in which terms the values accept by [illegible] are exchangeable, under favorable conditions. But the social process is not necessarily [illegible]. One of our present problems [illegible] the local [illegible] case people consider the procession [illegible] in [illegible] of their own, and within [illegible] [illegible] certain [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] from [illegible]. It [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The [illegible] in the last issue of this journal is in actual fact a [illegible] of problems. Dr. Harvey H. Potthoff, editor of The Iliff Review and Professor of Christian Theology of the Faculty of The Iliff School of Theology, has presented them in clear and precise fashion. His task was quite difficult in that he had to gather the materials he used from a number of magazine articles published over a period of more than twelve years. As indicated in his article, the primary problem in the reinterpretative phase of religion centers in the God-concept. This problem has a deceptively simple appearance. But when one begins to formulate hypotheses concerning the nature of God, he becomes aware of the fact that he faces a bewildering array of data all presented by various thinkers as relevant. If he ponders these facts long enough, he will discover thatthey cannot be organized into a self-consistent corpus. Some of them appear relevant if the concept Deity (which I use when discussing the category to which all God-concepts belong) denotes or designates what is of use and or enjoyment to human beings, or the sources of both, but do not appear relevant when one considers Deity to designate or denote the Dynamic determining Factor operative at all known levels of the Existential Medium.

When one approaches the selection of his category for Deity he soon becomes aware of the fact that categories cannot be vindicated directly. By direct vindication I mean gathering or presenting facts to prove something true or false. But so long as Deity is X, that is, undefined, there are no data. A fact becomes a datum only when integrated within some hypothesis. If one does not know whether X refers to the source of human goods or to the Dynamic Determinant, he cannot honestly gather data. He does not know what constitutes evidence for or against any proposition he might formulate. It thus appeared to me that one must accept a given category in terms of postulation, i.e., acceptance with no attempt to prove, or dogmatism, i.e., acceptance interms of assertion rather than proof. It then occurred to me that what cannot be proved directly may be vindicated indirectly. From this the path to the method of "Deduction from Previously Established Concepts" was relatively simple, as was pointed out by Mr. Potthoff. One first establishes his definition of religion, and the process followed here is outlined very well in Mr. Milligan's article mentioned above. When the evidence indicated that religion is a complex form of individual and group behavior where-by individuals and groups are prepared intellectually and emotionally to find value in situations destructive or disruptive of one's goals and interests by means of a reinterpretation of the Existential Medium in whole or in part, as well as by means of overt behaviors or techniques, the basis for the determination of the category for Deity was available. Diety is precisely that in one's Existential Medium in whose terms such threat or potential destruction can be parried or integrated into a new pattern of life. When conceptualized, God is the Dependable Factor operative at some or all levels of the Existential Medium whose presence makes possible the new life, the revised situation, the emergent value-system. As described so well by Mr. Potthoffand reviewed so

[illegible] of C[illegible] [illegible] of this way, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in that [illegible] activities involved from a number of religions and [illegible] over a period of more than twelve years [illegible] to its definite. The primary problem in the mature [illegible] of religion centers in the God-concept. This problem has a relatively simple appearance. But when one begins to formulate hypotheses concerning the nature of God, he becomes aware of the fact that he faces a bewildering array of data presented by various thinkers as relevant. If he pursues these facts long enough, he will discover that they cannot be organized into a self-consistent pattern. Some of them [illegible] up [illegible] the concept Deity (which I use when discussing the category in which all God-concepts belong) denotes or designates [illegible] one and or adjustment to human beings, or the [illegible] [illegible] do not appear relevant when one considers Deity [illegible] to denote the Dynamic Determining Factor operative in all [illegible] terms of the existential Realm.

When one approaches the validation of his category for [illegible] he soon becomes aware of the fact that categories cannot be vindicated directly. By direct vindication I mean [illegible] presenting facts to prove something true or false. [illegible] to believe in X, that is, [illegible] [illegible] because a datum only when [illegible] [illegible] hypotheses. If one does not know whether X refers to the [illegible] or to the Dynamic Determinant, he cannot honestly [illegible] He does not know what constitutes evidence for any [illegible] proposition he might formulate. It thus appeared to me that one must accept a given category in terms of postulation, i.e., acceptance with no attempt to prove, or dogmation, i.e., acceptance in terms of assertion rather than proof. It then occurred to me that what cannot be proved directly may be vindicated indirectly. From this the path to the method of "Vindication from Previously Established Concepts" was relatively simple, as was pointed out by Mr. Potthoff. One first establishes his definition of religion, and the process followed here is outlined very well in Mr. Milligan's article mentioned above. From the evidence indicated that religion is a complex form of individual and group behavior whereby individuals and groups are prepared intellectually and emotionally to find value in situations destructive or disruptive of one's goals and interests by means of a reinterpretation of the Existential Medium in whole or in part, as well as by means of overt behaviors or techniques, the basis for the determination of the category for Deity was available. Deity is precisely that in one's Existential Medium in whose terms such threat or potential destruction can be [illegible] or integrated into a new pattern of life. This conception, had [illegible] the [illegible] Determinant operative at some or all levels of the Existential [illegible] these [illegible] possible the new life, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] is [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] ing. There are no [illegible] traditional [illegible] which must be recognized for what they are, and then discarded or revised before one can uncover the essential factors in situations.

The next step in the analysis of the problem of God, namely the organization of the data prescribed by the category for first defined as data-determinant, had long been in the forefront of my attention. In fact, this is the place where my thinking began shortly after the problem of the definition of religion emerged. I delivered a series of lectures to the annual gathering of the Congregational clergy of Nebraska in 1930. The purport of these lectures was that of unearthing the basic assumptions which controlled the logicused to vindicate the systems discussed. Perhaps this excerpt from the second lecture will set the problem. "Empirical theologians in America may be divided into three distinct groups. These groups may be designated as (i)Theists, (ii) Ecclesiastical Humanists, and (iii) Absolute Immanentalists. They agree that theology must be based upon experience, but differ radically with reference to the meanings to be given to the major concepts in the field. While many reasons may be suggested to account for these differences in meaning, the fundamental reason is perhaps the initial assumptions with which each theologian begins. In-volved in every theology is a logicalmethod, and basic to every logical method are assumptions, more or less consciously held, which determine the types of argument which give rise to the conviction that truth has been reached. These basic assumptions are the watersheds that determine the direction in which the theological stream shall flow. It is to these basic assumptions that we first direct our thought"

As Mr. Pottholf indicated in his review of the development which occurred since 1930, these "basic assumptions" have grown into levels of presuppositions, three of which have been subjected to rather extensive research. A rereading of his article will indicate the complexity involved in attempting to investigate critically the beliefs which we hold concerning God as conceptual object. In 1930, I used Occam's presupposition that explanatory principles should not be multiplied unnecessarily as a test of basic assumptions. It was some time later that I discovered that Occam's razor was itself an ontological assumption, and could not be used to test other ontological presuppositions and assumptions. This led to the development, about 1940, of an epistemological presupposition, The Presupposition of Increasing Cognitional Efficiency, in whose terms it appears possible to break out of the circle of ontological presuppositions. Until it was possible to do this, either skepticism or dogmatism appeared tobe the only outcome of the investigation.

Even after the research had been completed, tentatively, at the categorical and the conceptual level, there appeared still more work to be done. When one has conceptualized God, he has made possible a basis for productive relationships with God. At the same time, it became evident that no religious

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[illegible] colleague in the same medical institution; in another, as a companion in a social situation, in another the friend may become a surgeon who removes a diseased organ. In each of these relationships, some specific facet of the other person serves as a determinant of the person as a whole. I suggest that the same is true on our relationships with God. For purposes of analysis, I have called this "the Individual-Particular" level of the problem of God. It is at this level that God becomes functional in religious experience. The skill of the religious leader or technician becomes evident at this point. To what extent can he analyze the religious needs of the person or congregation before him so that he can present that phase of God's total nature which is relevant to the satisfaction of the specific need under consideration? To say; "God will take care of you," may be true, but it is no more designative of how this will be done than it would be for a physician to say to a patient "Medicine will cure you." It is not "medicine" per se that cures one. It is a specific medicine designed to cure a specific form of morbidity which is needed. In similar fashion, it is not God per se that one seeks in time of trouble, but it is God in precisely those phases of His total nature which bears upon the situation in hand that is needed.

It is at this point among others that Mr. Potthoff himself has been making a distinct contribution to religious thought. For some eighteen years, part of them as part-time professor, and the past two as full-time professor, he has been making God "real" to his students in The Iliff School of Theology. "Making God real" must not be interpreted in any purely emotional or sentimental sense, but in precise terms with reference to specific religious situations. This has been only a part of his task, but it has been and is a very important one which promises to bear fruit not only in a more effective ministry but also in mor efficient religious living on the part of the ministers themselves.[5]

It is at the Individual-Particular level, also, that Dr. J Edward Carothers has made a significant contribution. As pastor of several large and important churches in the East, he has continuously explored the avenues whereby religion could become a vital factor in the lives of the individuals who constituted his congregations. His discussion of the implications of a modern philosophy of religion which appeared in the last issue of this journal is indicative of his mental acumen and unerring insight into what is relevant and what is trivial. When the question of the transcendence or immanence of God is raised, he is not bothered by the fact that tradition or popular interest may favor one view or the other. He faces the question of truth and significance. If the evidence indicates that immanence is closer to the truth than transcendence, he accepts this and asks the next question: What religious significance has God as absolutely immanent within the Existential Medium for himself and his congregation? If you will turn to his article again, you will discover that he has viewed his conception of God in specific situations which have confronted him and his large congregation. He has not permitted differences of opinion, variation from traditional concepts, or the

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[illegible] "the individual-institutional level" [illegible] problem of [illegible] it is at this level [illegible] religious experience. The result [illegible] or [illegible] becomes [illegible] at this point. [illegible] can be said, as the religious leaders of the [illegible] [illegible] actions him so that he can proceed due place or [illegible] [illegible] religious [illegible] to the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] need under [illegible] "God will [illegible] you," may be true, but it is an [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] values. And that he knows how to apply it to the critical situations in life. Some phases of his thought have been developed in articles in The Illi[illegible] Review.[4]

III.

Turning now to another phase of my work during the last quarter century, I wish to commend Mr. Sermon M. Stanage for his clear analysis of my approach to ethics. His task was made quite difficult because I have thus far not published much in that area. He was compelled to draw heavily upon lecture notes. At the same time, he demonstrated his ability to get what was said in more or less informal class situations and to organize this with the published materials so as to provide a very good statement.

Thefield of Christian ethics has been a matter of real concern from my early introduction to it in Garrett Biblical Institute under Professor I. G. Whitchurch. The matter became acute when as a representative to the Student Volunteer Convention in Indianapolis in 1924, I faced critically the identification of pacifism with passivism. The passivistic approach to the matter seemed to me to be wholly unrealistic,a position I stated rather truculently in two articles in student publications at the time. At the suggestion of my good friend, Dr. Art[illegible] Nagler, I undertook an examination of John Wesley's pacifism while a student in one of his courses. As a result of that study I learned that Wesley was thoroughly pacifistic with reference to the protection of his own person, but that he supported the English in their prosecution of the Revolutionary War. Some very fine"hymns of hate" may be found in the collection written by the two Wesleys. Even then, I was convinced that man was essentially rational and good, basic beliefs of nineteenth century Idealistic ethics. Until Sept.1, 1939, I remained rather firmly rooted in that tradition. But the failure of the Munich Conference and Hitler's drive for power forced me to reconsider my estimate of man. I then became aware of the significance of power, namely, the capacity to control, in individual and group behavior. Some research convinced me that the possession of power has a corrosive effect upon man's ethical perceptions. This was, of course, a logical outcome of my earlier rejection of pacivism as a mode of life. It has led to the development, now in process, of an ethic of responsible power to which Mr. Stanage has called attention in his recent article.

As Mr. Stanage pointed out, ethical systems which deny the relevance of power have been developed by leaders of minority groups. The leaders of majority groups either learn how to use power responsibly or they are supplanted by those who do. The leaders of social institutions must recognize the fact that power is, and that it will be used either directly or as a threat, but in either case to control. WhenChristianity was a minority movement, itsleaders could neglect power, but it is not that in the modern world. If the Christian leaders of national states,

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are Christian, or to outline [illegible] but this is not enough. Man is responsible for himself and to God. He is also responsible for others, and in more than relative terms Power will be used, and it is the Christian's responsibility to see that it is used for good rather than for evil.

This ethical conception is related to the problem of the category for Diety discussed by Mr. Potthoff. If one adopts the Agathonic category, God is defined in terms of goodness, or the source of goodness. But this leaves the problem of power unresolved. The Dynamic Category views God as Dynamic Determinant and would thus appear to provide a better theological ground for the type of ethic of responsible power desperately needed today. To this problem of an Ethic of Responsible Power I hope to devote much of my free time in the years ahead. Given the limited amount of published materials, and relying quite heavily upon book-reviews and class -lectures, Mr. Stanage has presented an excellent analysis of this problem as it appears in my thinking at present. Mr. Stanage is now engaged in graduate work in the philosophy department of The University of Colorado. He has been interested in research in N. Hartmann's Ethics, and has published a Preliminary statement of his findings in The Iliff Review.[5]

IV.

Twofurther statements in the recent issue of this journal are left for final consideration. They are by President Harold F. Carr and Dr. Francis W. Brush. I am honored to count both among my friends, and they were more than generous in their tributes. I have Known President Carr from the time I arrived on the campus of Nebraska Wesleyan University where he was considered one of the finest and most generous of men. His experience as head of The Iliff School of Theology during the past years confirms in the minds of faculty and students alike that these traits are still his, and that they have grown through the years as he has. Dr. Brush has been professor of Philosophy in The University of Denver since 1945, and as proved himself to be an excellent teacher. He taught a course for me a year ago, and men who had the privilege of studing with him are unanimous in their reports that he is an excellent teacher who knows how to clarify ideas and make them vital. He is collaborating with me in a course in Metaphysics this quarter (Spring, 1954), and is deepening the impression we had of him previously.

There is a statement in his article which rather fascinated me. He wrote: "Having taken a course in philosophy of religion you find yourself stuck with a philosophy of life."[6] I am convinced that this is symptomatic of what has happened to scores of his students: They took a course in philsophy with him and found themselves stuck witha philosophy of life. Andthey are better women and men as a result. Perhaps I should take advantage of his discussion of my teaching methods to outline briefly what could possibly be called my philosophy of education. So far as my memory serves me, I have never attempted to formulate this

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VI

Concluding statements in the usual issue of this journal are left for final consideration. They are by President [illegible] Dr. Gore and Dr. Francis W. Brush. I am honored to count both among my friends, and they were here when previously in their [illegible]. I have known President Gore from the time I entered as the campus of Hobart's Hosleyan University where he was considered one of the finest and most generous of men. His conference as head of The Liff School of Theology during the past years continues in the minds of faculty and students alike that these traits are still his, and that they have grown through the years as he has. Dr. Brush has been professor of philosophy at the University of Denver since 1943, and as proved himself to be an excellent teacher. He taught a course for me a year ago, and men who had the privilege of studying with him are unanimous in their reports that he is an excellent teacher who knows how to clarify ideas and make them vital. He is collaborating with me in a course in Naturalistic this quarter (Spring, 1954), and is deepening the impression we had of him previously.

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My attempt to bring [illegible] together [illegible] social situation in what [illegible] "cro[illegible]" [illegible] The teacher in such a situation is primarily a catalytic agent. When subject and students do not fuse, it is his function to [illegible] action. So I have never involved myself in controversies [illegible] whether a curriculum should be "student-centered" or subject-centered." In all of the teaching in which I have been involved, [illegible] has been an attempt to see that students and subjects were properly introduced and some type of creative interaction resulted.

A second conviction which has characterized my teaching, at its best, may be stated as follows: Successful learning is a function of success in learning. Perhaps this is badly stated, but its significance will become clear if one considers levels of aspiration. It has been determined, experimentally, that rats fathom intricate mazes if they are started at rather simple or elementary levels. Having learned how to traverse a simple maze, their level of aspiration has been lifted, and they try more intricate mazes with good prospects of success. If, however, they are first presented with intricate mazes, and fail, they face even simpler mazes with less prospects of success.7

I learned this lesson as a youth. I did some gardening, and had a pony whom I valued highly despite the factthat he had a crippled leg. Hitched to a spring-wagon, he hauled me back and forth to and from the garden located in a hollow a mile from home. One day, after a heavy rain, I drove to the garden to bring home a load of corn and vegetables. Without considering the pony's strength, I piled all of the wet vegetables upon the wagon that it would hold. Then we started for home. The pony could pull the wagon on level ground, but the road included a hill, not high but very wet and muddy. The horse tried the hill, but soon found the load beyond his limited resources. Being young, I thought slappings with the reins would add strength to the pony. Presently, he gave up completely and would not even pull the empty wagon up the hill.

In some real sense, this experience has guided my teaching. Almost any student will learn, if he is given a fair opportunity to do so. If he is given tasks beyond him at first, his experience may parallel that of my pony. Given tasks within the range of his abilities, he increases his levels of educational aspiration. Under such circumstances, even mediocre students can make surprising progress in what is admittedly a highly technical field of study. I am sure that this conviction has been a major factor in whatever success I may have had over the years that I have been teaching. And I appreciate Dr. Brush's remarks since they provided me with this opportunity of presenting this much of my general philosophy of education.

Prentiss Cox, who served as my office assistant for more than a year, managed to find most of the materials I have published through the years. This has not been easy, since much that I have published appeared in numerous journals and reports. Since the issue of the Review devoted to my teaching was prepared without

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[illegible] spite that fact, he managed to get overseas. Earlier one reviewer long article on "A Preface to Theology," which appeared in Religion in Life, Vol 7, Summer, 1938, pp. 358-373. It contains an early analysis of the theological field in which are many ideas, notions that have been developed morefully since that time. The bibliography as a whole indicates the conditions under which I have done most of my research. I have never had an extended period of time to give to research and writing. Most of what I have written was done within limited time-periods, usually after having done a day's work in teaching or administration. Perhaps this is as good a way as any. It makes for the development of limited objectives, and for a return now and again to the same or similar problems. This provides the conditions for growth. I am sure that Mr. Cox's work in gathering to-gether this bibliography will be of real service to me whether of not it is of interest to others. And in fairness to him and to the others who contributed of their time to the production of the Winter 1954 issue of The Iliff Review, let me say that most if not all of them had to do this under the same type of conditions as I myself have worked through the years. My grateful thanks to all of them.

In conclusion, let me say that this is the first attempt I have made at "I-writing." I am not in favor of it as a general practice. Perhaps I can be forgiven this one offense in twenty-five years. Should I be about at the end of another quarter century, I may try it again. Who knows?

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3 Dr. Potthoff has published some of his materials in Colorado in several articles in The Iliff Review: "Some Comments on the Doctrine of Forgiveness," Vol. I, Winter, 1944, pp. 22-30; "Some Comments on the Doctrine of Sin," Vol. III, Spring, 1946, pp. 56-61; and "Theological Preaching in the Liberal Pulpit," Vol. II, Spring 1945, pp. 207-217.

4 " The Love of God in Absolute Immanence, Vol. II, Spring, 1945, pp. 202-206; "Motivation in Religion," Vol. IV, Fall, 1947, pp. 124-129; and "The Physical Consequences of Frustration," Vol. III, Fall, 1946, pp. 110-114.

5 "An Introduction to Harmann's Ethics," Vol. III, Fall, 1950, pp. 133 ff.

6 The Iliff Review, Vol. XI, Winter 1954, p.68.

7 Cf. Kurt Lewin and others, "Levels of Aspiration," in Hunt, (ed) Personality and the Behavior Disorders, (1944), Vol. I, pp. 333 ff.

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